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1  Introduction 
 
The geopolitical conditions which led to the creation of NATO in 1949 rapidly 
disappeared following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. According to neorealism, if 
alignment is formed because of threat, it will falter in the absence of a threat. Scholars 
like John Mearsheimer and Kenneth Waltz even predicted that without the Soviet 
threat, NATO would cease to be a durable alliance.1 The ending of the Cold War 
unlocked a period of profound soul-searching within the Alliance. The new conditions 
indeed led to an American rethinking of the US commitment to NATO, just as it led 
to a refocusing of priorities within European members of the Alliance. In May 1990, 
NATO’s Military Committee announced that it no longer considered the Warsaw Pact 
a threat to the Alliance. President George H.W. Bush then called for spending cuts 
which would eventually result in significant reductions in funding and force levels for 
NATO’s conventional and nuclear forces. He also proclaimed the emergence of a 
“New World Order”, suggesting that NATO was bereft of a strategic anchor. In 
addition, President Francois Mitterrand of France and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of 
Germany delivered a Franco-German statement on joint defence policies in late 1991, 
the provisions of which facilitated the formation of the Eurocorps on May 22, 1992.2 
This symbolic gesture was even interpreted by some observers as indicating that the 
two leaders hoped to replace NATO with a European defence “identity” as Europe’s 
primary security apparatus. 3  In short, the possibility of the termination of 
institutionalised US support for European security was seriously raised in this period, 
as was the possibility of NATO ceasing to exist. 
 
The survival of NATO 
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Following major debates about the appropriate direction for post-Cold War American 
internationalism, the administration of President Bill Clinton not only committed 
itself to the continuation of NATO, but also began to sponsor a major programme of 
NATO renewal and enlargement. After progressive transformation, NATO expanded 
rather than disbanded. It went on to participate in “out-of-area” action in Bosnia, 
Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya. It developed a set of more or less concerted doctrine 
regarding “new threats”, and broadened the function of NATO to include effective 
mechanisms for solving disputes and coordinating foreign and political policies 
instead of strictly focusing on military responses. 4  All these commitments were 
accompanied by major debates about the purpose and capabilities of NATO. Relevant 
debates included continuing tensions between Washington and European capitals over 
defence spending levels; accusations that the US was using NATO as an instrument of 
extra-United Nations unilateral power; especially the preference of Washington 
immediately after 9/11 for working through ad hoc rather than institutionalised 
alliance structures; and the developing relationship between NATO and Russia 
(particularly in the context of possible Georgian and Ukrainian membership of the 
organisation). However, NATO continued to exist and Washington remained formally 
committed to the defence of Europe. The recent history of the US commitment has 
been dominated by economic pressures, squabbles over NATO’s military 
performance in Afghanistan, and the apparent American preference for “leading from 
behind” in Libya. The current tensions within NATO were graphically expressed in 
retiring Defence Secretary Robert Gates’ June 2011 speech, “Reflections on the Status 
and Future of the Transatlantic Alliance”: 
In the past, I’ve worried openly about NATO turning into a two-tiered alliance, 
between members who specialise in “soft” humanitarian development, peacekeeping, 
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and talking tasks, and those conducting the “hard” combat missions…This is no 
longer a hypothetical worry. We are there today. And it is unacceptable.5 
But no matter how complicated the history of NATO debates has been, there 
was always a consensus on the fact that the US attitude was most crucial to the 
survival as well as continued existence of NATO. 
 
The US and NATO 
Looking back on the period since the end of the Cold War, Washington was more 
than once expected to support NATO dissolution: when the Soviet threat subsided; 
when US decision on bypassing NATO was announced after 9/11; when NATO 
demonstrated its incapability to assume the overall responsibility for all military 
operations in Afghanistan; when the US insistence on “leading from behind” in Libya 
became conspicuous. Nevertheless, by 2011 when the Libyan crisis subsided, NATO 
had remained for 20 of the most eventful and challenging years in the post-Cold War 
history, regardless of how frequently NATO was relegated to the very margins of 
debate. This interesting phenomenon raised a question: why did the US remain 
committed to NATO in the post-Cold War period?  
In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, Americans had high expectations 
of seeing the US scaling down its international commitments. They believed that there 
was no need to continue the institutionalised protection for European security, and 
that it was time to focus on domestic affairs. With respect to this domestic demand, 
why did the Clinton administration nonetheless choose the opposite course: to remain 
committed to NATO and to support NATO enlargement? Moreover, NATO not only 
expanded its membership, but also participated in “out-of-area” actions, which were 
regarded as “the most visible manifestation of NATO’s development in the post-Cold 
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War period”.6 Kosovo was basically a NATO operation, though 80 per cent of its 
tasks were completed by the US. Hence why did the US support the Kosovo mission 
to be accomplished under the framework of NATO? On the contrary, Afghanistan at 
first saw the US declining to work through NATO. Why did the Bush administration 
prefer an ad hoc coalition to the institutionalised alliance? If Afghanistan suggested a 
change of US attitude toward NATO, why would the Alliance be able to continue 
with second and third rounds of enlargement in 2004 and 2008 respectively? Anyway, 
since NATO had gone through more transformation and expansion after Afghanistan, 
there was a great hope for the Alliance to shoulder more responsibilities. Whereas 
when the Libyan crisis came along, the US was reluctant to intervene at the very 
beginning, not to mention to utilise NATO to conduct the mission immediately. Why 
did the US hesitate to initiate military actions against Libyan military targets, given 
that the US had always played a dominant role in carrying out operations? Although 
the US then joined its allies, it quickly transferred the Libyan mission to NATO and 
started “leading from behind”. Thus in terms of how the US anomalously behaved, 
did Libya imply a new “American way of war”? Furthermore, the contribution from 
other NATO members to the Libyan mission was still quite small: “less than half have 
participated, and fewer than a third have been willing to participate in the strike 
mission”.7 As a result, Libya pushed the “burden-sharing” debate to another climax. 
Would NATO remain useful to the US, given that task divisions between Washington 
and European capitals remained unequal?  
As the crisis in Syria deteriorated in the summer of 2013, the US not only 
hesitated to intervene, but was unprecedentedly uncertain about whether to resort to 
NATO, the highly controversial alignment that served as the main though sometimes 
inefficient mechanism to resolve conflicts in the past. The plan to wrest chemical 
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weapons from Syria offered Washington a buffer against tremendous pressure on 
intervention, but it could not assure that military action would be forever unlikely. If a 
missile strike on the Assad regime became the only option, would the Obama 
administration agree to conduct military operations under the framework of NATO, 
taking into account the increasing US consciousness about working with allies? 
Moreover, the Ukrainian crisis recently showed that NATO reverting to its original 
purpose: to contain Russia. Yet on the other hand, President Putin is believed to be 
testing what NATO can do. The irony is that even though the candidate of NATO is 
threatened, so far NATO has done very little. Hence as Ian Bond, the director of 
foreign policy at the Centre for European Reform said, Russia’s annexation of Crimea 
questions about the Alliance’s options and ability to act: “Putin has just given NATO 
something to do, but the question is whether NATO is up to it.”8 This again puts 
forward the question: will the US remain committed to NATO? If yes, what role 
should NATO play, a global alliance or an alliance with global partners? 
 
Organisation 
This book mainly seeks to explain the continuing US commitments to NATO in the 
post-Cold War era. The initial focus is on the recommitment decisions of the Clinton 
administration. It has also researched in some depth the operations in Kosovo, 
Afghanistan and, in particular, Libya. The case study on Libya is especially important 
in exploring the Obama administration’s understanding of the purpose of NATO in 
the context of current economic pressures, domestic US debates about post-War on 
Terror interventions, and of increasing American preoccupation with Pacific rather 
than European security. Libya is apparently one of this book’s contributions, as so far 
there has not been much work on the Libyan mission. James Mann, Francois 
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Heisbourg, Martin Indyk and Luca Tardelli all mention the Libyan operation in their 
work, but neither treats it as a detailed case study. In general, this research aims to 
contribute to the literature on the US commitment to NATO. The majority literature 
on the subject of NATO has been on European side, not American foreign policy side, 
so this book chooses to address the topic mainly from US foreign policy perspective. 
Specifically, the combination of realism and liberal internationalism serves as the 
overarching theoretical framework to explain US foreign policy as a whole, as 
historically, US decision-making on international intervention has been greatly 
influenced by the debate over the relationship between self-interest and universal 
values like democracy, freedom and human rights. Additionally Alliance Theory is 
applied to address why NATO has persisted after the Soviet threat subsided and why 
more powerful countries would like to cooperate with less powerful countries. On the 
micro level, this research adopts a “Foreign Policy Analysis” focus, with particular 
emphasis on intra-US administration bureaucratic politics. The “pulling and hauling” 
among players is vital to understand why the US pursues certain foreign policy, who 
might influence it, and how it is conceived. 
Chapter 1 outlines the purpose of NATO and historical background. It mainly 
focuses on the debate over the role, purpose and utility of the Alliance; the Clinton 
administration’s commitment to NATO expansion; and NATO’s “out-of-area” 
operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya. Chapter 2 outlines theoretical 
frameworks that are applied to the research. The introduction of theoretical 
frameworks contains Alliance Theory; the explanation of US foreign policy according 
to interaction between realism and liberal internationalism; and Foreign Policy 
Analysis, especially the Bureaucratic Politics Model. Alliance Theory is used to 
explain why NATO persists in the post-Cold War era, rather than disappearing due to 
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the lack of the Soviet threat. The latter two theoretical frameworks are both important 
to analyse how the US makes policy on NATO. To be specific, interaction between 
realism and liberal internationalism is useful to comprehend the traditional approach 
of US foreign policy-making at the macro level, while the Bureaucratic Politics 
Model provides a more detailed understanding of the decision-making process at the 
micro level.  
Chapter 3 introduces the debate over NATO’s persistence immediately after 
the end of the Cold War, focusing on the Clinton administration’s commitment to 
NATO expansion. Specifically, this chapter mainly analyses why, how and when 
NATO expanded in the post-Cold War era, and which countries could gain the 
membership of NATO in the first place. Chapters 4 addresses NATO’s engagement in 
Kosovo, which demonstrated the strength of the Alliance deriving from its 
institutional structure while underlining intra-alignment disputes about the capabilities 
and relevance of NATO. The Kosovo mission was chosen as a case study, for it was 
the first test of a newly transformed NATO immediately after the end of the Cold War. 
Chapter 5 firstly discusses NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan, focusing on why the 
Bush administration decided to bypass NATO and choose an ad hoc coalition to 
implement the campaign, and why it then decided to utilise NATO to deal with 
reconstruction issues. It then analyses the evolving concepts of NATO since the 
Kosovo operation.  
Chapters 6 and 7 provide an overview of the Libyan operation, concentrating 
on why the US was reluctant to intervene in Libya at the very beginning, why it 
changed its mind to join the operation later, and why it decided to transfer the Libyan 
mission to NATO and adopted the strategy of “leading from behind”. The final 
chapter discusses the contemporary debate over the US commitment to NATO in the 
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context of the growing burden-sharing problems within the Alliance, unambiguous 
US policy of “Pivot to Asia”, the potential US decision on bypassing NATO to 
resolve the crisis of Syria, and the possible utilisation of NATO to contain Russia in 
the case of Ukraine. 
 9 
 
2  The Purpose of the Transatlantic Community 
 
 
The debate over the purpose of NATO 
It is now 65 years since the creation of NATO, leading to a political and military 
alliance that has been committed to safeguarding the freedom and security of its 
members. However, throughout the history of the Alliance, NATO has more than 
once been forecast to disappear. 25 years ago when the Soviet threat subsided 
following the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO was about to cease to exist, as there was 
no longer a common threat to its member states. Kenneth Waltz was among the first 
to predict the Alliance’s imminent demise in the absence of an overriding security 
threat. 1  He got support from those who called for the US to scale down its 
international commitment after the end of the Cold War. But the Clinton 
administration soon committed itself to the continuation of NATO, bringing the 
transformation of NATO on to the agenda. 2  The Alliance, according to James 
Goldgeier, then faced a daunting task: “how to reach out to former members of the 
Warsaw Treaty Organisation and help them integrate into the prosperous and peaceful 
Western order”.3 In Not Whether But When, Goldgeier focused on how the Clinton 
administration actually developed NATO enlargement into American policy rather 
than simply introducing proponents and opponents’ arguments about NATO 
expansion. The major feature of this book refers to the analysis of the inner workings 
of the foreign policy bureaucracy. With regard to this, Philip Zelikow comments that 
Goldgeier tends to treat midlevel bureaucrats as the heroes in the story, which 
inappropriately shifts the focus from international politics to American interagency 
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arguments. It was true that once Clinton was committed, there were few ways the 
initiative could go wrong, yet the interaction among different branches of government 
was the key to making NATO expansion a priority for the President.  
If Goldgeier gives the picture of NATO enlargement from the perspective of 
an “outsider”; Ronald Asmus analyses the process as a real “insider”, as he was a 
principal aide to Madeleine Albright and Strobe Talbott during the Clinton 
administration. In his Opening NATO’s Door, Asmus focused on the fierce divisions 
within the administration about how to reconcile the wish of the Eastern European 
countries to be part of a reunited Europe.4 In terms of NATO’s new role, Asmus 
emphasises the cautions of allies and the changes of mood in Russia. Although he 
writes about NATO’s “out-of-area” operations in Yugoslavia, Asmus, according to 
Stanley Hoffmann, does not mention much about how the Alliance was internally 
divided over the Kosovo campaign. Actually since the adoption of the 1991 “New 
Strategic Concept”, NATO began to go “out-of-area” to prevent crises from escalating 
in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya. The Kosovo mission was regarded as the first test 
of a newly transformed NATO immediately after the end of the Cold War, which 
dispelled the rumour that the US was going to abandon the Alliance, whereas scholars 
like John R. Deni, James Sperling, Mark Webber, Derek Chollet, James Goldgeier 
and Sean Kay argue that NATO in fact proved ill-equipped to operate in the case of 
Kosovo, given many of the frictions among NATO members highly decreased the US 
operational freedom and flexibility as well as the efficacy of the Alliance as a whole.5 
The Kosovo operation therefore led to a debate over the relevance of NATO, which 
indirectly encouraged the Bush administration to bypass NATO after 9/11. 6  The 
Alliance was once again being brought to the edge of breakup.  
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Ellen Hallams examines US attitudes to NATO following 9/11 in The United 
States and NATO since 9/11: The Transatlantic Alliance Renewed.7 She believes that, 
although the Bush administration understood that alliance unity was precarious at 
times, they recognised there were core benefits to be gained from utilising the 
institutional structures and military capabilities of NATO. As the Alliance has made 
incomparable contributions to post-combat reconstruction and stabilisation operations 
in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the US should remain committed to NATO. The work 
also systematically introduces NATO transformation from the 1991 Rome Summit to 
the 2002 Prague Summit, concluding that the US is the very engine driving NATO 
forward, and it will remain committed to the Alliance as long as European allies 
change to share more responsibilities. As her focus is on the US attitude to NATO, 
Hallams does not go further to discuss the transatlantic interactions in detail, not to 
mention to address the question of how the relationship between the US and its 
NATO allies should develop. Jussi Hanhimaki, Benedikt Schoenborn and Barbara 
Zanchetta fill this gap by paying more attention to how the transatlantic relations were 
created, extended, and multiplied ever since the defeat of Nazi Germany. 8  Their 
Transatlantic Relations Since 1945, together with Hallams’ book, give insights into 
the future of NATO especially after the launch of the controversial US-led “War on 
Terror”.  
9/11 marked the advent of a new era in terms of new security challenges. The 
legacy of the Bush administration made the questions difficult but vital about whether 
the Obama administration has been able to issue appropriate foreign policies to 
counter potential threats and to make changes for the better in US relations with the 
wider world. Martin Indyk, Kenneth Liberthal and Michael O’Hanlon pay attention to 
how President Obama chose reasonable foreign policies and whether he is able to 
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change the climate of Washington that was previously influenced by Bush’s 
unilateralist militarism.9 Robert Singh is interested in the same topic. In his Barack 
Obama’s Post-American Foreign Policy, Singh argues that Obama’s approach of 
“strategic engagement” was appropriate for a new era of constrained internationalism, 
though it has yielded modest results.  
More importantly, 9/11 also provoked a new round of debate over the purpose 
of NATO. NATO Beyond 9/11 comprehensively explores the significance of 9/11 for 
the transformation of the Alliance over the last decade. 10  The authors aim to 
understand whether 9/11 represents a major transformative event for NATO that has 
long been grappled with the implications of the end of the Cold War. As the 
continuation of Hallams and Hanhimaki et al.’s story, this work adds examination of 
more recent topics including NATO’s poor performance in Afghanistan, the Libyan 
mission, global partnership, burden-sharing mechanisms, and the Russian threat.11 
Erwan Lagadec also provides an overview of what happened to transatlantic relations 
in the early 21st century, but concentrating more on whether the US still remains as an 
“indispensible” and “intolerable” nation in Europe.12 On the other hand, instead of 
talking about the general transatlantic interactions, Bob Woodward narrows his view 
down on the “Obama’s wars”, questioning whether a president’s advisers and 
decision-making process are responsive to his conception of strategy.13 This work is 
accused of focusing too narrowly on the inside Washington game. But according to 
most scholars who study US policy-making, the first and foremost factor they should 
always consider is internal interactions among different bureaucrats. With regard to 
this, Robert Gates’ memoir Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary of War is a valuable source, 
as it provides more details about the Obama administration’s growing frustration with 
US policy on Afghanistan.14 David Auerswald and Stephen Saideman also see the 
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Afghan war through the lens of bureaucratic politics, yet expand the scope to include 
other participating countries in addition to the US. After conducting more than 250 
interviews with senior officials, they find that domestic constraints in presidential and 
parliamentary systems place great influence on decision-making. 15  If Woodward 
offers a remarkable early glimpse of Obama’s wars, James Mann picks up the banner 
and carries it a step further toward the most recent Obama’s war: Libya.16   
Early in 2011, the Libyan crisis escalated, proposing another test for NATO 
that has undergone further transformation since the 2010 Lisbon Summit. The US has 
always played a dominant role in carrying out international interventions in regional 
conflicts, but in the case of Libya, the US apparently hesitated to unfold military 
operations against Libyan military targets. It seems to be the first time that the US 
followed rather than led its European allies to a campaign. Although the US 
eventually decided to participate, it announced the decision to transfer the Libyan 
mission to NATO immediately after the campaign. To understand why the US 
preferred “leading from behind” in Libya, James Mann analyses the events, ideas, 
personalities and conflicts that have defined Obama’s foreign policy. The Obamians 
mainly adopted the same approach as Woodward, telling the compelling story of 
internal conflicts among those who could either directly or indirectly shape the policy-
making of the Obama administration including the President, Robert Gates, Hillary 
Clinton and Joseph Biden. Libya was seen as an important case to discover as well as 
predict the Alliance evolution because it again revealed the inherent problem between 
the US and its European allies within NATO. With the US withdrawing from 
Afghanistan and reducing its role in the Alliance, Francois Heisbourg et al. argue in 
All Alone? What US Retrenchment Means for Europe and NATO that the Alliance 
will not be able to continue unless the Europeans begin to assume more military 
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responsibility.17 Graeme Herd and John Kriendler further discuss the existing strategic 
debates over the direction and scope of NATO’s potential evolution.18 Specifically, 
they assess the Alliance’s role, purpose and utility in the context of a US strategic 
pivot in a “Pacific Century”.19 This work comes to a similar conclusion that NATO 
needs more transformation in order to adapt to the changing global security 
environment that is characterised by the proliferation of ballistic missiles, nuclear 
weapons and WMDs, terrorism, cyber attacks and fundamental environmental 
problems.  
The debates over the purpose of NATO have never stopped since the end of 
the Cold War. Many scholars have addressed NATO’s “out-of-area” operations 
especially in Kosovo and Afghanistan, the legacy of which acknowledges US 
commitment to NATO on one hand, and underlines the urgency of NATO 
transformation on the other. Yet so far, not much literature has focused on the 
implication of the Libyan war to NATO, making it hard to conclude whether the US 
will remain committed to NATO in the future. Therefore this book aims to complete 
the whole story of US attitudes to NATO in the post-Cold War era by analysing in 
some depth the operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan and in particular Libya, hoping to 
make some contributions to the literature on US commitment to the transatlantic 
alliance.      
 
Historical background 
The vast Pacific and Atlantic Oceans serve as natural barriers that posit a separation 
between the American scene and the infectious strife of the European “quarter of the 
globe”, resulting in a foreign policy of non-entanglement that had ever dominated 
America for a century. To speak of America as a political given and as a space whose 
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contours were beyond question was not rhetoric until Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on 
December 7, 1941, which “broke this emotional deadlock” by forcing the US to 
engage in world affairs, especially in the whirl of European affairs.20  
American non-entanglement was soon replaced by American internationalism, 
starting to march towards “universal mission” and “exceptional superiority”. 21 
However, the desire to promote American-style democracy was soon discouraged by 
the ambitious Soviet expansion, which caused severe panic among Western European 
countries. Hence in order to secure a “Democratic Bridgehead”, namely Western 
Europe, from being occupied by Communism once and for all, America decided to 
promote a transatlantic bloc that could ensure a more effective response to the Soviet 
threat.22 The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was initially an intergovernmental 
military alliance built upon the North Atlantic Treaty, which was signed in 
Washington D. C. on April 4, 1949. The creation of NATO explicitly demonstrated 
the importance of US participation both in countering the military power of the Soviet 
Union and in preventing the revival of nationalist militarism. As a result, during the 
Cold War America was fully committed to NATO as a platform to provide both 
legitimacy and resources for necessary actions against the Soviet Union and the 
Warsaw Pact military alliance. 
 
NATO during the Cold War 
To a certain extent, the Cold War was a “war” between two camps: the US-led 
NATO and the Soviet Union-led Warsaw Pact. According to Lord Ismay, the first 
NATO Secretary General, the Alliance’s goal was “to keep the Russians out, the 
Americans in, and the Germans down”.23 Thereby whether NATO was an efficient 
organisation during the Cold War depended on whether NATO had achieved this goal. 
The Purpose of the Transatlantic Community 
16 
 
First of all, it was apparent that NATO helped drag the US into European affairs. By 
working under the framework of NATO, Washington and European capitals were 
bonded together to fight against their common enemy. Hence, the US commitment to 
NATO not only marked the end of US anti-entangling alliances tradition, but also 
enabled the US to use force when confronted with the Soviet threat. In addition to 
keeping the Russians out, NATO also succeed to paraphrase Lord Ismay in keeping 
the Germans down during the Cold War. On one hand, Germany’s strength had 
already been highly reduced due to the division of its territory after the end of WWII. 
On the other, European members of NATO enjoyed increasing protections from the 
US and the Alliance. All these changes made Germany’s rivalry with other European 
countries very unlikely. Therefore, Germany’s chancellor Helmut Kohl took the 
initiative and negotiated Soviet consent to the reunification of Germany. Kohl assured 
anxious allies in Washington, London and Paris by agreeing that Germany would be 
reunified within the US-led NATO, and that Germany would support further 
centralisation of the European Union. 24  The reunification of Germany within the 
Alliance further contributed to keep the US in and Germany down.25 
NATO was basically a US-led defensive organisation during the Cold War. 
Although the Alliance demonstrated its strength in dealing with the Soviet threat and 
the German problem, it also revealed tensions among member states. West Germany 
was apparently pro-NATO, because it saw its accession to NATO as “an important 
step in the country’s post-war rehabilitation and paved the way for Germany to play a 
substantial role in the defence of Western Europe during the Cold War”.26 Most of 
Germany’s neighbours appreciated NATO as insurance against German ambitions.27 
Britain also welcomed the establishment of NATO in that the Alliance helped tie 
Britain more closely with the US. France, quite the opposite; voiced its criticism of 
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the US domination of the Alliance. French President Charles de Gaulle regarded 
NATO as a special relationship between the US and Britain, and called for a creation 
of a tripartite directorate that would put Paris on an equal footing with Washington 
and London.28 After receiving negative response from both the US and Britain, de 
Gaulle started withdrawing French armed forces from NATO command; banning the 
stationing of foreign nuclear weapons on French soil; and constructing an independent 
defence for France.29 In short, throughout the Cold War, France, however, remained a 
member of NATO, prepared to fight against possible Communist attack with its own 
forces stationed in West Germany.  
It is no wonder NATO’s unity was breached due to the French withdrawal 
from NATO’s military command structure. Many NATO member states expressed 
surprise over the French action. In the US, surprise was also mixed with dismay and 
anger, given that de Gaulle’s plan had forced Washington to transfer military aircraft 
out of France and return control of the air force bases to France. Some of President 
John Kennedy’s advisors strongly condemned de Gaulle for his abandonment of 
French military commitment to NATO, which would threaten the security of other 
European allies. Further, what the US worried about more was that de Gaulle’s action 
might set a disturbing precedent.30 Although US fears were proved unrealistic because 
no other member state followed France’s step, French “defection” indeed unveiled 
tensions within NATO.   
What was worse, the US domestic debate disclosed US concern about its own 
commitment to NATO in view of the burden-sharing problem. Specifically the debate 
focused on the fact that there remained many free–riders in the Alliance relying on US 
protection while reducing their own defence budget. As a result, the late 1960s and 
early 1970s saw a series of attempts by Senator Michael Mansfield, the majority 
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leader in the Senate, to introduce identical Senate Resolutions on the issue of cutting 
the US deployment on the European continent. According to Mansfield, reducing US 
troops would give the Europeans an incentive to raise the forces necessary for their 
defence, thereby to assume more responsibility and share more burdens in the 
Alliance.31 Particularly, Mansfield called for the number of US troops stationed in 
Europe to be halved in 1971. However, his proposal was rejected due to “tremendous 
pressure from the Nixon White House and zealous NATO supporters in the foreign 
policy community”.32 Although Mansfield failed in attempt to achieve the reduction 
of US troops overseas, his Amendment threw light on the various determinants of US 
policy towards Europe. 
The US warning that Washington would pull its troops out of Europe never 
seemed to work well. Former Under Secretary of Defence Robert Komer candidly 
confirmed the reason why America’s burden-sharing admonitions invariably failed 
was because “The Europeans know that we need them as much as they need us”.33 
Therefore throughout the Cold War the US had struggled for a change in the burden-
sharing dynamic. However, little improvement took place. This burden-sharing 
problem combined with other tensions within the Alliance, highly influenced US 
policy on NATO in the post-Cold War period. The problems of NATO, which had 
been discovered during the Cold War, persisted in the post-Cold War period. That 
was why it was necessary to review those tensions in order to find better solutions in 
the post-Cold War era. Despite those long-standing challenges, what needed to be 
addressed immediately after the end of the Cold War was: indeed, what was the 
ongoing role of NATO if the major threat no longer existed yet the burden-sharing 
problem still existed?  
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NATO expansion  
Although it was widely predicted that NATO would dissolve as the Soviet Union 
disintegrated, the Clinton administration was dedicated to supporting NATO renewal 
and enlargement. Yet, NATO expansion was not put on the agenda as soon as the 
Soviet Union collapsed, because officials both in the State Department and the 
Pentagon worried that enlargement would make management of the Alliance more 
difficult and would damage US-Russian relations. The US domestic debate over 
whether to increase or scale down international commitments also peaked, hindering 
further discussion about a more ambitious NATO. Simultaneously, European 
countries began to pursue an independent defence policy, though they had been 
accustomed to US protection throughout the Cold War.  
The disadvantageous situation faced by NATO soon improved. President 
Clinton wished to enhance America’s national security through enlarging the 
community of democratic, market-oriented states. Moreover both Republicans and 
ethnic communities within the US urged the Clinton administration to demonstrate 
US leadership rather than pleasing Russia blindly. It soon became obvious that 
expanding NATO would help the US maintain involvement in Europe, especially in 
filling the strategic vacuum in Central Europe.34 On the other hand, after undertaking 
a series of attempts including the failure of European efforts to resolve the crisis 
through the European Community in Bosnia, Europe finally acknowledged the 
importance of US leadership in dealing with European security issues. Most 
importantly, the fact that the Bosnia crisis was eased through the reassertion of 
NATO’s primacy reinforced Central and Eastern European countries’ faith that their 
safety could only be secured with and through the Alliance. Leaders of Central and 
Eastern Europe more than once expressed their willingness to join NATO, appealing 
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to erase the line drawn for them in 1945. With multilateral efforts the US finally 
announced the invitation to Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic at Madrid in July 
1997. The first round of NATO expansion became a watershed in the history of 
NATO, as the capabilities and relevance of NATO were visibly reaffirmed.  
 
“Out-of-area” missions: Bosnia and Kosovo 
Another great breakthrough which NATO obtained in the post-Cold War period was 
that it began to participate in non-Article Five missions, the authorisation of which 
was based on the “New Strategic Concept” released at the Rome Summit in 1991. 
Bosnia put forward the first challenge to NATO after the end of the Cold War. As the 
crisis of Bosnia unfolded, leading policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic agreed 
that it was a “European project” that Europe alone should handle. The US was happy 
to see Europe take the initiative on Bosnia, as conflict in the Balkans was not one 
which US policymakers wished to embroil the US in. On the other hand, European 
leaders regarded the conflict as an opportunity to show that they were able to resolve 
European security problems without having to rely on the US for help. However such 
claims that Europe could best deal with the implosion of Yugoslavia proved hollow. 
The failure of the European Community implied that NATO was still the only viable 
mechanism for implementing military operations and that NATO was to continue to 
be the primary vehicle for American involvement in Europe. Hence when Kosovo 
came along, it was expected that the US would irrevocably affirm its commitment to 
NATO because success for NATO in Kosovo would help consolidate US leadership 
in Europe and further unify the alliance. 
The lesson of Bosnia apparently suggested that if NATO were to succeed in 
Kosovo, it would require US leadership and capabilities. However, the US was 
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actually reluctant to get involved. US concerns were mainly related to the 
fundamental need to avert a humanitarian catastrophe, which determined both 
whether and when NATO would intervene. The Pentagon, unsupportive of Clinton’s 
liberal internationalist aims, hesitated to see US forces embroiled in a humanitarian 
crisis of only peripheral strategic interest. But on the other hand, considering that US 
leadership and NATO’s credibility had already been at stake in Bosnia due to its 
failure to intervene earlier, the US could not afford to repeat the mistake it had made 
in Bosnia. To this end, Operation Allied Force (OAF), a 78-day campaign, finally 
commenced on May 24, 1999, though without specific UN authorisation except 
previous UN resolutions that had called for “full and prompt implementation of the 
agreements Milosevic had signed with the OSCE and NATO”.35 According to one 
RAND study, OAF was “the most intense and sustained military operation to have 
been conducted in Europe since the end of the World War II”.36 In other words, OAF 
was an overwhelming success, demonstrating NATO’s both “unwavering political 
cohesion and (the) unmatched military capability that will be required to meet the 
security challenges of the 21st century”.37 Meanwhile, Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary 
General, firstly reflected on the dilemma of humanitarian intervention in 1999, 
appealing to the international community to take the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) 
if a country was unwilling or unable to protect its people from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.38 The adoption of this emerging norm 
gave all states a responsibility to uphold and protect basic human rights regardless of 
where they were violated, legally authorising the international community including 
NATO to play a pivotal role in preventing humanitarian conflicts in the future.39      
On a military level, NATO, led by the US, succeeded in achieving its military 
objectives in both Bosnia and Kosovo, but on a political level, it also revealed 
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significant weakness in that the inability to reach consensus within the Alliance could 
impede timely and effective actions. NATO’s institutional structure proved a double-
edged sword: while providing a certain legitimacy and credibility, it also decreased 
military effectiveness due to the consensus engine. In the meantime, key NATO allies 
complained that the US was seeking to turn NATO into a “global policeman” based 
on their perception that the US was keen to see NATO engage well beyond its borders, 
particularly in the Persian Gulf and Middle East. Overshadowed by deficiencies in 
alliance strategy, NATO’s capability and credibility faced reassessment within the US, 
soon leading to a momentous US decision to bypass NATO when terrorists caused the 
deaths of over 3000 innocent lives on September 11, 2001.   
 
“Out-of-Europe” mission: the “War on Terror” after 9/11 
The attack of 9/11 “did not merely produce a shift in NATO’s deployments but 
reversed the founding rationale of the Alliance”. America came to regard NATO as a 
channel to “export” European capabilities out-of-area so as to impel global US goals 
in the “War on Terror” rather than continuing to “import” an American security 
guarantee into the European theatre as it did during the Cold War. Such a revolution 
caused unrest among allies as European countries unconvinced by the doctrinal 
underpinnings of the global “War on Terror” noticing that they “had to live with the 
unrecognisable implications of US hegemony”.40  
Most challenging of all, the nature of post-9/11 threats again raised poisonous 
question about NATO’s viability. Collective security formalised as well as enhanced 
by Article Five had been self-evident when NATO had encountered the Warsaw Pact 
across the Iron Curtain, whereas the paradigm was more or less undermined after 9/11 
because terrorist strikes would influence countries individually and an ally could 
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ensure its own safety by claiming the divisibility of alliance security. Before 1989, 
NATO members could identify where the threat on the Alliance would come from, 
while after 9/11 the geography of confrontation was revolutionised. The front line was 
everywhere especially in terms of cyber and biological terrorist attacks. As Ellen 
Hallams emphasised, “9/11 heralded the dawn of a new—and infinitely more 
dangerous—era in the international security environment”.41 Emerging threats, those 
defined as “form of attack against which the United States has no defences”, 
eventually altered the implications of the American dominance: though Washington’s 
sway over NATO had not been problematic when members altogether encountered 
with the Soviet threat, it became controversial due to the increasing influence 
America placed on the homeland security policies of European countries.42 The global 
“War on Terror” resulted in restrictions on American deployments through NATO, as 
any intervention led by Washington would be perceived as “an intolerable expression 
of American imperialism”.43  
Four weeks after 9/11, the US announced a massive military intervention in 
Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The irony of the ad hoc coalition 
was that out of a coalition consisting of 69 nations, only 21 made military 
contributions to OEF; and of those 21 nations, 14 were NATO members. In this sense, 
OEF demonstrated the inherent difficulties in maintaining loose coalitions, and 
NATO with its core strength of institutional structure would better accomplish the 
mission. Therefore, since August 2003, NATO has had a substantial military presence 
in Afghanistan, and in September 2006, it assumed the overall responsibility for all 
military operations. NATO continued to exist and Washington remained formally 
committed to the defence of Europe, dispelling the rumours that NATO could hardly 
persist in the context of new insidious and shapeless challenges following 9/11.  
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Although transformation had been on NATO’s agenda since the end of the 
Cold War, NATO missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan showed that the capability and 
interoperability of the Alliance required further improvement. In 2002, a set of 
reforms designed to “improve and develop new military capabilities for modern 
warfare in a high threat environment” was passed at the Prague Summit, enabling 
NATO to thrive in safeguarding member states’ interests and values according to 
revised strategic concept and at the same time underscoring that the US was still the 
very engine driving NATO forward rather than “losing interest in NATO”. 44 
Subsequent years witnessed NATO remaining a successful alignment to preserve the 
Alliance, but the war in Afghanistan and the “near-death experience” of the Iraq crisis 
put forward many new challenges, especially the tensions among NATO members, to 
be resolved. The 2006 Riga Summit set its goal of healing rifts, one about the military 
contributions to the war in Afghanistan, and the other concerning whether NATO 
should assume a more global role.45 The great achievement of the 19th NATO Summit 
was the Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG), which reaffirmed collective 
defence as the core purpose of NATO, whilst simultaneously emphasising the 
potential of NATO’s contributions to conflict prevention and crisis management.46 
Although some scholars continued to argue that the elucidation of NATO’s grand 
strategy remained too controversial, it was obvious that “the debate was no longer 
whether NATO would take the lead role in post-9/11 combat operations, but simply 
what role, if any, it would play”.47    
 
A new model: the Libyan Model?    
By the time Libya imploded in 2011, the US had already learned enough from both 
Bosnia and Kosovo that quicker response would result in fewer deaths of innocent 
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civilians. The US decided to join its European allies to tackle the Gaddafi regime, 
even though there was no direct, first-order US interests at stake in Libya. Meanwhile, 
the lesson of Afghanistan vividly implied that working through the institutional 
structure of NATO early on was crucial to guarantee a far more advantageous position 
when confronting enemies. With regard to this, immediately after the initial air 
campaign, the US announced the transfer of the Libyan mission to NATO and started 
“leading from behind”. Libya was hailed as a great success in the history of 
humanitarian intervention: the United Nations identified the severity of the crisis at 
the earliest time and legally authorised the use of military force through the UN 
Security Council Resolution 1973; France and Britain took the lead to wage war 
against Gaddafi immediately when the conflict escalated, even without the US 
participation; President Obama finally based intervention in Libya on the doctrine of 
the “Responsibility to Protect”, after ending a heated debate over “another Rwanda or 
another Afghanistan?” within the administration, and provided indispensible support 
to guarantee a victory.  
What was more, attention was also paid to codifying a “Libyan Model” that 
could be applied to future crisis management. But the fact that tensions within NATO 
revealed by the low rate of member contribution obviously overshadowed the Libyan 
mission as a successful NATO operation. The concern was graphically expressed in 
retiring Defence Secretary Robert Gates’ June 2011 speech, “Reflections on the Status 
and Future of the Transatlantic Alliance”—“In the past, I’ve worried openly about 
NATO turning into a two-tiered alliance…Between those willing and able to pay the 
price and bear the burdens of alliance commitments, and those who enjoy the benefits 
of NATO membership—be they security guarantees or headquarters billets—but 
don’t want to share the risks and the costs. This is no longer a hypothetical worry. We 
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are there today. And it is unacceptable.”48 By reemphasising the internal disharmony 
of NATO, the question of whether the US still viewed NATO as the main 
transatlantic forum for discussing political issues and resolving crises was again 
placed under the spotlight.  
The US has driven NATO’s transformation process since the end of the Cold 
War when the Clinton administration provided determined support for expansion and 
helped ensure US leadership in NATO’s Balkans missions. And although previously 
President Bush decided to bypass the Alliance, leaving many in Europe feeling 
abandoned and rejected by the US, he, particularly in his second term, showed 
determination to equip NATO with the necessary capabilities to deal with threats 
posed by international terrorism. Thus when President Obama took office, it was 
widely expected that he would follow his predecessors’ steps to better use NATO’s 
capabilities to create alliance missions that were sustainable and expeditionary. The 
anticipation turned out to be true, given that the US announced the transfer of the 
Libyan mission to NATO, which enhanced the relevance of the Alliance. But on the 
other hand, throughout the transformation process of NATO in the post-Cold War 
period, a hard reality was repeatedly reflected in those “out-of-area” missions that the 
Europeans simply lacked the necessary capabilities to make the kinds of contributions 
that the US required.  
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3  A New Framework: Two Levels of Analysis  
 
Generally speaking, this book utilises three theoretical frameworks to analyse the US 
commitment to NATO in the post-Cold War period: Alliance Theory; the 
combination of realism and liberal internationalism to explain the overall US foreign 
policy preference; and the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) especially the Bureaucratic 
Politics Model. Alliance Theory helps address key questions regarding why NATO 
was formed and especially why NATO persisted without the Soviet threat. To 
understand the decision-making of US policy on NATO, the book pays attention to 
two levels of analysis. Specifically, the combination of realism and liberal 
internationalism serves as the overarching framework on the top level, while the FPA 
especially the Bureaucratic Politics Model is used to analyse US foreign policy at the 
micro level, namely the foreign policy decision-making in the government. 
Traditionally, interaction between realism and liberal internationalism has great 
influence on US foreign policy, hence to understand US decision-making on a given 
issue, it is necessary to figure out whether it is the realist, or the liberal internationalist, 
or a combined approach that leads to the US final decision. But this only provides a 
broad picture of possible directions for US foreign policy, it is not enough to 
understand why and how a particular policy is made. That is why the book applies the 
FPA to the analysis, as the bureaucratic wrangling gives an insight into concrete steps 
toward final decision-making. The nature of the governmental decision-making 
process suggests that every policy is a result of bargaining among the major players. 
As a result, “pulling and hauling” among participants plays a vital role in 
understanding why the US pursues certain foreign policy, who might influence it, and 
how it is conceived.  
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Alliance Theory 
 
Neorealist Theory and Alliances 
Traditionally, literature on alliances has focused on two key questions: Why do states 
form alliances? What makes alliances durable? Those two questions are actually 
strongly associated with each other, as without the understanding of what factors hold 
alliance members together, it would be impossible to know what changes that make 
alliances either break up or continue. Hence although this research aims to examine 
NATO in the post-Cold War period, which is basically about NATO’s persistence, it 
should not ignore the explanation of NATO’s formation, given that it is the premise of 
systematically analysing NATO as an alliance and that it will shed light on the 
interpretation of NATO’s continuance.  
A number of works have examined the origins of alliance, and almost all 
traditional works fall within the broad compass of either “balance of power” or 
“balance of threat” theory. Hans Morgenthau argued in his Politics among Nations 
that alliances “are a necessary function of the balance of power operating in a multiple 
state system”.1 Kenneth Waltz, founder of neorealism, argued when balance-of-power 
politics prevailed, two options would be available for those who wished to survive, 
namely internal balancing and external balancing. The former referred to internal 
efforts to increase economic, strategic and military strengths; while the latter 
recommended states to increase security by forming alliances. 2  Paul Schroeder 
supplemented Waltz’s view on alliance formation from a perspective of threat, 
suggesting that alliance was formed either to oppose a threat, or to accommodate a 
threat, or to provide the great powers with a “tool of management” over weaker 
A New Framework: Two Levels of Analysis 
29 
 
states.3 George Liska also agreed that “alliances are against, and only derivatively for, 
someone or something”.4 Glenn Snyder further clarified that the “general incentive” 
to ally with some other states referred to the need to enhance its security and 
preservation of a balance of power.5  Among the traditional literature were many 
accounts of individual alliances, hence the lack of systematic tests of general 
hypotheses reduced the universal applicability of those approaches. For example, case 
studies on individual alliances could tell neither how states would behave in different 
circumstances nor which motives for alignment were most common.  
Stephen Walt, after recognising these challenges, developed the “balance of 
threat” theory. He firstly identified the alliance formation as a response to threat, then 
emphasised that four factors including aggregate power, geographic proximity, 
offensive power and aggressive intentions, would affect the level of threat that states 
might pose.6 Although Walt tried to distinguish states behaviours between balancing 
and bandwagoning7, he concluded that balancing behaviour was much more common 
than bandwagoning simply because no statesman could be completely sure of what 
another would do.8 Therefore balancing beliefs was a recurring theme throughout the 
Cold War, implying that “states facing an external threat will align with others to 
oppose the states posing the threat”. Furthermore, according to Walt, the greater the 
threatening state’s aggregate power, offensive capabilities and aggressive intentions 
were, the greater the tendency for those nearby to align against it.9 Put simply, the 
greater the threatening power to be balanced, the greater the cohesion of the alliance 
against it. This was in line with Snyder’s prediction that during the Cold War period, 
which was recognised as an era of bipolar world, abandonment was highly unlikely 
because the superpowers were solidly committed by their strong interests to defend 
their allies and keep them within the alliance.10 In general, both “balance of power” 
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and “balance of threat” theories predicted that states would act to restore the disrupted 
balance by creating alliances when confronted by dangerous threats.11  
This was exactly what happened during the Cold War period when NATO was 
built up to balance the USSR. Intimidated by the threat of the USSR, 12 countries 
including the US, Canada, Portugal, Italy, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, France and the UK signed the North Atlantic Treaty in 
Washington D. C. on April 4, 1949. Ever since its formation, NATO has served as a 
tool to balance against the most serious threat to its member states. In response, the 
USSR formed the Warsaw Treaty Pact with its allies in 1955, replacing the rivalry 
between two superpowers with confrontations between two camps. By comparing the 
membership of these two alliances, “the US and its allies surpass the Soviet alliance 
network by a considerable margin in the primary indicators of national power”.12 One 
explanation for those Western European countries’ apparent preference to choose the 
US as their “perfect ally” lay in the fact that “its aggregate power ensures that its 
voice will be heard and its actions will be felt”.13 Simply, by joining NATO, Western 
European countries would gain security protections from the US. Additionally, it was 
anticipated that the USSR would pose a greater threat to Europe if it predominated the 
confrontation with the US. Halford Mackinder claimed in The Geographical Pivot of 
History, “who rules Eastern Europe commands the Heartland, who rules the Heartland 
commands the World Island, who rules the World Island commands the World”.14 
Based on this logic, the USSR certainly enjoyed a great advantage to occupy the so-
called Heartland due to its central position, hence imposing a foreseeable threat to the 
other countries that were also located in the Heartland. On the contrary, staying far 
enough away from these allies, the US was not considered as a significant threat. As 
Walt concluded, “the US is geographically isolated but politically popular, whereas 
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the Soviet Union is politically isolated as a consequence of its geographic proximity 
to other states”. 15  “Politically popular” did not mean European countries 
overwhelmingly welcomed US foreign policy at that time, but it suggested that 
European countries preferred to see the US as a safeguard for their security.       
It seemed that traditional literature on alliances had fully explained why the 
alliance was established and how member states would choose their allies. In general, 
nearly all realists believed that while threats might not be sufficient to produce 
alliances, they were necessary. However, neorealism bypassed the issue of alliance 
persistence after the initial enemy had been defeated. “What, then, happens when 
threats go away, either through a shift in the balance of power or a change in the allies’ 
perception of threat?”16 Ideally, according to neorealism, if alignment was formed 
because of threat, it would falter in the absence of a threat. Renato De Castro took the 
US-Philippine alliance as an example, arguing that once the Soviet threat subsided, 
the security cooperation between the US and the Philippines folded up abruptly.17 Ole 
Holsti, Terrence Hopmann, and John Sullivan found that “one major cause of their 
disintegration may be the reduction of disappearance of the external threat against 
which they were initially formed”. 18  Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf also 
agreed with this claim, believing that “almost all alliances dissolved once the original 
threat faded”. 19  Generally, traditional literature, heavily realist or neorealist in 
orientation, concluded that alliances would not persist without threats. Thus through 
the neorealist lens, when the USSR collapsed, the threat perceived by NATO 
members shrank rapidly and substantially, which would weaken NATO’s cohesion to 
the edge of break-up. The year of 1989 witnessed the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
signalling the demise of the Soviet threat. John Mearsheimer predicted that without 
the Soviet threat, NATO would cease to be an effective alliance.20 Kenneth Waltz 
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took the same view, believing that “NATO is a disappearing thing. It is a question of 
how long it is going to remain as a significant institution even though its name may 
linger on”. 21  Yet, contrary to those expectations, NATO expanded rather than 
disbanded in the following decade, indicating that neorealist predictions showed little 
sign of coming true immediately after the end of the Cold War.  
Rondall Schweller tried to revise Walt’s explanation by pointing out the 
prevalent bias of neorealism that assumed status quo motivations. He believed that 
“Sometimes, the status-quo order is destroyed by the decline of a dominant power, 
such as the demise of the Soviet Union and the wave of democratic revolutions that 
followed in 1989.”22 In his view, both “balance of power” and “balance of threat” 
theories were based on the perception of fear, considering only cases in which the 
goal of alignment was security, however, “Alliance choices…are often motivated by 
opportunities for gain as well as danger, by appetite as well as fear”. 23  Hence 
balancing was not necessarily more common than bandwagoning. 24  According to 
Schweller, “The aim of balancing is self-preservation and the protection of values 
already possessed, while the goal of bandwagoning is usually self-extension: to obtain 
values coveted.”25 His main contention was that patterns of alliances predominantly 
were shaped by conflicting state motives, and that the compatibility of political goals 
was perceived as “the most important determinant of alignment decisions”. 26 
Although his “balance of interests” theory fulfilled neorealist explanations of alliance 
formation by introducing various motivations, it did not develop further the analysis 
on alliance persistence. Clearly in analysing the criteria that alliances would 
disintegrate, neorealist arguments including “balance of power”, “balance of threat” 
and “balance of interests” all fell short.  
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Robert McCalla viewed NATO as a deviant case to test neorealist theory, as 
those traditional arguments only “help explain NATO’s birth and Cold War lifespan 
but cannot account for subsequent developments”.27 It was true that in the post-Cold 
War period, which was regarded as an era of multipolar world, opportunities for 
realignment abounded. Thereby, according to Snyder, alliances would never be 
absolutely firm because the fear of being abandoned by one’s ally was ever-present. 
But, as he went on, the suspicion that allies were considering realignment might 
generate an incentive to realign pre-emptively. Allies might be induced to act through 
rigid strategies as they hoped not to lose their partners. 28  However, Marco Cesa 
criticised Snyder’s model, arguing that Snyder seemed to be excessively focused on a 
restricted, almost uniquely defensive interpretation of security. As Cesa suggested, the 
possible aims of alliances and their typologies varied.29 In other words, in addition to 
concerns about security or threat, there might be some other factors that also highly 
influenced the alliance formation and durability. 
 
Organisational Theory, Institutionalist Theory and Alliances 
NATO’s formation can be explained by the traditional realist alliance theory which 
emphases on member states’ perception of either the “fear for danger” or the 
“opportunity for gains”. The implication of this theory is obvious that alliance will 
break up when this perception has gone. But NATO survived in the post-Cold War 
period even when the “fear” and “opportunity” was disappeared. To understand why 
NATO is different from other traditional alliances, or why the realist alliance theory is 
not enough to explain NATO’s persistence, it is useful to examine NATO by applying 
the Organisational Theory and the Institutiaonal Theory. Hans Morgenthau put 
forward a concept called “ideological solidarity”, which highlighted the importance of 
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ideology in alliance formation. States that shared similar political, cultural, or other 
traits were more likely to ally. George Liska, however, supported the view that 
alliances were formed in the face of a common enemy, and suggested that 
“ideological or ethnic affinities” between states might also be important factors in 
unifying alliance partners. 30 Actually most realists downplayed the importance of 
ideology in alliance formation, merely viewing alignments as expedient responses to 
external threats. However, the durability of alignment rested largely on internal 
harmony originating from common ideologies. President Reagan once claimed that 
the US and its allies had “rediscovered their democratic values…that unite us in a 
stewardship of peace and freedom with our allies and friends”.31 Despite the fact that 
the Soviet threat directly led to the creation of the transatlantic alliance, common 
values further fastened ties between the US and its European allies. Walt, as another 
proponent of this view, offered explanations as to why common ideologies could hold 
alliances together: alignment with similar states might share common beliefs in 
political principles that created the sense of belonging and loyalty to the unity. Yet he 
also emphasised that the likelihood of conflict among member states would grow if 
the ideology called for obedience to a single authoritative leadership. The collapse of 
the Soviet Union provided striking evidence for these arguments. An authoritative 
Soviet occupation dramatically decreased the cohesion of the Communist bloc, 
causing ideological disputes that damaged the source of legitimacy for each of the 
member states. As Louise Richardson summarised, alliances could not be continuous 
because eventually the interests of the allies would conflict.32 However, neorealist 
theory ignored the possibility that alliances might also have organisational interests 
that were different from those of single members. If true, this might account for 
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alliance persistence, as organisational interests helped enhance the alliance’s ability to 
survive and prosper.  
Robert McCalla pointed out that “an organisational perspective moves beyond 
neorealism’s limits by taking the analysis beneath the interstate level and looking at 
some of the specific internal features that characterise this alliance.”33 NATO is such 
an alliance that enjoys organisational interests. In other words, in addition to material 
institutions and practices, the transatlantic relationship is also structured by shared 
ideological values.34 With a belief in the natural affinity of democracies, members of 
NATO view each other as inherently good states that have no intention to pose a 
threat to one another. Therefore, even though the US plays a dominant role in NATO, 
its leading style differs from the Soviet Union’s: the US never behaves coercively to 
force the other member states to compromise. The reason, as Benjamin Pohl clarified, 
was because of the considerable “degree of overlap between the purposes that the 
United States and its European allies pursue” and the extent to which they share a 
common commitment to the “current liberal global order” and a “shared liberal 
ideology”.35 Therefore, sharing similar traits, member states regard the alliance as a 
way of defending their own political principles, which avoid ideological quarrels and 
mistrusts on one hand and enhance natural loyalty to the unity on the other. According 
to Walt, once the alliance became a symbol of credibility, it was more likely to 
persist.36 The US statesmen, in particular, were highly convinced by this belief that 
allies were attracted by displays of both strength and will. Thereby they committed 
themselves to the build-up of an image of credibility. Former Secretary of State Dean 
Rusk put it as follows “the integrity of… (America’s) alliances is at the heart of the 
maintenance of peace, and if it should be discovered that the pledge of America was 
worthless, the structure of peace would crumble and we would be well on our way to 
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a terrible catastrophe.”37 The US, though enjoying sufficient capabilities to control 
other member states, contributed more to promoting the trustworthiness and reliability 
of NATO, which in turn upgraded the credibility of both the US and the alliance as a 
whole. 
As can be seen, organisational interests, namely credibility originating from 
common ideologies or values, can drive the behaviour of alliances; however, there are 
limits to how far organisational interests can sustain them. An alliance with a well-
developed organisational entity attached can have its life prolonged, yet this does not 
guarantee that an alliance in the absence of a threat will never die. What survival truly 
depends on, as Robert McCalla concluded, was “how much (NATO) members benefit 
from the alliance and the security relationship that surrounds it”.38 Actually, neorealist 
theory had already told us that alliances would be formed only when members 
believed benefits outweighed costs. Conversely, any decrease in benefits relative to 
costs would bring challenges to the continuance of alliances. James Morrow applied 
the autonomy-security trade off model to explain why alliances failed, suggesting that 
members would move away when the increase in security was no longer worth the 
sacrifice of state autonomy.39 As neorealists calculated, NATO was no different from 
other alliances that were as costly in policy and resource terms as one could imagine. 
Thus once the threat that previously justified those costs shrank, NATO member 
states would quit as expected. However, again, neorealist prediction was inaccurate, 
as NATO moved forward to be a robust and healthy alliance. 
In wartime, the benefit to alliance members mainly meant collective security 
that largely outweighed individual sacrifice. But when the Soviet threat subsided, 
NATO members began to question what other benefits besides the containment of the 
USSR it could bring to its members. In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, 
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North Atlantic Ministers expressed their concern that, “Even in a non-adversarial 
relationship, prudence requires NATO to counterbalance the Soviet Union’s 
substantial residual military capabilities.”40 By warning how threatening those former 
members of the Soviet bloc would be, this ministerial communiqué actually called for 
NATO members to continue to stay together. It was persuasive at the beginning, yet 
when Russian troops were fully withdrawn from Europe, significant cuts in nuclear 
weapons were underway, and active participation of former USSR members in PfP 
increased, the necessity of NATO’s continuance was again under question. Could 
NATO keep on benefiting its members in the “new strategic environment”? 
Following major debates about the direction for NATO, the Clinton administration 
began to sponsor a programme of NATO renewal and enlargement, which helped 
NATO being transformed to deal with “instabilities that may arise from the serious 
economic, social, and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and terrorist 
disputes”.41 Those redefined security problems did not only characterise new threats 
that tied NATO members together, but also increased the relevance of NATO, as it 
evolved into a broad multilevel and multi-issue institution.  
The transformation of NATO was regarded as a watershed in its history 
because “the wider the range of functions that an alliance fulfils beyond its core 
defence function, the less responsive it will be to changes in the threats it faces and 
the more likely it is to be transformed in purpose as its external environment 
changes”.42 Those who predicted an end to NATO often took too narrow a perspective 
of NATO’s function, yet in fact, as Douglas Stuart claimed, NATO had room for 
more than strictly military functions, given that it also encompassed effective 
mechanisms for solving disputes and coordinating foreign and political policies.43 
Robert Keohane required theorists to take “advantage of the fact that alliances are 
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institutions, and that both their durability and strength (the degree to which states are 
committed to alliances, even when costs are entailed) may depend in part on their 
institutional characteristics”. 44  According to Walt, alliances with high levels of 
institutionalised cooperation between partners would obtain greater credibility that 
helped extend the alignment.45Basically, NATO members all agree on the Article Five 
promise that “an attack on one is an attack against all”, which lays a solid foundation 
for legalised cooperation. Hence norms and practices are smoothly formalised within 
NATO’s structure and process, reducing “both long-term and short-term transaction 
costs of members by providing guidelines to their own behaviour and to the behaviour 
of others”.46 In this way, as Douglas Bland noted, NATO consolidated its members’ 
common defence through the creation of mechanisms for acting on shared 
expectations, lowering the need to constantly adjust security ties in response to 
continual external changes. 47  Moreover, with regard to the fundamental idea of 
institutionalism, once a regime was set up, there were both internal and external 
incentives to perpetuate it rather than start anew when problems arose.48  
By the end of the Cold War, NATO members had already spent 45 years 
learning how to work as a long-term coalition through a sophisticated structure, so 
there was no reason for them to abandon the existing procedures and mechanisms and 
to form an alternative alliance, not to mention that creating a new regime was more 
costly than maintaining the old one. In other words, NATO’s great asset has been its 
institutional fabric. As Celeste Wallander suggested, the “adaptability of the alliance’s 
institutional assets” was one major explanation of NATO’s persistence in the absence 
of the primary threat. 49  Further, according to Kostas Ifantis, “the impact of 
institutionalisation within NATO has been instrumental in increasing its 
attractiveness”.50 Therefore from the institutionalist perspective, NATO would persist 
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as long as its members continued to value what the alliance did and wished to modify 
NATO as necessary to deal with new problems.  
In short, in terms of the original design, NATO is no different from other 
alliances that are formed in the face of a common enemy. However, NATO also 
enjoys some unique features that no other alliance can display. Sharing common 
values in addition to common interests, NATO members double the cohesion of the 
alignment, setting NATO off from traditional alliances that have no choice but to 
terminate when a common threat subsides. Credibility, deriving from its high degree 
of organisational and institutional developments, enables NATO to be a unity of 
protecting respected political principles for all member states. To sum up, alliances 
like NATO are likely to endure, because once a unity becomes a symbol of credibility, 
it begins to enjoy sufficient reasons to persist.  
 
US Foreign Policy—Realism vs. Liberal Internationalism 
 
Non-entanglement vs. internationalism  
Before the turn of the 20th century, the US adopted “non-entanglement” as the 
guidance of its foreign policy. Although many observers used “isolationism” to 
characterise US foreign policy, it is more appropriate to replace “isolationism” with 
“non-entanglement”. By definition, isolationism aims at isolating one country from 
world affairs including alliance formation, international trade, and the formulation of 
international law. In this sense, US foreign policy did not completely follow 
isolationism, given that America had built up close relationships with Canada and 
some other countries in South America. What the US really pursued at that time was 
not isolationism but non-entanglement, especially within the whirl of European affairs.   
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According to geopolitics, geographical strengths can help safeguard a state’s 
advantageous position in international competitions. With regard to this, since nature 
separates the US from European countries by the endless ocean, the less America is 
involved in European disputes and politics, the more advantages for America. In 
addition, by considering the then-US capability that was relatively weak compared 
with those European powers, the US actually also hoped to prevent European 
intervention by its “natural barriers”. Thus, non-entanglement had been popular 
among Americans for more than a century, peaking at George Washington’s farewell 
address in 1796, which reiterated America’s traditional aversion to “entangling 
alliances”: “It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliance with any portion 
of the foreign world”.51 President Jefferson’s inaugural pledge was no less clear: 
“peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with 
none”.52 At that time, the US was cautious about signing treaties with Europe, simply 
because it could not see any reason why the US should get involved in European 
affairs.  
However, after the Spanish-American War, American leaders began to feel the 
world closing in on the US. Understanding that “no nation can any longer be 
indifferent to any other”53, the McKinley administration reshaped America’s new 
image in the world by committing itself to promoting an “open door” commercial 
policy in China. On December 2, 1902, President Theodore Roosevelt gave his first 
state-of-the-union message to Congress, claiming that “more and more the increasing 
interdependence and complexity of international political and economic relations 
render it incumbent on all civilised and orderly powers to insist on the proper policing 
of the world”.54 He called for the US to act like other great powers, no longer warning 
European powers to stay out of global affairs but claiming America’s right to 
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intervene in them. But according to Robert Dallek, “most Americans in Roosevelt’s 
day were unprepared to accept his realism as a guideline for current and future actions 
abroad”.55  
When it came to the Wilson administration, another round of debate over non-
entanglement arose rapidly. President Wilson picked up Roosevelt’s banner but 
carried it a step further toward a different approach. He supported US engagement in 
the political and security affairs of the world as long as it was consistent with 
“American principles” such as democracy, sovereign equality, free trade, and 
transparent diplomacy. His famous “fourteen points”, combined his proposal for “a 
society of nations” into a comprehensive programme for post-war peace, which later 
formed the core of Wilson’s idealism. Although apparently, both Roosevelt and 
Wilson were eager to abandon the anti-entangling alliances tradition, they differed 
profoundly in the means they chose toward that end. As John Ruggie concluded, 
“Where Roosevelt tried to “normalise” America to get it to act as he believed a great 
power should, Wilson appealed to American principles—to American 
‘exceptionalism’”. 56  In broad terms, the reverse side of non-entanglement is 
internationalism, but to be specific, there are two competing forms of internationalism, 
namely realist unilateralism and liberal multilateralism. The failure to find common 
grounds between Roosevelt and Wilson actually resulted from the traditional fight 
between these two forms of internationalism. In the end, both strict unilateralist means 
and Wilson’s soft multilateralism lost, suggesting that non-entanglement won by 
default.57 It is no wonder that the US refused to join the League of Nations. The US 
anti-entangling alliances tradition was so strong that it stopped Washington from 
participating in any international organisation.  
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Realist unilateralism vs. liberal multilateralism 
The US anti-entangling alliances tradition was seriously questioned after the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, which “broke this emotional deadlock” by forcing the 
US to engage in world affairs.58 The lessons that future American leaders learned 
from this experience “were not only that isolationism is ‘bad’ and internationalism 
‘good’ for the sake of international stability and the pursuit of US interests, but, more 
subtly, that unilateralism had opened the door to isolationism”.59 The initial purpose 
in adopting non-entanglement was to guarantee America as “the well-wisher to the 
freedom and independence of all…the champion and vindicator only of her own”.60 
However, although President John Adams promised not to go abroad “in search of 
monsters to destroy”; he could not prevent other states from setting foot on the 
American land. 61  Therefore, the following presidents were unprecedentedly clear 
about which track to take. In order to drag the US out of the shadow of non-
entanglement, they chose Wilson’s multilateralism, not Theodore Roosevelt’s 
unilateralism, though they departed from Wilson instrumentally. Franklin Roosevelt 
“grafted a collective security scheme onto a concert of power” by introducing a 
“four/five policemen” formula to the design of UN, which seemingly solved the 
dilemma of how to integrate those two forms of internationalism. President Truman 
moved more straightforwardly toward multilateralism by sponsoring the NATO 
formation, the root of which was the Article Five commitments that “an attack on one 
is an attack against all”.  
According to the logic of US Senate rejection of joining the League of Nations, 
the US should not have joined NATO. However, the Truman administration claimed 
that its choice of instrument was not only determined by the need to deter the USSR, 
but also by the domestic appeal: “to transform the “old” European order, making it 
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economically and militarily better able to take care of itself; rendering it less war-
prone and therefore less likely to drag the United States into yet another European war; 
and ultimately making Europe more like the United States”.62 The US commitment to 
NATO became a watershed in US foreign policy, as it not only marked the end of the 
US anti-entangling alliances tradition, but also demonstrated that the US was prepared 
to get into warfare. However, realists like George Kennan believed there was no need 
to establish a “legalistic-moralistic” relationship between the US and Europe. 63 
Regarding NATO as barely an improvement over the UN, he feared that NATO 
expansion might be problematic. Yet, Kennan lost that debate because “he had 
exorcised the spirit of idealistic Wilsonianism”.64 The public, quite the opposite; had 
already agreed with the desirability of an active US role in the world. Thus when John 
Kennedy came into office, he “took it for granted that the United States was a 
superpower with global interests and responsibilities”.65  
Generally, internationalist leaders differed little on why international 
engagement for the US was necessary; where they differed a lot was the means they 
chose toward that end. Realists such as Theodore Roosevelt preferred to “normalise” 
the US, promoting it to act the same as other great powers did; while liberals, 
beginning with Wilson, focused on “American exceptionalism”, urging the necessity 
to link US international engagement to US principles at home. Although liberal 
leaders experienced internal conflicts over balance-of-power politics, they basically 
agreed that multilateralism was consistent with American nationalism that “is a civic 
nationalism embodying a set of inclusive core values: intrinsic individual as opposed 
to group rights, equality of opportunity for all, antistatism, the rule of law, and a 
revolutionary legacy which holds that human betterment can be achieved by means of 
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deliberate human actions, especially when they are pursued in accordance with these 
foundational values”.66           
Prior to the Cold War, Americans did not see their country as a normal great 
power due to its isolated geopolitical condition. It was the outbreak of the Cold War 
that “put America into power politics to stay”.67 Since then, realist internationalism 
has become popular among American leaders, given the perceived need to contain the 
USSR. Hans Morgenthau, one of the “founding fathers” of realist school in the 20th 
century, argued that nation states, as the main actors in international relations, all 
pursue “national interest”, the concept of which is defined in terms of power.68 He 
contended that “international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power”.69 
Thereby, statesmen will seek policies “either to keep power, to increase power, or to 
demonstrate power”.70 This realist view of power politics played a major role in US 
foreign policy, facilitating America to exercise globe-spanning power during the Cold 
War period.  
In analysing the reason why America engaged in global affairs through 
initiating NATO, a multilateral military organisation, realists fall into two camps: 
defensive realism and offensive realism. Kenneth Waltz, identifying the international 
system as perpetually anarchic, claimed that states must act in a way that ensures their 
security above all. No one can count on the goodwill of others to help; hence states 
must always be ready to fend for themselves.71 According to Waltz, NATO was set up 
due to defensive purposes, given that NATO members were pursuing collective 
security rather than aggregate power in the face of an imminent threat from the Soviet 
Union. Yet, John Mearsheimer took a different view, holding that states were not 
satisfied with a given amount of power, so they sought opportunities to increase 
power at the expense of competitors. Considering the uncertainty of state behaviour in 
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an anarchic international system, “great powers recognise that the best way to ensure 
their security is to achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any possibility of a 
challenge by another great power”.72 With respect to offensive realism, the US motive 
behind NATO formation was to achieve “regional hegemony” that would enable 
America to act as offshore balancer to intervene in other regions when states within 
those regions were unable to prevent the rise of a hegemon. That was also why some 
European allies were actually reluctant to see America unfolding its strategy through 
such a transatlantic alliance. But when the confrontation between the US and the 
USSR became irreversible, Western European countries eventually chose to join 
NATO, given that America could provide security protections for them. In short, one 
key difference between defensive and offensive realism lies in the assumption 
whether states’ behaviour is security-oriented or power-oriented. Although both 
theories share a common ground that great powers’ active participation in world 
affairs is vital to the making of international order, offensive realism apparently falls 
short in explaining why the US adopted NATO as the instrument to increase its 
international commitments. If NATO were designed as a part of US aggressive 
policies, aiming to interfere or even manipulate European affairs, those Western 
European countries would not have joined NATO.   
The realist approach guided US foreign policy throughout the Cold War. 
Owing to the lesson of isolationism and the grim reality that the Soviet Union was 
posing tremendous threat, America extended its engagement in international affairs 
during that period. But, as Henry Kissinger concluded in his Diplomacy, once the 
Soviet threat subsided, realism by itself would not suffice to frame US foreign 
policy.73 Put simply, whether realist considerations would continue to keep America 
on the track of internationalism was under question. After spending so many years on 
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competing with the Soviet Union abroad, it was time to focus on domestic affairs, as 
the public seemed to prefer. To scale down international commitments, President 
George H.W. Bush called for spending cuts which would eventually result in 
significant reductions in funding and force levels for NATO’s conventional and 
nuclear forces. The possibility of the termination of institutionalised US support for 
European security was seriously raised in this period, as was the possibility of NATO 
ceasing to exist. However, the renaissance of the US non-entangling alliances 
tradition faded away quickly when President Clinton announced his support for 
NATO renewal and enlargement.74 If the US support for NATO formation relied 
largely on realist consideration about the Soviet threat, then what was the US motive 
behind NATO expansion after the collapse of the USSR? Was US foreign policy 
continuing to be dominated by realist claims? 
In the aftermath of the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the first oil 
shock in the 1970s, the Cold War understanding of national interests suffered a lot of 
criticism for its negligence of emerging realities. Realism, providing “a narrow and 
incomplete description and explanation of world affairs”, was eroding due to its 
exclusive focus on military matters.75 Robert Keohane “was thus in the right place at 
the right time—politically and academically—to make these breakthroughs”. 76  In 
Transnational Relations and World Politics, he and Joseph Nye undermined the 
realist state-centric paradigm by highlighting the importance of non-state actors. 
Moreover, by defining “transnational interaction” as “the movement of tangible or 
intangible items across state boundaries when at least one actor is not an agent of a 
government”, they underscore the importance of nongovernmental actors in 
international interactions.77 However, they did not continue with this track to explore 
how transnational actors influenced international relations; instead, they moved 
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forward to understand explanations of the international political process. In 1977, 
Power and interdependence was published, offering “an alternative, pluralistic 
perspective to that of power and security”.78 According to Keohane and Nye, both 
economic and political interdependence among states intensified with the advent of 
globalisation, leading to a decline in the use of military forces and coercive power in 
international relations. In analysing how international politics is transformed by 
interdependence, they proposed a concept of “complex interdependence”, serving as a 
contrast to the realist image of world politics. As defined, it has three main 
characteristics including the use of “multiple channels that connect societies including 
inter-state, trans-governmental and transnational relations”; the agenda “consisting of 
multiple issues that are not arranged in a clear and consistent hierarchy”; and a decline 
in the use of military force in international relations.79  Keohane and Nye further 
predicted that states would therefore try to use international organisations, which had 
become “a normal part of foreign as well as domestic relations”, as instruments other 
than military force for obtaining power.80 “Their discussion of international regimes 
and organisations hints at the importance of “agenda-setting” and 
institutionalisation.”81  
Based on the assumption that international organisations begin to play a more 
important role in shaping state behaviour, Keohane committed himself to address the 
central puzzle concerning why and how institutions alter state behaviour. In After 
Hegemony, by taking “the existence of mutual interests as given”, his analysis focuses 
on examining “the conditions under which they will lead to cooperation”.82 He firstly 
distinguished “cooperation” from “harmony” by underlining that harmony resulted 
from automatically converged preferences while cooperation referred to a situation 
where actors’ motives were mixed and even uncertain, reducing the likelihood of 
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optimal outcomes unless active steps are taken. According to Keohane, shared 
interests are necessary, yet insufficient, to explain cooperation. What he found was 
that international regimes had the stabilising power that helped cooperation to persist. 
That was also why the decline of US power after the collapse of Bretton Woods did 
not lead to disorder. Therefore, by valuing considerable elements of institutional 
continuity, he concluded that the transaction costs of regime creation were much 
higher than the costs of regime maintenance.  
Liberal internationalism has certainly influenced US foreign policy in the post-
Cold War era. For example, by extending the “stabilising power” of NATO to deal 
with “new threats” including instabilities arising from economic, social, and political 
difficulties, the Clinton administration also facilitated NATO’s participation in “out-
of-area” action in Bosnia and Kosovo. However, it did not declare the realist course 
invalid. Actually both realists and liberal internationalists have noticed the importance 
of combining their aspirations together as a rule. According to Kissinger, realism, if it 
wanted to survive in the post-Cold War era, must be coupled with an animating 
“vision” that provides the Americans with a sense of “hope and possibility that are, in 
their essence, conjectural”—and for which he, the master practitioner of the realist 
craft, now looks to the “idealism” that he spent his career mocking.83 Coincidentally, 
Keohane and Nye also declared that conditions of complex interdependence would 
not prevail at all times. They clarified that most situations would fall somewhere 
between the two ideals of realism and complex interdependence.84 What succeeding 
presidents actually sought in the post-Cold War period was to link the pursuit of 
American interests to the remaking of the world order in a way that attracted the 
support of American people.   
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John Ikenberry, who shared the same liberal vision as Keohane and Nye that 
“open markets, international institutions, cooperative security, democratic community, 
progressive change, collective problem solving, shared sovereignty, the rule of law” 
were core aspects of the liberal international “project”, argued that “In the early 
twenty-first century, liberal order is…marked by increasingly far-reaching and 
complex forms of international cooperation”.85 By defining liberal international order 
as open and rule-based arrangements between states, Ikenberry further identified three 
versions of liberal international order, the first of which referred to the Wilsonian plan 
that was “built around a “thin” set of institutional commitments…(and) a “thick” set 
of norms and pressures—public opinion and the moral rectitude of statesmen”.86 
According to Ikenberry, “liberal internationalism 1.0” turned out to be an “historical 
failure” because “it simply did not fit the realities of the time”, which lacked 
“underlying conditions needed for a collective security system to function”. 87  By 
contrast, “liberal internationalism 2.0” that appeared in the post-1945 decades was 
highly adapted to existing realities. Ikenberry characterised the world order during the 
Cold War as an American-led liberal international order, which was a result of the 
weakness of post-war Europe and rising tensions with the USSR. The American-led 
order or Western system has functioned well even after the end of the Cold War. One 
development of liberal internationalism was the elaboration of the universal rights of 
man, legally permitting the international community to intervene in the affairs of 
sovereign states due to the “Responsibility to Protect”. Hence in the early 20th century, 
President Clinton called for US-led NATO to participate in “out-of-area” missions in 
Bosnia and Kosovo where human rights were unprotected.  
However, following heated debates about the appropriate direction for post-
9/11 American internationalism, the Bush administration declared its response to 9/11 
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in a unilateral way, though member states of NATO requested America to invoke 
Article Five immediately after the attack. President Bush determined to bypass NATO, 
“choosing instead to adopt a more flexible approach based upon forming an ad hoc 
coalition”.88 This decision directly led to the marginalisation of the alliance that had 
been at the very heart of the transatlantic relations for more than 50 years. The Prague 
Summit, which was depicted as “the last days of the Atlantic Alliance”, witnessed a 
serious crisis in NATO’s continuation, as America turned to fight the “War on Terror” 
through an alliance of willingness. 89  Some anxious observers even argued that 
America stepped back to “isolationism”/non-entanglement or at least to unilateral 
realism. But on the other hand, as Ellen Hallams noted, “With the US and NATO 
engaged in critical operations in Afghanistan and an ongoing transformation agenda, 
the US remains firmly committed to NATO”.90 In September 2002, the US National 
Security Strategy was revealed, highlighting the American foreign policy to be “as 
much multilateral as possible, as much unilateral as necessary”.91 In dealing with Iran, 
the Bush administration basically subcontracted to the “EU Three” including Britain, 
France and Germany from 2003 to 2006; and on the issue of the North Korean nuclear 
programme, it was deeply involved in the six-party talks, which was not unilateral at 
all. With regard to all these facts, which approach, realism or liberal internationalism, 
did President Bush really prefer? Did he simply select one and abandon the other? Did 
he choose a completely different way from Clinton? This book will try to find 
possible answers to those questions through looking in detail at operations in Kosovo 
and Afghanistan. But only by asking these questions, a conclusion can be drawn that 
at least liberal internationalism has evolved and will evolve again in the future. 
The liberal world order seems to be problematic recently with global 
economic slowdown and the rise of non-Western states. Many observers believe that 
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“the world will not just look less American…(but) also look less liberal”.92 Although 
acknowledging that America’s position in the global system is changing, Ikenberry 
insists the liberal international order will be alive and well, given that “its rules and 
institutions have not just enshrined open trade and free markets but also provided 
tools for governments to manage economic and security interdependence”. 93 
Moreover, according to Ikenberry, what China and other emerging great powers want 
is not to overturn the liberal order but to gain more authority and leadership within it. 
“Democracy and the rule of law are still the hallmarks of modernity and the global 
standard for legitimate governance”, thus an alternative less open and rule-based 
“Beijing model” would not dominate as long as the liberal international order 
continues to renew.94 As a result, Ikenberry puts forward “liberal international order 
3.0” in which authority should move toward universal institutions such as the UN and 
the US will remain at the centre of the global system with its worldwide system of 
alliances like NATO. Hierarchy will remain but it will be “flatter”, therefore “the US 
will not be able to rule…but can still lead”.95   
If Bush were a pure unilateralist, NATO’s validity would have been damaged 
considerably, leaving no room for his successor to utilise the alliance. But in reality, 
President Obama found NATO still capable in accomplishing assigned tasks. The case 
of Libya again underscored NATO’s advantages in providing a high level of 
legitimacy and in accumulating sufficient support, which encouraged America to 
remain committed to the alliance. It was the US that decided to transfer the Libyan 
mission to NATO, demonstrating the Obama administration’s preference for liberal 
multilateralism. Characterised as a multilateralist, Obama initially believed he could 
build partnerships and perhaps even institutionalised partnerships with new partners 
such as the Chinese, the Brazilians, the Indians and the Turks. Yet after a year of 
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trying, he realised how difficult it would be to deal with those people. Hence by one 
and a half years into the Obama administration, the president understood “When the 
US needs help in the world, there is no better place to go than Europe”.96   
However, when the Libyan crisis subsided, American leaders began to re-
evaluate the relationship with European allies under the framework of NATO. Putting 
aside that the US had no direct, first-order interests at stake in Libya, the US finally 
decided to join the campaign mainly because of the need to help its European allies. 
Robert Gates, then-Secretary of Defence, even complained that “the mightiest military 
alliance in history is only 11 weeks into an operation against a poorly armed regime in 
a sparsely populated country. Yet many allies are beginning to run short of munitions, 
requiring the US, once more, to make up the difference”.97 Gates then delivered a 
speech on reflections on the status and future of the transatlantic alliance when he left 
office, warning that NATO risked “military irrelevance” unless spending would be 
increased by members other than the US.98 There was a prominent concern that the 
US public would not stand for the imbalanced share of burdens much longer, leading 
to an urgent request for Europe to invest more capabilities.      
It became more obvious that President Obama hesitated to remain as an 
Atlanticist in his second term, given that nothing had been mentioned about Europe in 
his second inaugural speech. 99  Moreover, when war loomed in Mali, America 
acquiesced in French intervention, demonstrating even less interest than it did in 
Libya. President Obama, who once committed more than 30,000 troops to the allied 
fight against the Taliban, even planned to withdraw almost all American troops from 
Afghanistan by the end of 2014. Thus, questions arose rapidly over whether Obama 
retreated to be an isolationist.100  The truth is Obama, still staying on the liberal 
multilateral track, simply re-orientate America to face up to the rise of Asia rather 
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than abandoning foreign commitments. During his trip to Australia in November 2011, 
President Obama said that “the Asia Pacific is critical to achieving my highest 
priority…As President, I have, therefore, made a deliberate and strategic decision—as 
a Pacific nation, the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this 
region and its future, by upholding core principles and in close partnership with our 
allies and friends”.101 This was not empty rhetoric. He also declared a huge transfer of 
naval hardware toward the Pacific region. In June 2012, Leon Panetta, then-Secretary 
of Defence, told the annual Shangri-La Dialogue conference that “by 2020, the (US) 
navy will reposture its forces from today’s roughly 50-50 per cent split between the 
Pacific and Atlantic to about a 60-40 per cent between those oceans.”102 In addition, 
though Obama’s first trips as president were to Canada, Britain, France and Germany, 
he, after re-election, paid his first visit to Thailand, making himself the first serving 
US president to visit Burma and Cambodia. He also visited Japan and Indonesia twice 
and South Korea three times, reflecting not only an accelerated shift to the Pacific, but 
also a weakened tie with Europe. Furthermore, John Kerry, the Secretary of State and 
Chuck Hagel, the Secretary of Defence, who are both Vietnam veterans, strongly 
support the Trans-Pacific Partnership.  
Although the current US foreign policy tends to focus more on the Asian 
Pacific region, it does not ignore Europe completely. On February 16, 2013, President 
Obama gave the annual state-of-the-union message to Congress, announcing that 
America and the EU would begin talks to create a transatlantic free-trade zone. This 
proposal was not new, but reemphasised how high Europe ranks on the list of 
American foreign policy. The debate about whether America is styling itself more as a 
Pacific than a European power in fact strengthens rather than weakens US attachment 
to the multilateralist approach. On one hand, the Obama doctrine continues to 
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encourage US cooperation with Europe, though unilaterally asking for more European 
contribution to NATO. According to Keohane, the transaction costs of regime 
creation are much higher than the costs of regime maintenance. Therefore it is too 
hasty to say that America is going to abandon NATO or to create another institution 
to replace it.103 On the other hand, by considering more concretely about US national 
interests, Obama expands the traditional multilateral framework to include one more 
coordinate besides Europe, resulting in his “Pivot to Asia” strategy.          
Historically US foreign policy has tended to swing between realism and liberal 
internationalism; yet the US final decision is not simply driven by either the realist or 
liberal internationalist approach because in actual political terms it is not obvious 
what distinguishes realists from liberal internationalists. President Clinton was a 
liberal internationalist in terms of his sponsorship of NATO enlargement, but he was 
also a realist when taking his reluctance in Bosnia and Kosovo into account. President 
Bush’s bypassing of NATO in fighting the “War on Terror” is often labelled himself 
as a unilateralist, yet he was also in favour of a multilateralist approach that guided 
America through talks with Iran and North Korea. Viewed as a follower of the 
Clinton doctrine that apparently absorbed liberal multilateralist aspirations, President 
Obama not only moves forward to enlarge the span of multilateralism by adding the 
“Pivot to Asia” strategy, but also integrates US interests according to realist 
calculations to the making of American foreign policy. To sum up, though there might 
be a clear dividing line between realism and liberal multilateralism in theory, there is 
no such thing in practice. Influenced by both realist and liberal multilateralist 
aspirations, almost all administrations choose neither a pure realist nor pure liberal 
multilateralist approach. NATO, as a vital part of American foreign policy, has gone 
through twists and turns in the post-Cold War period. Critics about US commitments 
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to the transatlantic alliance have never faded away. As Robert Gates warned, if 
European allies remain irresponsible, NATO will be relegated to the very margins of 
debate. However, as long as America dedicates itself to multilateralism, transatlantic 
relations are crucial to US foreign policy, given that the Atlantic Alliance might not 
be perfect, but it is the best thing going.104   
 
Foreign Policy Analysis and the Bureaucratic Politics Model 
 “Foreign policy as a field of study gets us to step inside the shoes of policy makers, 
enter their world, and then judge whether—in light of the context—they did the right 
thing (and for whom?)”. 105  The relevance of foreign policy to the study of 
international relations has attracted attention since the end of WWII. Foreign Policy 
Analysis (FPA), a flourishing approach in studying foreign policy, developed in the 
1950s as an independent intellectual domain. By defining “foreign policy” as “the 
sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) 
in international relations”, Christopher Hill outlines the two extremes of what FPA 
should focus on. 106  The first approach, as he claimed, focuses purely on what 
diplomats say to each other; the second is a broader study that “include(s) almost 
everything that emanates from every actor on the world scene”.107 According to Hill, 
the best solution is to find a balance between these two approaches. 
Actually the question proposed by Hill has been the heart of debate since the 
foundation of FPA. Richard Snyder and his colleagues encouraged researchers to look 
below the nation-state level of analysis and to focus on the players involved. Viewing 
decision-making as “organisational behaviour”, they believed that desirable 
descriptions of behaviour were of necessity both multicausal and interdisciplinary.108 
James Rosenau took the same view, underscoring “the need to integrate information 
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at several levels of analysis—from individual leaders to the international system—in 
understanding foreign policy”.109 Harold and Margaret Sprout sought to link reality to 
the analysis of foreign policy by suggesting that “Foreign policy can only be 
explained with reference to the psycho-milieu (the psychological, situational, political, 
and social contexts) of the individuals involved in the decision-making.” 110  The 
combined message of these three works is that “multiple levels of analysis, ranging 
from the most micro to the most macro, should be integrated in the service of such 
theory building”.111 The interpretation of this message, which “was and continues to 
be the hard core of FPA”, apparently suggests that this is not one approach to foreign 
policy but many.112  
Previously most analysts tended to explain problems of foreign policy and the 
behaviour of national governments in terms of various forms of one basic conceptual 
model, the so-called Rational Policy/Actor Model. Since Richard Neustadt had his 
Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership published in 1960, researchers have 
become interested in the bargaining nature of the governmental decision-making 
process. According to Neustadt, “Presidential power is the power to persuade”, thus 
the governmental process is one of inherent bargaining. 113  Although Samuel 
Huntington, Warner Schilling, and Roger Hilsman had also described policy as a 
result of bargaining among the major participants, it was Graham Allison who made 
the notion of bureaucratic politics popular by formalising three decision-making 
models: the Rational Actor Model (Model I), the Organisational Behaviour Model 
(Model II), and the Bureaucratic/Governmental Politics Model (Model III).114 What 
Allison aimed at was to provide a base for improved explanation and prediction by 
introducing two alternative models in addition to the classic rational paradigm. His 
A New Framework: Two Levels of Analysis 
57 
 
contribution has eventually become “one of the most widely disseminated concepts in 
all of social science.”115  
Allison firstly argued that political science and the study of international 
relations were saturated with rational-expectation theories inherited from the field of 
economics. Under such a view, the classic Rational Actor Model basically saw the 
nation or government as a “rational unitary decision maker” that examined all options 
and acted rationally to maximise the utility.116  To ensure a state’s action was “a 
calculated solution to a strategic problem”, this model originally assumed that 
government possessed “knowledge of consequences that follow from the choice of 
each alternative”, which enabled it to optimise its goals in “narrowly constrained, 
neatly defined situations”.117 In short, the primary inference of this model was that “if 
a nation performed a particular action, that nation must have had ends towards which 
the action constituted an optimal means”. 118  However Allison questioned the 
applicability of this model to policy-making behaviour because “an imaginative 
analyst can construct an account of value-maximising choice for any action or set of 
actions performed by a government”.119 He noticed that analysts had to ignore many 
facts to make their analysis fit this classic model. According to Allison, the problem 
of Model I was “not simply to find an objective or cluster of objectives around which 
a story of value-maximizing choice can be constructed, but to insist on rules of 
evidence for making assertions about governmental objectives, options, and 
consequences that permit him to distinguish among the various accounts”.120  For 
example, by using this model, the motive behind the attack on Pearl Harbor would be 
that Japan would never dare attack because it would lose a war with the US; and 
nobody would start a nuclear war given the knowledge of its consequences. But 
human beings were not inextricably bound to act in a rational manner. Therefore, 
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Allison concluded that using the Rational Actor Model was dangerous because people 
would make unreliable assumptions about reality.  
Allison next turned to Model II, namely the Organisational Process Model, 
under which “government consists of a conglomerate of semi-feudal, loosely allied 
organisations, each with a substantial life of its own”. 121  After dividing primary 
responsibility into particular areas, “Each organisation attends to a special set of 
problems and acts in quasi-independence on these problems.”122 Coordination of these 
organisations was required, which could be achieved through standard operating 
procedures (SOPs). Thus “The behaviour of these organisations—and consequently of 
the government—relevant to an issue in any particular instance was, therefore, 
determined primarily by routines established in these organisations.”123 In this model, 
policy was described as the output of organisational processes and behaviour was 
“determined by previously established procedures”. 124  The dominant pattern of 
inference in Allison’s Model II was that “if a nation performs an action of a certain 
type today, its organisational components must yesterday have been performing (or 
have had established routines for performing) an action only marginally different 
from today’s action”.125 Considering that SOPs were not “far-sighted” or “flexible”, 
organisational actions were predominantly determined by organisational routines, not 
governmental leaders’ directions. In short, “with its emphasis on routine, Model II 
could not explain change”.126 This, according to Allison, decreased the adaptability of 
this model by broadening the gap between “what leaders choose (or might rationally 
have chosen) and what organisations implement”.127 What Allison truly proposed was 
that administrative feasibility should be included as a major dimension, implying 
further development of decision-making models.  
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As a result, Allison introduced his Model III, the so-called Bureaucratic 
Politics Model. This model saw the leaders of organisations, rather than a “monolithic 
group”, as a player in his own rights in a “central, competitive game” named 
bureaucratic politics: “bargaining along regularised channels among players 
positioned hierarchically within the government”. 128  In contrast with the classic 
Rational Actor Model, the Bureaucratic Politics Model saw “no unitary actor but 
rather many actors as players—players who focus not on a single strategic issue but 
on many diverse intra-national problems as well; players who act in terms of no 
consistent set of strategic objectives but rather according to various conceptions of 
national, organisational, and personal goals; players who make government decisions 
not by a single, rational choice but by the pulling and hauling that is politics”.129 Thus 
Government behaviour could be understood as the result of bargaining games rather 
than organisational outputs, in other words, policies, as “essentially intra-national 
political outcomes” resulted from “compromise, coalition, competition and confusion 
among government officials who see different faces of an issue”. 130  Hence the 
inference of this model was straightforward: “If a nation performed an action, that 
action was the resultant of bargaining among individuals and groups within the 
government.”131 In Allison and Halperin’s co-authored article “Bureaucratic Politics: 
A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications” and Halperin’s book Bureaucratic 
Politics and Foreign Policy, the Bureaucratic Politics Model had been further 
consolidated by incorporating sufficient empirical evidences regarding the US foreign 
and security policy, while reemphasising the backbone of this model—”What a 
government does in any particular instance can be understood largely as a result of 
bargaining among players positioned hierarchically in the government.”132  
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Edward Rhodes summarised Allison and Halperin’s observation, indicating 
that Model III mainly answered four specific questions in order to predict state 
behaviour: “Who plays? What are their interests? What is their relative strength? And 
what are the rules under which participants interact?”133 In this model, individuals 
were regarded as players, whose positions in the government were the key, given that 
“the advantages and handicaps with which each player can enter and play in various 
games stems from his position”. 134  According to Allison, “positions define what 
players both may and must do”, hence “propensities of perception stemming from 
position permit reliable prediction about a player’s stances in many cases”.135 In other 
words, players’ interests were principally associated with the position they occupy. 
The ability of players to advance their interests reflected their relative power, which in 
this context was “an elusive blend of at least three elements: bargaining advantages 
(drawn from formal authority and obligations, institutional backing, constituents, 
expertise, and status), skill and will in using bargaining advantages, and other players’ 
perceptions of the first two ingredients”. 136  For the rules under which players 
interacted, Model III emphasised that bargaining games, far from being unpredictable, 
proceeded in a highly structured way. Allison believed that “the individuals whose 
stands and moves count are the players whose positions hook them on to the action-
channels”. 137  Therefore, regularised “action-channels structure the game by 
preselecting the major players, determining their usual points of entrance into the 
game, and disturbing particular advantages and disadvantages for each game”.138    
As was typical of a popular concept, much criticism had been levelled at 
Allison’s Model III. Milton Friedman, “the most influential economist of the second 
half of the 20th century (Keynes died in 1946), possibly of all of it” and an economic 
adviser to President Ronald Reagan, countered Allison from the perspective of 
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instrumentalism, arguing that although the rational policy paradigms did not describe 
the reality per se, they should be retained since they provide accurate predictions.139 
But Friedman did not provide enough evidence to support the fact that his theories 
could accurately predict possibility, which was criticised as “unscientific” by Allison 
in turn. Friedman continued to counter that the Bureaucratic Politics Model was 
impractical because it required a very large amount of information. Although it was 
true that compared with the other models, the Rational Actor Model “serves as a 
productive shorthand, requiring a minimum of information”140, Allison refused to 
agree there was any necessity to automatically revert to those rational policy 
paradigms, taking into account that rationalistic thinking might be flawed—”You can 
sit in your armchair and try to predict how people will behave by asking how you 
would behave if you had your wits about you. You get, free of charge, a lot of 
vicarious, empirical behaviour”. 141  However, Jonathan Bendor and Thomas H. 
Hammond also complained that Allison’s Model III lacked absolute clarity about 
whether players were required to be rational actors, which disabled the model to 
derive testable propositions.142 David A. Welch nonetheless helped defend Model III 
in his reading of Allison’s works, suggesting that “Model III did not suppose that the 
individual players behaved irrationally in the games in which they participated, 
merely that the net effect of those games was to deflect state behaviour from the 
course that would have been chosen by a unitary rational actor”.143 Further, there was 
always a wide gap between academic literature and the experience of participants in 
government. The decision on which paradigm of the rational actor and the 
bureaucratic politics should be adopted largely depends on whether it recognised and 
even bridged the gap between theoretical guess and reality. In fact, as Lawrence 
Freedman concluded, the Rational Actor Model and Allison’s Bureaucratic Politics 
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Model should be best understood “not as opposing conceptual frameworks but simply 
as alternative models of a political system that are not necessarily incompatible and, at 
least in theory, can be evaluated by reference to evidence”144. In short, as stated in 
their cooperative work, what Allison and Halperin tended to contribute was to 
“present an alternative approach that focuses on intra-national factors, in particular 
Bureaucratic Politics, in explaining national behaviour in international relations”.145  
Serving as “an analytical breakthrough that recognises a critical variable in the 
determination of policy that has hitherto been neglected by most analysts”, Allison’s 
Model inspired numerous works concerned with US foreign policy to utilise this 
approach in their description of the policy process.146 The core metaphor of Allison’s 
original model was that of the game, focusing on what and how the outcome/policy 
decision was achieved. Individual players with various differences in characteristics 
occupied particular positions within the government. Their perceptions and 
preferences led the players to define their interests and objectives of any single issue, 
which therefore determined their stands. Those players were often cited as “senior 
players” who “have a disproportionate share of influence on major decisions”.147 In 
developing the paradigm, Allison and Halperin further introduced the action games, 
most of which were participated in by “junior players” who sat around the central 
circle of senior players. Considering that “action-channels determine, in large part, 
which players enter what games, with what advantages and handicaps”, junior players 
always played a major role in carrying out the decision rather than dominating the 
decision games.148 For example, although “’Congressional influential’, members of 
the press, spokesmen for important interest groups, especially the ‘bipartisan foreign 
policy establishment’ in and out of Congress, and surrogates for each of these groups” 
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could hardly determine the decision-making, they nonetheless exerted considerable 
influence on how the governmental behaviour might be perceived.149  
In practice, US government is composed of numerous individuals, many of 
whom work in large organisations. In comprehending the environment where it has to 
operate, each organisation has to “address itself to the whole set of shared 
assumptions, images and facts that determine the prevalent concept of the ‘national 
interest’”.150 This responsibility is assigned to actors in terms of the strength of their 
position rather than any claim to rationality. However, there is no preponderant player. 
Even the President is merely one participant rather than a dominator, although he may 
have the most influential power. According to Allison, the President is only one of 
many chiefs compromising of “the President, the Secretaries of State, Defence, and 
Treasury, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
and, since 1961, the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs”.151 The final 
decision is actually a “political resultant” achieved through bargaining and 
compromising among participants. In other words, to speak of US foreign policy, “is 
really to speak of a number of foreign policy decisions determined by competition 
among a number of actors”.152  As a result, most players see themselves only as 
“inputters, recommenders, vetoers and approvers” instead of decision-makers. 153 
More often there are competing options, each with their own costs and benefits, yet 
bureaucratic politics is not a necessary condition for policy in cohesion because “in 
fact all bureaucratic politicians can do is to exploit the inherent problems of policy 
formation through the manipulation of communication flows and policy debates.”154 
Therefore, this “pulling and hauling” among the various participants who attempt to 
advance their understanding of “national interest” in turn guarantees a full range of 
rational options for the government to choose. 
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Foreign Policy Analysis, although not the only approach to the study of 
foreign policy, has evolved into a significant approach by drawing heavily on ideas 
and concepts found in International Relations theories. Based on the core realist state-
centric assumption, the classic Rational Actor Model traditionally regards the state as 
the central foreign policy actor, which has inspired researchers to focus on predictions 
of foreign policy outputs. Yet the reliability of this model has been under question, 
given the embarrassment that only complete information can lead to accurate 
prediction. As a result, Allison proposes his Bureaucratic Politics Model as an 
alternative FPA theme, which has bequeathed to FPA its characteristic emphasis on 
decision-making process rather than foreign policy outcomes only. After analysing 
the US foreign policy at the macro level (which is discussed above in the second 
section of this chapter), further explanations on decision-making should take place at 
the micro level—bureaucratic politics. Thus the “pulling and hauling” among players 
becomes vital to understand why the US pursues certain foreign policy, who might 
influence it, and how it is conceived.  
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4  The Clinton Administration’s Recommitment to 
NATO 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, a range of choices for the future 
directions of US foreign policy presented themselves. On one hand, most Americans 
believed that it was time for the US to focus on domestic affairs rather than 
continuing with more international commitments. The Soviet threat had already 
subsided, suggesting there was no need for the US to keep on providing security 
protection for European countries. Moreover, there was never a possession of infinite 
power, thus “the US could not function as a diplomatic Atlas, bearing the entire world 
upon its shoulders”.1 American people had suffered a lot from the Cold War, hence 
they wished to see the administration making efforts to build prosperity at home. On 
the other hand, it was also widely accepted that the US should take the collapse of the 
Soviet Union as an unprecedented opportunity to rise as the only superpower or even 
“the policeman of the world”. This idea mainly came from those who assessed that “if 
the US did not take the lead in efforts to preserve international peace and security, 
then what nations are in a position, and have incentive, to do so?”2 According to them, 
only the US had the power and force-projection capability needed to shoulder and 
implement global responsibilities. In short, they supported the administration to 
increase its international commitments in the post-Cold War period. This chapter 
discusses US recommitment to NATO in this context of post-Cold War policy choice.   
Between the extremes of isolationist withdrawal and global policeman, it 
seemed likely that the favoured policy would be one that recognised the dynamics of 
global political and economic interdependence and integration. Deeply committed to 
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the doctrine of (especially economic) globalisation, the Clinton administration 
eventually chose a course of cooperation with other countries to police the 
international system. This course was apparently the desirable middle between these 
two extremes, which not only demonstrated great selectivity in how to engage in 
international affairs but also met the need to show US leadership. Perhaps one of the 
reasons was because the US needed the tangible and intangible support of its allies 
throughout the international community if it is to accomplish worthwhile purposes. 
With regard to this, a proper way to achieve this balance would be working through 
NATO, an alliance that had witnessed enormous successful cooperation between 
Washington and its European allies. However, NATO faced severe challenges to its 
survival after the end of the Cold War, making it difficult for the US to utilise the 
Alliance to pursue its foreign policy. 
In May 1990, NATO’s Military Committee announced that it no longer 
considered the Warsaw Pact a threat to the Alliance. President George H.W. Bush 
then called for cuts in NATO and Warsaw Pact force levels, which would eventually 
result in significant reductions in funding and force levels for NATO’s conventional 
and nuclear forces. Many other changes came along with the cuts in defence spending 
and force strength: the US leadership in NATO receded; policy disputes among 
members about security issues increased; and more attention was given to other 
security organisations other than NATO. All these seemed to coincide with neorealist 
predictions that NATO, an alliance built up because of a common threat, would 
undoubtedly disappear with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Yet, no matter how 
thoroughly those neorealists speculated about how an alliance would come to its end, 
NATO expanded rather than disbanded. It became a more active and vibrant 
organisation that was expanding its scope and membership. Needless to say, without 
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the Clinton administration’s support, NATO would not have survived in the post-Cold 
War era.  
The presidency of Bill Clinton was “the very warp and weft of contemporary 
US politics”.3 The Clinton administration took office less than two years after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, and the administration’s foreign policy addressed 
conflicts in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo and Haiti. Whether Clinton was a good 
foreign policy president was controversial.4 The extraordinarily fluid nature of the 
post-Cold War policy-making context made Clinton’s foreign policy process 
complicated. Clinton was the president who faced unprecedented political opposition 
in 1994 when Republicans took control of both Houses of Congress. This decisive 
victory for Republicans was heavily attributed to the release of the Contract with 
America, which became a blueprint for the policy of the new Congressional majority. 
According to John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, the Contract placed the 
Clinton White House firmly on the defensive.5  Since then, President Clinton had 
striven against the difficulty to cooperate with a Congress that was dominated by 
Republicans for six years. Specifically, liberals in Congress often urged Clinton to 
take military action, yet the President was reluctant to situate himself at the centre of 
the foreign policy process during early years of his presidency. Moreover, a post-
Vietnam War, post-Cold War Pentagon was often cautious about military action, 
making it harder for Clinton to establish a reasonable working relationship with the 
US military.6 
Despite Clinton’s personal and political vulnerabilities, he succeeded in 
issuing policy toward the old enemies, which aimed to assimilate instead of eliminate 
former Warsaw Pact members. As John Dumbrell argued, “NATO enlargement was a 
major Clinton success”.7 It clearly demonstrated how Clinton’s foreign policy was a 
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response to the changing post-Cold War domestic and international conditions. The 
President’s determination was apparently a driving force for NATO expansion, but it 
is also worth noting that pressures from the US pro-expansionist ethnic lobbies played 
an important role to push forward NATO enlargement. Particularly the Polish-, 
Hungarian-, and Czech-Americans created a strong domestic group in favour of 
NATO expansion, which certainly became part of the evolving dynamics. The 
influence of the ethnic communities seemed unquestionable, as the end of the Cold 
War in part opened up the policy-making environment in a way that favoured 
domestic lobbies. More importantly, active response to the ethnic lobbies could help 
increase Clinton’s popularity in the pro-expansionist ethnic constituencies. However, 
the true influence of ethnic lobbies might be exaggerated because after all, those 
ethnic communities were so tiny that they might lack ability to place significant 
impact on US foreign policy-making. As with this debate, it is tempting to trace other 
factors with evenhandedness to the ethnic lobbies that had influenced the Clinton 
administration’s policy on NATO expansion.   
 
Why should NATO expand? 
On the issue of NATO enlargement, the question of “why” came first. The answer to 
this question would not only provide the rationale for NATO expansion, but also lay a 
solid foundation for further discussions about “how” and “when” NATO could 
expand, and “who” might become potential candidates.  
 
“NATO expansion would serve both European and American interests” 
Central and Eastern Europe  Charles W. Freeman, Assistant Secretary of Defence for 
Regional Security Affairs, took the reverse deduction approach by asking an inspiring 
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question that “If expansion is the answer, what is the question?” He saw the question 
of NATO expansion equal to the question of “how to build a security architecture to 
manage problems across Europe”, indicating that NATO expansion would, first of all, 
meet European countries’ interests. 8  By definition, NATO enlargement refers to 
expansion towards Central and Eastern European countries, most of which belong to 
the former Soviet bloc. Thus whether those Soviet allies were willing to join NATO, 
or in other words, whether NATO expansion could meet those aspirants’ interests, 
became fundamental to address the question whether the Alliance should move 
eastward. NATO was originally designed as an organisation of shared interests and 
values, focusing on protection against Soviet attack and the promotion of democracy 
and peaceful relations among its member states. Although the Soviet threat had 
subsided since the end of the Cold War, no one could be confident that Russia would 
become part of the new order and would not re-emerge as a threat to the West any 
time soon. As Secretary of State Warren Christopher observed, if Russian democracy 
collapsed Washington would face a very insecure future indeed with the strong 
“possibility of a renewed nuclear threat, higher defence budgets, spreading instability, 
the loss of new markets and a devastating setback for the worldwide democratic 
movement”.9 Thus, former Soviet republics perceived NATO membership foremost 
as “an insurance policy against a resurgent Russia”.10  
Further, a “new definition” of threat was put forward at the Rome Summit in 
1991, clarifying that in addition to the aggression of Russia, future threats would 
come from instabilities arising from economic, social, and political difficulties.11 With 
respect to those principal security challenges, if aspirant Central and Eastern 
European countries were allowed to become members of NATO, it would create a 
“win-win” situation for both existing and new member states of NATO. On one hand, 
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those aspirants would gain the same US protection as those Western European 
countries had received since 1949 in connection with the post-war recovery; on the 
other hand, absorbing former Warsaw Pact satellites into the Alliance would help 
consolidate the continuing relevance and desirability of a transatlantic alliance in the 
redefined security environment, as those candidates would be encouraged to reform 
until democracy was achieved. In other words, NATO enlargement could provide 
security guarantee for nations that had often been sacrificed to great power politics in 
the past, and could bring the sense of belonging to those new members so that they 
could voluntarily become “contributors” rather than “consumers” to develop peace 
and prosperity within the Alliance.  
Western Europe  Despite the fact that NATO enlargement would satisfy the 
Central and Eastern European countries that were eager to “anchor themselves in the 
West and ‘return to Europe’”, would NATO expansion simultaneously meet existing 
European members’ interests?12 Immediately after the end of the Cold War, not many 
NATO members saw expansion as a necessary option, as they viewed NATO 
enlargement as a unilateralist American policy, believing that the US was pursuing 
hegemony in the post-Cold War period. Taking into account these accusations, 
President Clinton was not very determined to demonstrate a continuing US 
international leadership, though both the Republican majority and the Democratic 
minority had pressured him to do so for quite a long time.13 Moreover, many Western 
European countries believed that priority should be given to promoting the 
development of a democratic, peaceful Russia, and that expanding NATO would 
conflict with this objective. Those European members saw it as significant to help 
Russia adapt to the new order, yet they might be too optimistic to neglect the 
uncertainty over whether Russia was more likely to reform or to remain as an unstable 
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and potentially unfriendly power. The Russian response to the rebellion in Chechnya 
soon reaffirmed the view of those who insisted on keeping a watchful eye on Moscow, 
as Russia might not become a gentler European democracy very quickly. European 
members did not acknowledge the necessity of NATO enlargement until the outbreak 
of the Bosnia conflict, which warned the European countries of the unstable security 
environment. Although the initial European approach to Bosnia led to “a feeling on 
the part of people that NATO (was) irrelevant”, the failure of European governments 
either to accept US prescriptions for handling the crisis or to assume responsibility for 
solving it themselves eventually proved that an “active” US leadership in the Alliance 
was the key to guarantee successful operations and thus reassured the capability of 
NATO in dealing with crises.14   
According to Article Five of the NATO charter, an attack on any member of 
the Alliance would be an attack on all, but since Bosnia was not a member of NATO, 
then why was NATO still relevant if what appeared to be a more typical post-Cold 
War conflict was outside its jurisdiction? Given that most governments preferred to 
firstly concentrate on their own domestic affairs and were always reluctant to use 
force, there was neither much knowledge of nor interest in an organisation like NATO 
to deal with conflicts abroad. Even the US restrained its military participation by 
claiming NATO as the only multilateral organisation under which American military 
forces should be permitted to operate. 15  Bosnia brought forward the question of 
whether the transatlantic alliance remained relevant to the security challenge of the 
post-Cold War world, the answer to which largely depended on whether the member 
states continued to believe that their interests would require their cooperation to 
respond to future crises. As a result, what quickly spread throughout European 
members after Bosnia was the acknowledgement that there was a continuing 
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relevance for NATO in the post-Cold War world, and that NATO expansion would be 
an effective way to help strengthen NATO and in the end, to solve future “Bosnias”. 
America  The US has played a dominant role in the transatlantic alliance, thus 
without US support, NATO would not survive, much less expand. There were equally 
important divisions on the question of whether the US should promote NATO 
enlargement. Some Americans including General John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff and Les Aspin, Secretary of Defence, emphasised that although 
they understood why new membership served the interests of the Europeans, they did 
not see how it served American interests. 16  Others like Vice President Al Gore 
responded that the security of the states lying between Western Europe and Russia 
affected the security of America, arguing that NATO expansion would meet US 
interests. 17  Ideally, with the advent of globalisation, every state was more 
interdependent with each other, regardless of geographic constraints.18 And even in 
terms of traditional geopolitical considerations, both the intimate ties between the US 
and its European allies and the sensitive US-Russian relationship implied that as long 
as there were shared security concerns among NATO members, including the 
potential threat from Moscow, it would be necessary and crucial for the US to support 
the transatlantic alliance’s persistence. In other words, proponents of enlargement saw 
NATO as “a benign institution representing Western ‘security community’ that serves 
to promote trust and foster cooperation among its members”.19 
Moreover, in addition to primary concerns over security issues, the US attitude 
towards NATO in the post-Cold War era was also highly influenced by consideration 
of many other national interests. First of all, given the pressure coming from both 
inside and outside of America, the Clinton administration wanted to demonstrate US 
leadership. The abrupt collapse of the Soviet Union marked the disappearance of one 
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of the two polar states during the Cold War, suggesting that for the first time in its 
history, America enjoyed circumstance in which no other power imposed credible 
military threats to its core national interests. Ideally, this created an unprecedented 
opportunity for the US to unfold its global strategy, especially to fill the strategic 
vacuum in Central Europe. However, for the time being, the US seemed neither ready 
nor willing to provide international leadership. Instead, it moved to adopt an approach 
towards international involvement that could be characterised as “self-deterrence”.20 
Although the Clinton administration did not withdraw to an isolationist posture, it 
announced US domestic prosperity as a key “pillar” of its foreign policy, declining to 
increase the international commitments. This approach, though it highlighted the 
importance for any government of improving the economic fortunes of its citizens, 
undermined the traditional value base for US foreign policy. Thereby, most 
Republicans and ethnic communities including the Polish-, Hungarian-, and Czech-
Americans in the US urged President Clinton to show US leadership rather than 
pleasing Russia blindly.21 Specifically, leaders of the new Republican majority in 
Congress weighed in on this issue, calling for a more active US leadership as well as 
the renewal of the US commitment to a stronger NATO.22 The debate over future 
directions for US foreign policy also attracted attention abroad, especially after the 
Bosnia conflict which reemphasised that even in the absence of the Soviet threat, US 
leadership tailored to the new security realities would remain essential both to a stable 
European security system and to international stability more generally. Thus the 
Clinton administration not only noticed the great need to demonstrate US leadership 
in the post-Cold War period, but also affirmed a stronger NATO as the most 
appropriate platform for the US to remain the framework for transatlantic defence 
cooperation.   
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In broader terms, acting as the leader, the US would be able to exert more 
influence on the other states, particularly on potential NATO membership candidates. 
This would meet another American interest—promoting democracy in Central and 
Eastern Europe, which could enhance global peace and prosperity. According to Luca 
Ratti, cooperation with NATO would encourage democratic reforms in former Soviet 
republics.23 Hence, guided by the traditional liberal internationalist approach, the US 
has always regarded it as a duty to help other countries transform into democratic 
ones. There was no exception to President Clinton whose Wilsonian orientation was 
evident in his desire to spread democracy internationally.24 When Clinton gave his 
speech for the opening of the US Holocaust Memorial Museum on April 21, 1993, he 
expressed his hope that “the seeds of democracy in Europe will one day soon bear the 
fruit of a more peaceful civic culture”. Moreover, since countries including Croatia, 
Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Albania and 
Moldova all participated in the opening, Clinton saw it as a chance to properly convey 
US policy on Europe: “the United States will remain fully engaged in Europe and in 
its transitions toward a new and better future”.25  Charles Gati, a specialist on Central 
and Eastern Europe, warned that new democracies were so fragile that the ex-
communists were likely to gain power again. But, for example, if NATO assisted 
Poland in carrying out successful reforms, this would create a huge positive effect on 
the rest of the region.26 Stephen Flanagan, a policy planning staff member in the 
George H.W. Bush administration also agreed that the prospect of NATO 
membership would be a huge incentive for reformers in the East.27 Characterised as 
Wilsonians, Clinton and Anthony Lake, the National Security Adviser, believed that 
creating democracy, a market economy, civilian control over the military, and border 
treaties would lead to peace and prosperity, but more importantly, enlarging the 
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community of democratic, market-oriented states could enhance America’s national 
security.  
Besides the spread of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, the US 
simultaneously attached great importance to the security protection of its “old” 
European allies. Beyond the Soviet threat, another major factor giving NATO an 
important place in US foreign policy has been the goal of promoting internal 
European stability. Actually since the establishment of NATO, Washington has 
accepted that the US presence in Europe plays a constructive stabilising role within 
Western Europe, hoping to avoid a revival of internal Western European conflicts that 
had already led to two world wars. 28  Hence perhaps most apparently, NATO 
enlargement would help prevent the potential German problem from happening. 
There has long been a group of Europeans who worried about the revival of German 
militarism. They thought the chief threat to peace in Central and Eastern Europe was 
the renationalisation of German foreign policy, so they wished to convince Germany 
that instability to its east was unlikely and did not need to be dealt with unilaterally. 
The possible and quick resolution to this potential German problem was to move the 
eastern border of NATO to the eastern border of Poland, thus centring Germany in the 
alliance rather than leaving it on the flank. On the other hand, Germany also saw this 
proposal as being beneficial. Volker Ruehe, German Defence Minister, once 
expressed the view that it would be beneficial to have Poland included in NATO so 
that Germany would no longer serve as the Alliance’s eastern border.29  
Last but not least, by NATO expansion, the US wanted to encourage Russia to 
reform rather than to humiliate or provoke Russia. In his news conference with 
President Yeltsin in Vancouver in April 1993, Clinton emphasised that the US would 
not stand on the sidelines when it came to democracy in Russia. He further assured 
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Yeltsin that “We actively support reform and reformers and you in Russia” and that 
mutually reinforcing steps would be taken to strengthen reform in Russia.30  The 
Clinton administration gave priority to the development of a healthy US-Russian 
relationship rather than to endless confrontation. However, Clinton’s sponsorship for 
NATO expansion was an ambivalent policy that left the way towards future peaceful 
coexistence between Washington and Moscow clouded and contentious. Serious 
suspicion as well as criticism firstly arose within the US. For example, John Lewis 
Gaddis argued that NATO enlargement was “ill-conceived, ill-timed, and above all 
ill-suited to the realities of the post-Cold War world”.31 George Kennan was also 
strongly opposed to NATO expansion, on the grounds that it would damage beyond 
repair US efforts to turn Russia from enemy to partner.32 Certainly America should 
trust and encourage Russia to reform, but this did not mean there was no need to 
maintain vigilance against the possible non-peaceful rise of Russia, after all, Russia 
was down but not out. There remained many uncertainties about whether Moscow 
would become part of the West or revive as a threat again. In spite of the anti-Russian 
bias, Republican Senator Richard Lugar stated that enlargement was not inconsistent 
with American interests in Russia. 33  In fact, even though many people strongly 
insisted that Russia could never be a full member of the Alliance, the criteria for 
NATO membership were not purposely designed to exclude Russia.34 Dennis Ross, 
the special Middle East coordinator, Strobe Talbott, Special Adviser to the Secretary 
of State Warren Christopher, and Nicholas Burns, the senior director for Russian 
affairs, all suggested that Russia must have a place in European security arrangements 
and any criterion for NATO membership that would automatically exclude Russia 
should not be put forward.35 Following major debates over the appropriate direction 
for US foreign policy towards Russia, Washington decided to leave enough room for 
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Russia to reform by encouraging Russia to join NATO on one hand and to provide 
firm support for NATO expansion on the other. From the perspective of America, if 
Russia successfully transformed into a democratic partner, the US could then use 
relations with a democratic Russia to help unify the continent. Yet if Moscow 
attempted to recreate an imperial security zone in Central and Eastern Europe in a bid 
to achieve hegemony in Europe, the US could utilise NATO expansion as a protection 
to those fragile countries against the Russian threat. In other words, if Russia adopted 
a cooperative attitude and advanced democratic reforms, the expanded NATO would 
serve as a booster for unifying the continent as a whole; if Russia turned sour, the 
expanded NATO would provide the security umbrella to protect those Central and 
Eastern European countries. Thus, to guarantee peace and prosperity both regionally 
and internationally, the US should promote and support NATO expansion regardless 
of how Russia would behave in the post-Cold War world. 
 
The “old” NATO was out of date 
The belief that NATO enlargement would serve both European and American 
interests gave the subjective impetus for NATO expansion. But it was not enough to 
understand why NATO should expand without considerations from a more objective 
perspective. Another possible explanation seemed to be more realistic and 
straightforward: the “old” NATO was out of date, because simply, the new post-Cold 
War environment required a “new” NATO. The purpose of NATO, though it has 
always focused on the fight against the external threat and the promotion of 
democracy and peace, went through changes after the end of the Cold War. One 
prominent change was that concentration on shared values outweighed concentration 
on shared interests, because the subsiding of the Soviet threat highly reduced member 
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states’ imminent anxiety about security issues. The London Summit in 1990 stressed 
for the first time that NATO was becoming more of a political alliance rather than a 
pure military institution.36 Later in 1991, a “New Strategic Concept” and the creation 
of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) were proposed at the Rome 
Summit. The Concept redefined “threat” as instabilities arising from economic, social, 
and political difficulties, not just the aggression of Russia, implying that “European 
security was no longer premised on a known threat or geopolitical calculation that 
presumed a line of potential confrontation.”37 The Concept also reiterated that NATO 
was purely defensive in purpose so that none of its weapons would ever be used 
except in self-defence.38 The proposal on the NACC was relatively ambitious, for the 
Council was designed to include nations from central Europe to central Asia, which 
implied the desire for a much more extended cooperation. Yet this proposition 
suffered serious criticism. Scholars like Charles Freeman were not optimistic about 
the reform, pointing out that the NACC had a wrong membership list. For example, it 
included Tajikistan that was not even part of Europe but excluded Sweden and 
Austria.39 Ronald Asmus, Stephen Larrabee and Richard Kugler further argued that 
the NACC was not effective since it was “essentially a holding operation that 
provides meagre psychological reassurance”.40  
Hence, the NACC was modified. Jenonne Walker, the Senior Director for 
European Affairs at the National Security Council (NSC) worked with his group to 
unfold a programme that could bring NACC states closer to NATO as well as to 
involve other European countries in NATO affairs but that would not extend NATO’s 
security guarantee to new members. This later became known as the Partnership for 
Peace (PfP), which was officially passed at the principals meeting in October 1993. 
From then on, the NACC was replaced by a programme that was still inclusive but 
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emphasising on self-selection and rewards for reform: each partner could develop its 
own relationship bilaterally with NATO. Though depicted as a compromise, the PfP 
brought many benefits to reduce tensions between those who wanted to enlarge 
NATO right away and those who did not want to enlarge NATO at all. Ideally, it 
could build military relationships that involved all European countries, postpone the 
need to offer new security guarantees, and avoid confrontation with Russia, because 
the PfP was designed to invite “all former Warsaw Pact and former Soviet states plus 
other non-NATO members in Europe to join in military operation with NATO”.41 The 
PfP was welcomed by most officials in the Pentagon, such as Aspin, who saw the PfP 
useful enough because it not only avoided re-dividing Europe but also set up correct 
incentives for aspirants. In addition to the endorsement of the US, the PfP also 
received support from Yeltsin who considered the PfP as a substitute rather than a 
transitional phase toward enlargement. Yeltsin’s misunderstanding of the purpose of 
the PfP was not groundless, as the original intention of the proposition was too broad. 
Although the PfP was not supposed to replace NATO enlargement, neither was it “a 
permanent holding room”, it created a stir in those aspirants who were eager to join 
NATO as soon as possible.42  
Central and Eastern Europeans began to realise “when” was “never”, therefore 
their voice of doubt arose and the momentum for reform suspended. The accusation 
from aspirants combined with the problem of inability to pay the costs of the 
programme of the PfP, placed great pressure on Washington. This “substitute” 
eventually failed to prove itself a wise choice. Moreover, the “New Strategic Concept” 
led to General Shalikashvili’s suggestion of establishing the Combined Joint Task 
Forces (CJTF), which would allow the Europeans to develop their own capacities to 
act in cases in which the US declined to send troops. Characterised as “separable but 
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not separate”, the CJTF raised the real possibility of NATO forces acting “out-of-
area”. According to the US Undersecretary of State for political affairs Nicholas 
Burns, Washington and its European allies “now find that our entire agenda is 
pivoting from an inward focus on Europe to an outward focus”.43 Most officials in the 
Pentagon were proponents of the CJTF, especially when they noticed its benefit of 
heading off any effort by France to turn the Western European Union (WEU), the 
EU’s defence arm, into a competitor to NATO within the framework of European 
security. However, in addition to military goals that might be achieved through the 
CJTF, Clinton also wanted to realise diplomatic and political goals at the same time. 
With respect to this, Asmus, Larrabee and Kugler further clarified that NATO should 
transform from an alliance focused on collective defence against a specific threat into 
“an alliance committed to project democracy, stability and crisis management in a 
broader strategic sense”.44 And this was not something that could be easily realised by 
relying solely on the CJTF.  
All these evaluations showed that the “old” NATO with the NACC and the so-
called “New Strategic Concept” was out of date. Though these two pillars went 
through proper reforms into the PfP and the CJTF, they were still not good enough. A 
more effective way to improve this should be one that could address the potential 
problems of the Alliance more boldly and decisively. Moderate reforms proved to be 
unable to achieve the goal, therefore a more ambitious solution centreing on the 
establishment of a “new” NATO through expansion, became imperative.  
 
Internal US debate over NATO expansion 
In addition to the fact that NATO enlargement would meet both European and 
American interests and that the “old” NATO had to expand to remain relevant to the 
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post-Cold War world, there were also some pragmatic reasons that made NATO 
expansion more feasible. For example, Russia was too weak to stop NATO 
enlargement due to its economic and military collapse; Europe was willing to follow 
the US lead especially after the Bosnia conflict; but more importantly, the US was so 
powerful that no one could prevent enlargement from happening once Washington 
decided to sponsor the programme of NATO expansion. There would not be any 
strong or effective opposition abroad, but in terms of making the final US decision to 
support NATO enlargement, the Clinton administration also had to pay attention to 
the domestic debates which have long been vital to the decision-making process.  
To understand the domestic debates over the “why or whether” question, it is 
necessary to utilise bureaucratic politics as the analytical tool, which provides an 
angle to see policy-making through a more micro lens. According to bureaucratic 
politics, where individuals stand depends on where they sit, and that how they 
perceive a situation also depends on their bureaucratic role.45 Thereby any particular 
policy can be understood largely as “a result of bargaining among players positioned 
hierarchically in the government”.46 In terms of US attitude towards NATO expansion, 
“bargaining” mainly took place among individuals from the NSC including President 
Clinton, the State Department, and the Pentagon. Generally speaking, before 1994, all 
of them were uncertain about whether NATO should expand. Clinton’s foreign policy 
on Europe in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War concentrated on Russia, giving 
top priority to assisting Yeltsin with political and economic reform. This resulted in 
the administration’s vague attitude towards US support for NATO enlargement. Yet 
President Clinton inclined to think positively about absorbing new members into the 
Alliance after meeting the leaders of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary—Lech 
Walesa, Vaclav Havel, and Arpad Goncz respectively at the dedication ceremony of 
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the Holocaust Museum in late April 1993. There were great hopes for the meetings, 
during which those aspirants conveyed a common message to Clinton that their top 
preference was to get into NATO as soon as possible. Although it was the “Holocaust 
Dedication” that brought the NATO enlargement issue to Clinton’s radar screen for 
the first time, it failed to persuade Clinton to make a clear supportive stance on NATO 
expansion immediately.47  
Like President Clinton, many officials in the State Department were also 
reluctant to see NATO expand immediately after the end of the Cold War, worrying 
that enlargement would make management of the Alliance more difficult, and would 
damage US-Russian relations by undermining Yeltsin’s efforts at reform. To be 
specific, they mainly concerned that NATO enlargement would antagonise Russia, 
exacerbating its lingering distrust of the West and strengthening anti-Western 
elements in the Russian political system. 48  Pentagon officials were even more 
opposed to NATO expansion. They were pessimistic about the effectiveness of a 
military alliance with a large number of advanced industrialised democracies, and 
were particularly hesitant to provide NATO’s Article Five security guarantee to new 
members. There was an atmosphere of anti-enlargement in the government before 
1994, though no well-organised domestic opponents ever appeared. What was more 
astonishing, was that at that time National Security Adviser Anthony Lake seemed to 
be the only official in favour of near-term expansion of NATO.49  
With regard to the anti-expansion sentiment in the government, what could be 
achieved at the principals’ meetings in October 1993 was merely an ambiguous 
decision: putting forward the PfP while saying something vague about NATO’s 
eventual expansion. Ironically, both supporters and opponents of NATO enlargement 
alike agreed with this decision, though their interpretations of the decision differed 
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greatly. Supporters like Lake, Thomas Donilon, the State Department Chief of Staff, 
Lynn Davis, the Undersecretary of State regarded the PfP as a stepping stone rather 
than an “end” of the enlargement process; while opponents like William Perry, the 
Deputy Secretary of Defence and Ashton Carter, the Assistant Secretary of Defence 
thought PfP was good enough and the enlargement question had been left for later.50 
Those who stood in the middle such as Clinton and Warren Christopher, Secretary of 
State, saw the decision as an opportunity to keep their choice open-ended. This 
demonstrated how influential bureaucratic politics was on decision-making. 
Participants’ interpretations of the same situation might vary according to their 
different bureaucratic positions. And the gap between distinct interpretations would 
widen when “misperception” occurred, which deluded people into mistaking what 
they wanted to see as what they saw.51  
Even though the vast majority of leaders in the US government viewed the 
promotion of the PfP as the most appropriate approach by far, they were unable to 
convince the other interest groups why the PfP was a better choice than direct 
expansion. For example, outside experts including Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski and James Baker, the former secretary of state, believed that the idea of 
NATO expansion had been shelved in favour of the PfP. Hence they accused the 
Clinton administration of failing to demonstrate leadership, leaving in place a line in 
Europe drawn by Josef Stalin. 52  However, their complaints did not shake the 
administration’s sponsorship of the PfP. It was not until January 1994 that the US 
policy on NATO enlargement became apparent. In January, just before his trip to 
Brussels, Clinton sent Polish-born General Shalikashvili, Czech-born Albright, the US 
ambassador to the UN and Hungarian-born Charles Gati, the State Department adviser, 
to Central Europe to explain the administration’s preference for possible NATO 
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enlargement. Later during his visit to Prague, Clinton, for the first time, declared that 
NATO expansion was no longer a question of whether but when and how.53  
Then Lake and Talbott contributed to pushing Clinton’s policy forward before 
the president’s Warsaw visit. As the national security adviser, Lake had more direct 
access to the president instead of having to go through the bureaucracy, so he knew 
more clearly about Clinton’s attitude toward NATO expansion. And after Prague, 
Lake became more confident about how determined the president was to put NATO 
enlargement on the agenda. Talbott was a roommate of Clinton at Oxford, and had 
more chance to know the president’s true intention than the other officials. Although 
he was formerly one of the chief opponents of near-term NATO expansion, Talbott 
finally changed his mind to support the president’s policy on concrete steps toward 
enlargement the moment he noticed Clinton’s true aspiration.54 Promoted by Lake and 
Talbott, Clinton reiterated his pledge that “NATO will be expanded, that it should be 
expanded” during his July visit to Warsaw.55 The president was so determined that he 
further emphasised the imperativeness of NATO expansion: the Alliance should be 
expanded as a way of strengthening security and not conditioned on events in any 
other country or some new threat arising to NATO. Further, Clinton even told Poland 
the reason why Washington was working with Warsaw in the PfP was because the US 
believed that “when NATO does expand, as it will, a democratic Poland will have 
placed itself among those ready and able to join”.56  So far Clinton’s stance was 
clearly conveyed through various presidential statements. Actually in addition to Lake 
and Talbott’s lobbying, President Clinton had sufficient incentives to support 
enlargement: his Wilsonian orientation toward spreading democracy; the need to 
demonstrate US leadership at a time when others questioned that leadership; the 
appeal by Central and Eastern Europe to erase the line drawn for them in 1945.  
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Once Clinton had clarified his approval of expansion, the State Department as 
a whole began to support the president’s policy on enlargement. It is worth noticing 
that the shift in the State Department’s attitude occurred mainly due to the influence 
of Talbott. His promotion to deputy secretary of state led to a change of his stance on 
NATO expansion, given “where you stand depends on where you sit”. After he 
comprehended Clinton’s plan to promote enlargement, Talbott, the “friend of Bill”, 
decided to stay in step with the president without question. He then devoted himself to 
drumming up support for US policy on expansion within the State Department. At the 
same time, the Pentagon had undergone complex and painful changes regarding 
NATO enlargement since early 1994. The Pentagon had been content with its 
previous stance that the PfP and the CJTF were the right choices till Clinton adopted a 
supportive position in Prague and Warsaw. The Pentagon soon began to understand 
why enlargement was imperative: aspirant countries, once reformed well enough to 
meet the entry criteria, would naturally require full membership of NATO rather than 
remaining satisfied with the alternative “substitute”. The endorsement of the PfP 
should not and could not replace enlargement.  
Generally speaking, US policy on NATO expansion was successfully 
conveyed to Europe and Russia by presidential statements, nonetheless, it has not 
been accepted internally by all officials in the Clinton administration. In fact, few 
believed that enlargement was the administration’s policy, hence no one was acting to 
implement it. The autumn of 1994 witnessed “a big push” within both the executive 
and legislative branches. In September 1994, Richard Holbrooke, a close friend of 
Talbott, was brought back from Bonn to serve as assistant secretary of state for 
European affairs. He became the enforcer of the decision within the bureaucracy by 
holding an interagency meeting with his colleagues from the NSC, the State 
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Department, and the Pentagon. Holbrooke told them that President Clinton had 
already stated his policy and that our job now was to act on it. He won the 
confrontation with the Pentagon officials because he got the support from the 
president, vice president, national security adviser and secretary of state, the authority 
of whom gave him sufficient “legitimacy”. In December, William Perry, who 
replaced Aspin called for a meeting to further clarify Clinton’s intentions. By 
reemphasising that Clinton was indeed in favour of NATO expansion, Perry 
succeeded in persuading the Pentagon to consider providing support for enlargement 
from then on.  
Again, as predicted, the outcome of bureaucratic wrangling would be a 
compromise. Thereby a so-called two-track approach was produced following those 
internal meetings. Brzezinski was the first to put forward the two-track approach, 
which aimed to promote concrete steps on enlargement and to offer an explicit 
enough place for Russia in the meantime.57 It was then elaborated upon in Daniel 
Fried, Alexander Vershbow and Nicholas Burns’ “road map to enlargement” paper 
that the two-track approach was better than its alternatives, for it reflected a consensus 
that expansion and a NATO-Russia track would have to proceed in parallel for the 
policy to be effective.58 On the other hand, although the administration made few 
efforts to consult with congressional leaders on the issue of enlargement, the 
Republicans’ Congressional campaign left one plank that referred to foreign policy in 
its Contract with America in September 1994. The Contract detailed the actions the 
Republicans promised to take if they became the majority in the US House of 
Representatives, which included three core initiatives: constraints on multilateral 
peacekeeping efforts, ballistic missile defence, and NATO enlargement. The Contract 
was seen as a triumph by party leaders, though it also engaged in a frontal assault on 
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the legislation, as it unilaterally and prematurely designated certain European states 
for NATO, which would risk discouraging reformers in countries not named and 
fostering complacency in countries that were.59 The Clinton administration neglected 
this potential problem, and inclined to take necessary consideration for bridge 
building with legislators. Yet enlargement supporters in the Congress did not give up 
their idea of promoting NATO expansion. One month later, with the joint efforts of 
the House and the Senate, Congressman Henry Hyde, Benjamin Gilman, Senator 
Hank Brown and Paul Simon advanced the NATO Participation Act to be passed as 
Title II of the International Narcotics Control Correction Act of 1994, which provided 
names, a timetable, and criteria for enlargement.60 So far, adequate preparations for 
NATO expansion had been made. Finally the momentous time came—the NSC, the 
State Department and the Pentagon all came up with a clear unified position at the 
NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting in Brussels in December 1994 that the US would 
support NATO enlargement. Since the question of “why” was already resolved within 
the US, the next step for the administration would be to eliminate external obstacles, 
especially to reduce Russian objection.  
 
How to manage the NATO-Russian relationship? 
In addition to clarifying US determination to promote NATO expansion, there was 
another important task to be addressed at the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in 
Brussels: to see Russia sign the PfP programme documents as well as to establish a 
special dialogue between NATO and Russia. However, Andrei Kozyrev, the Russian 
Foreign Minister who regarded the prevention of NATO expansion as the greatest 
achievement of Russian foreign policy in 1993, refused to cooperate.61 Later at the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe summit in Budapest, Yeltsin 
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expressed his anger over NATO expansion and warned Europe that it “is risking 
encumbering itself with a cold peace”.62 Both Christopher and Clinton were shocked 
by Russia’s unexpected response, for they thought information symmetry between 
America and Russia had been carefully protected. Once again, the costs of 
“misinterpretation” became a hard nut for America to crack. Looking back to August 
1993, Yeltsin had promised that Russia would not object to Polish membership within 
NATO, but in January 1994, he required NATO to accept candidates, including 
Russia, in just one package. After hearing Clinton’s Warsaw declaration, Yeltsin flew 
to Washington in September for an in-depth discussion. Clinton told him face to face 
that NATO was potentially open to all European democracies, including Russia, and 
would not expand in a way that threatened Russian interests. Clinton even promised 
that names would not be announced until after Yeltsin’s 1996 presidential election.63 
However, Russia was not content with that; it launched an assault on Chechnya and 
facilitated its plans to complete a nuclear reactor deal with Iran. In short, throughout 
the year of 1995, the US was busy amending relations with Russia rather than moving 
forward to answer the remaining questions of “how”, “when” and “who”? 
In order to avoid serious confrontation with Russia, on one hand, Talbott 
intensively consulted with Russian deputy foreign minister Georgi Mamedov over a 
possible NATO-Russia agreement. On the other hand, Clinton accepted Yeltsin’s 
invitation to travel to Moscow for the fiftieth anniversary celebration of VE day in 
May 1995, when the president was facing an enormous dilemma of whether to 
strongly insist on expansion due to the accusation that the US was too weak to hold 
the Central European hostage to Moscow’s interests or to be soft on Russia in order to 
encourage its peaceful reform. As a result, during his visit in Moscow, Clinton 
affirmed that NATO enlargement which was not anti-Russian was moving forward 
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but also reiterated his promise that a timetable would not be announced until after 
Yeltsin’s re-election. The year of 1995 saw the president playing a difficult balancing 
game, yet it also witnessed the first glimmer of the dawn: Clinton did convince 
Yeltsin that Russia should join the PfP.64 In order to give an impetus to a benign 
NATO-Russian relationship, the NATO enlargement study was established, 
suggesting prospective members be judged on a case-by-case basis. With regard to 
this, Russia no longer needed to worry about its right to apply for membership, though 
it remained ambiguous whether Russia might someday become a member of NATO. 
Another thorny problem faced by NATO and Russia was the Bosnia resolution (the 
Dayton Accords).65 Although he strongly expressed his disapproval of US actions in 
Bosnia in September 1995, Yeltsin finally agreed in principle to Russian participation 
in the Bosnia implementation force. Moscow emphasised that Russians would serve 
“with, but not under” NATO, signalling its optimism about being under American 
command in Bosnia yet making NATO “still a four-letter word in Moscow”. 66 
Therefore, despite the fact that cooperation between NATO and Russia was successful 
in Bosnia, it could not assure the US that the future NATO-Russian relationship 
would be promising. 
The Clinton administration had always kept in mind that only by solving the 
“hazard”—the biggest concern about the NATO-Russian relationship—could NATO 
expansion go smoothly in the future. The first formal call for a special dialogue 
between NATO and Russia was proposed at the NATO Foreign Ministers meetings in 
Brussels in 1994. This turned out to be abortive in the end. Even though Washington 
failed in its attempt to improve the NATO-Russian relationship immediately, it at 
least figured out that the US-preferred bottom line was that neither would Russia gain 
a veto over the NATO decision-making process, nor would America engage with 
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Russia on the issue of nuclear weapons and the stationing of NATO troops. On the 
other hand, Moscow’s major concerns were put forward by Mamedov through his 
arguments about two conditions for NATO-Russian cooperation: “no nuclear 
weapons deployed on the territory of the new members and no stationing of NATO 
troops on new members’ territory”.67 According to Mamedov, unless both of these 
two requirements were met, Russia would not accept NATO expansion.  
With respect to this, the US delivered two unilateral statements aiming to 
address how Washington would meet these two conditions respectively. The first 
statement referred to Christopher’s speech in Brussels in December 1996, in which he 
articulated “three nos” to ease Russian concerns: NATO had no intention, no plan, 
and no need to station nuclear weapons on the territory of any new members.68 With 
this statement in hand, Russian foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov agreed to start 
working with the NATO foreign ministers on a possible NATO-Russia charter. The 
second US statement was also released in Brussels, in which Alexander Vershbow 
clarified that the additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces was not 
a choice for NATO.69 This, however, did not meet Russian requirements directly, as 
what Russia actually wanted was a binding commitment that no foreign troops would 
be stationed on the territory of the new members. Yet Moscow also understood it 
might be the best Washington could do, as US domestic complaints had already 
revealed that “NATO should not be turned into an instrument to conciliate Russia or 
Russia will undermine it”.70 In order to ease Moscow’s pain, Clinton offered Yeltsin 
more promises including the decision to move forward on START III immediately 
after START II was ratified, and an understanding to advance Russian membership in 
other key Western clubs like the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the G7/8. Finally, in May 
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1997, the NATO-Russia Charter, “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation 
and Security between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation”, was passed in Paris.71 This charter became another landmark after the 
Dayton Accords, which not only properly defined the relationship between NATO 
and Russia, but also significantly weakened the opponents’ argument that Russia 
would never accept enlargement. 
 
When should NATO expand?   
With the easing of US-Russian tensions and the improvement of the NATO-Russian 
relationship, the third question of NATO enlargement—When should NATO 
expand?—was put on the agenda. To address this question, it was necessary to firstly 
specify whether the first round of enlargement was the only and last one. If so, it 
would be meaningless to discuss the question of “when”, given “when” would 
become “never” for the other Central and Eastern European aspirants who could not 
gain the memberships in the first round. In March 1996, Christopher delivered a 
speech in Prague, in which he responded that the first wave of NATO enlargement 
would not be the last.72 Moreover, he also stressed the administration’s commitment 
to push NATO expansion forward and hinted that the question of “when” was going 
to be answered very shortly. The force that drove the question of “when” needing to 
be answered straight away came from Robert Dole, the Republican presidential 
challenger. Dole criticised the president for “foot-dragging” on expanding NATO, 
accusing Clinton of not naming names or setting a timetable for enlargement.73 Unlike 
the president, Dole neither hesitated to offer a list of candidates nor was unwilling to 
declare a date. He even announced his preference for setting the year of 1998, the 60th 
anniversary of the appeasement at Munich, as the date to bring in new members. This, 
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without doubt, placed great pressure on the administration. On the other hand, Clinton 
had always been reluctant to name names or to set a timetable, for fear of reducing the 
ability to cooperate with the other emerging democracies and making the management 
of the NATO-Russia relationship more difficult. However, when encountered with the 
challenge from Dole, Clinton intended to issue a more concrete plan of NATO 
expansion as soon as possible. Additionally, the anxiety of the Central and Eastern 
European aspirants and of those internal ethnic communities made Clinton more 
determined to proceed with all the details of enlargement. The administration soon 
realised that the strategic and political benefits of enlargement outweighed the 
concerns about Russia. Hence later in October when Clinton gave his campaign 
speech in Detroit, the president stated clearly that “by 1999, NATO’s 50th anniversary 
and ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the first group of countries we invite to 
join should be fully-fledged members of NATO”.74 Until then, the question of “when” 
was finally settled, but Clinton did not go further and identify which countries he 
wanted to see admitted to the Alliance. 
Even though many actors contributed to address the question of “when”, it is 
worth noticing that presidential dominance played a crucial role. Recalling Clinton’s 
promise to Yeltsin that concrete steps would not be implemented until he was safely 
re-elected, it was apparent that Clinton was so unwilling to see NATO expansion 
provoke Russia. Thus Talbott advised Clinton not to set a date, but rather simply to 
say something vague that new members would be taken in sometime during the 
second term. However, there remained supporters like Lake who argued in favour of 
concrete plans right away. The distinct views of these two key representatives 
stemmed from their different assumptions of Moscow’s role in Europe. Talbott 
believed that Russia should be part of the European security framework, while Lake 
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agreed more with Kissinger that Russia would remain as an outsider due to the long-
term mistrust between the two sides. Again, bureaucratic wrangling led to a 
compromise: Talbott, who was inspired by Brzezinski’s “two-track” approach, 
decided to commit himself to put together the two tracks of the policy in 1995. The 
“two-track” policy was expected to end the debate, as it would satisfy both proponents 
and opponents of near-term expansion.  
However, it was soon questioned due to its ignorance of the changes in 
Clinton’s attitude toward a more concrete plan. Presidential dominance soon prevailed 
over bureaucratic wrangling, shifting US policy to immediate implementation of 
NATO enlargement. Though President Clinton used to see the peaceful reform in 
Russia as his top national security objective, he also wished to support Walesa and 
Havel and to maintain his credibility in ethnic communities. In other words, Clinton 
had to deal with a trade-off between wanting to support reform in Central and Eastern 
Europe as well as reform in Russia, which was referred to as “value complexity”.75 It 
seemed almost impossible to pursue one objective when that would adversely affect 
the pursuit of another vital objective. For Clinton, the only way to solve the problem 
of the so-called “value complexity” was to figure out which one of these issues would 
be a priority over the other, on the basis of a careful assessment about Washington’s 
military, diplomatic, and political demands. Bearing this in mind, the president soon 
found “value complexity” was not a big issue when he discovered the great possibility 
of solving the problem of Russia. He believed that the Russian track would not be 
undermined and future cooperation between Russia and the Alliance would be 
promising, given that Russia was willing to make contributions to the Bosnia 
operation regardless of how underdeveloped the NATO-Russian relationship was at 
that time. Therefore, he became confident of his ability to convince Yeltsin of the idea 
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that NATO expansion was not anti-Russian and that future Russian membership in 
NATO was possible. In his Detroit speech, Clinton reemphasised that “NATO 
enlargement is not directed against anyone. It will advance the security of everyone: 
NATO’s old members, new members and non-members alike”.76  In short, it was 
Clinton who pushed NATO expansion a large step forward, implying that presidential 
determination might play a more important role than bureaucratic rivalries. 
 
Who should gain the membership of NATO (in the first round)? 
The question of “who” was the last one to be addressed in the Clinton administration. 
It turned out to be the only one being discussed thoroughly through a formal decision-
making process. The main focus of the debate was on which countries were qualified 
enough to be invited to join the Alliance as the first wave of NATO expansion. To be 
specific, there was not great controversy surrounding the memberships of Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic, yet debates remained over the memberships of 
Slovenia and Romania. 
In response, Ronald Asmus, the deputy assistant secretary of state for 
European affairs, raised a famous approach of “Small is Beautiful plus Robust Open 
Door”. 77  He, accompanied by Vershbow and Fried, tried to persuade Clinton to 
merely agree to the membership of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. 
According to them, a small membership would make it easy for the administration to 
obtain support from the Senate, to put off the Baltic question, and to ensure 
enlargement can continue to the next round.78 However, challenges came from both 
inside and outside of America. The Pentagon used to have high expectations about 
Slovenia, yet it abandoned the thought after examining the existing infrastructure in 
Slovenia. It was apparent that neither Slovenia nor Romania could meet the criteria 
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for NATO membership due to their lack of developed economies and benign strategic 
environments. Thus the Pentagon reached an agreement on limiting the first round of 
NATO expansion to three countries only. The Senate, on the other hand, rejected the 
proposal of a small membership until it was informed by Gore, Albright and Deputy 
National Security Adviser Samuel Berger altogether that the president believed three 
was better.79  
Contrary to internal challenges, external challenges were more durable. US 
allies like France and Italy were in favour of more states being admitted than America 
wanted. They even accused the US of its dominance in NATO. But this time, the US 
did not need to be soft on Europe. The US has always played a dominant role in the 
Alliance, shouldering the responsibility to provide necessary security guarantee for 
European members. Yet after the end of the Cold War, Europe began to pursue an 
independent role. Bosnia saw the Europeans’ first attempt to deal with relevant issues 
by themselves, the failure of which again confirmed the importance of a US security 
umbrella to Europe. As a result, in terms of NATO membership, it was unnecessary 
for the US to dedicate itself to persuade its allies, because European members would 
follow the US decision anyway. With the establishment of the Senate NATO 
Observer Group and the NATO enlargement ratification office which were created by 
Senator Trent Lott and Jeremy Rosner respectively, the question of “who” was 
addressed satisfactorily—the issuance of invitation to Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic was made at Madrid in July 1997. 
So far, all relevant questions on NATO expansion including “why”, “how”, 
“when”, and “who” had been addressed one by one. Next, as long as the Senate voted 
in favour of enlargement, NATO expansion would be truly realised. Actually what 
concerned the Senate most were the problems of Russian objection and the costs of 
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expansion. Since the former was properly handled through the NATO-Russian charter, 
more attention was paid to the latter. Surprisingly, a consensus on the budget was 
easily achieved despite different estimations having been made by the Pentagon, the 
NATO enlargement study, and NATO itself. The “fast-track approach” to address the 
question of costs would not have been striking, yet it attracted attention due to the fact 
that it gave a valuable insight into how the lack of formality led to the failure to cover 
all aspects early in the decision-making process. Specifically, the estimation of costs 
should have been done in the early stage, taking into account that people would like to 
know the costs of a project before rather than after embarking on it. There were a 
number of reasons why no effort was made to have a cost estimate done until near the 
end of the process. For example, Lake focused more on the crises in Bosnia, Haiti and 
Somalia; and Perry saw the issues of denuclearisation more urgent. Bureaucrats’ 
preferences varied according to their positions, which might lead to the problem of 
informality, but they would all contribute to promote a particular policy once that 
policy became prominent.      
Finally the exciting time to open the gift box came. Following Lake, who 
inspired the administration as a whole; Holbrooke, who woke up the bureaucracy and 
led the implementation; and Talbott, who kept the two tracks going harmoniously, 
Rosner took the last stick to win Senate consent. In the administration’s NATO 
enlargement ratification office, Rosner continued to make efforts till a resolution was 
reported out of the Foreign Relations Committee in March 1998. The awarding time 
came one month later when the Senate voted in favour of that resolution, which 
marked the official launching of NATO expansion. 
To sum up, in order to analyse the impetus behind the Clinton administration’s 
recommitment to NATO, it has been necessary to focus on the influence of 
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bureaucratic politics, the consultation between the executive and legislative branches, 
and the attitude of the public. From the perspective of bureaucratic politics, 
interactions among the NSC, the State Department and the Pentagon, especially 
among key figures including Clinton, Lake, Albright, Talbott, Holbrooke, and Rosner 
were considered as the driving force for NATO expansion. But it is also worth noting 
that without the Capitol Hill’s efforts, US policy on enlargement would not have 
become reality. In 1995, Republicans took over both the Senate and the House, 
creating a divided government. Besides, the Clinton administration failed to 
adequately consult with the Congress until 1996. But Clinton did not have to face 
serious internal disputes on the issue of expansion because the majority of 
Republicans were actually in favour of NATO enlargement. The reason why they 
voted yes on the president’s policy lay in their belief that they were fulfilling Ronald 
Reagan’s legacy rather than handing Clinton a victory. 80  Thus interestingly, 
Republicans saw themselves rather than Clinton as the engine driving NATO 
enlargement. The third important angle on analysis about US commitment to NATO 
expansion referred to public opinion. Demonstrated by polls, the public also favoured 
NATO expansion, believing that new members would become “contributors” rather 
than “consumers” in order to share burdens and responsibilities. A poll taken in 
January 1997 showed that 45 per cent favoured enlargement while 40 per cent 
opposed it. The margin soon became even higher: 54 per cent to 37 per cent.81 
Moreover, interest groups within the public also played important roles in boosting 
enlargement: ethnic communities like the Polish Americans, and outside experts such 
as Kissinger, Brzezinski put great pressure on the Clinton administration following 
the initial stage of the policy. 
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While enjoying the victory, the Clinton administration also needed to reflect 
on previous mistakes and beware of potential challenges. As mentioned above, the 
issue of informality, such as the delayed evaluation of costs and the administration’s 
inadequate consultation with the Congress, was a serious error that needed to be 
avoided in the future. Although the first wave of enlargement had demonstrated that 
NATO was transformed into a diplomatic and political alliance rather than remaining 
as a pure defensive military institution, and that the US still possessed the leadership 
in the Alliance, and that the Russia track was not undermined by expansion, the 
prospect of NATO remained unclear. According to Robert Hunter, the challenges to 
NATO mainly centred on “whether allies are able and willing to defend new members 
under challenge, whether they will underpin the domestic political and economic 
development of new entrants, and whether a much larger alliance can continue to take 
decisions and act on them”.82 Further, would there be a second round of enlargement, 
taking into account that countries in the “grey zone” were eager to join NATO? 
Would Russia stay peacefully under the framework, given that Russia did not have a 
real voice in NATO affairs? Moreover, the Baltic issue, the potential financial costs, 
and the suspected effectiveness of the new NATO would also become challenges on 
the road to expansion.83 Thus, in addition to having every confidence in a promising 
future of NATO expansion, the US should always get prepared for potential twists 
and turns at the same time. 
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5  NATO’s Engagement in Kosovo
 
Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has navigated several existential crises, over 
Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya. Each of these NATO involvements, either 
active or passive, have witnessed and pushed the transformation of NATO. In the 
aftermath of the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, suspicions on the persistence of 
NATO were growing, entailing that the relevance of NATO was little to the new 
security environment without the common threat of Soviet Union to the Alliance. As 
Ellen Hallams noted, an institution can persist only if it proves able to adapt its rules 
and procedures to meet changing circumstances and the emergence of new threats and 
challenges to the security of its members, and there was no exception for NATO.1 
Guided by the US, NATO underwent a process of adaption immediately when being 
questioned about its constituency. The 1990 London Declaration and, to a greater 
extent, the 1991 “New Strategic Concept” released at the Rome Summit 
acknowledged that the risks to allied security in this “new strategic environment” 
would be harder to predict and access. New threats were suggested to come from “the 
adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social, 
and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and terrorist disputes, which are 
faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe”.2 Thus how NATO would 
adapt itself to the new task of crisis management and conflict prevention became 
critical for its maintenance as a viable and important organisation in the post-Cold 
War era. As Senator Richard Lugar predicted, NATO would go “out of area or out of 
business”. Hence in respect of these challenges, NATO found Bosnia to be a likely 
answer to the question of its relevance.  
In 1992, NATO issued statements to offer support to both the UN and the 
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Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) respectively, which 
signalled its “formal entry into peace-support operation”.3 However, its subsequent 
engagement in Bosnia only reflected hidden hesitation in dealing with those “new 
threats” when they did arise. Throughout, NATO proved ill-equipped to operate this 
type and its force structure reforms could not keep pace with the requirements of the 
new tasks of conflict management.4  In addition, it was hard to reach agreements 
among allies, either on what interests were at stake in the former Yugoslavia or how 
to go about achieving them.5 Actually, regarding the fact that NATO’s involvement in 
Bosnia was determined by an agenda laid down not in Brussels but in New York, the 
political leadership and military capabilities of the US became the real prerequisite to 
ensure that NATO would be truly effective. Hence as the situation in Bosnia 
continued to deteriorate, there re-emerged a realist criticism: “NATO was little more 
than a ‘hollow shell’”.6 As a result, NATO’s reluctant and shattering response to the 
break-up of the former Yugoslavia and the resulting war in Bosnia led to the eventual 
criticism about its role in Yugoslavia’s collapse—”had it acted sooner and more 
decisively, NATO might well have forced an early settlement and thus prevented 
much of the carnage and colossal human suffering that was visited upon Bosnia”.7  
Although Bosnia demonstrated that NATO’s transformation from a traditional 
alliance preoccupied by self-defence to one oriented towards collective security was 
not an easy task, it did witness NATO’s evolvement “to the heart of an emerging 
European security architecture”.8 Bosnia saw NATO’s first “out-of-area” operation, 
the first experience of peacekeeping, the first major deployment of NATO-led land 
forces beyond member-state territory, and the first major instance of NATO’s 
coordinated involvement with partner countries including Russia.9 Furthermore, those 
challenges of creating peace and security highlighted in Bosnia finally turned out to 
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be a driving force for NATO expansion. With the crisis of Bosnia being resolved, 
many Central and Eastern European countries began pursuing full-scale membership 
of NATO as the only means of ensuring their long-term security. As Hallams 
concluded, it was NATO’s mission in Bosnia that helped push the issue of 
enlargement firmly onto NATO’s transformation agenda. Thus, after the formal 
invitation of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to join the Alliance at the 
Madrid Summit, the end of the 1990s saw NATO moving towards “an alliance of 
values, united in extending security to those states in Europe that embrace the political 
and economic norms that bind NATO’s current members”.10 This “new” alliance, 
which had its membership expanded and its tasks broadened “out-of area”, then faced 
its first formal test in the post-Cold War period: the Kosovo operation. According to 
Javier Solana, Kosovo was important to the history of NATO, given the fact that “For 
the first time, a defensive alliance launched a military campaign to avoid a 
humanitarian tragedy outside its own borders. For the first time, an alliance of 
sovereign nations fought not to conquer or preserve territory but to protect the values 
on which the alliance was found”.11      
The timing of the outbreak of the Kosovo war partially contributed to the 
success of the operation, as the war occurred when the international community 
especially the US had learned a lot from Bosnia that a quick response was necessary, 
and when NATO had transformed further to be capable of assuming more 
responsibilities “out-of-area”, and when the Clinton administration had officially 
acknowledged the importance of the transatlantic alliance and reconfirmed its 
commitment to NATO.  
 
From “Ancient Hatred” to Dayton Peace 
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As the crisis in Bosnia subsided, it was widely expected that Kosovo would be the 
“next test” for the Alliance which had gone through certain transformation alongside 
the expansion process. “Ancient hatreds”, the long-standing historical grievances in 
the region, which stemmed from contested views over territorial claims to Kosovo, 
were regarded as the main causes of the conflict. Kosovo, a province of less than 
11,000 square kilometres, had a population of two million, 90 per cent of whom were 
Albanian. But both the Albanian and the Serbian national communities claimed it for 
their own. The primary relevance emphasised by the Serbs referred to the belief that 
Kosovo was Serbia’s historical and spiritual heartland. On the other hand, the 
Albanians insisted that long before the Serb tribes arrived in Kosovo, their ancestors 
had already inhabited there since the sixth century AD. As a result, based on their 
own rationales, both the Albanians and the Serbs had a deep-rooted commitment to 
claim Kosovo for their own through generation after generation.  
WWII witnessed the increasing anger of Kosovars when they found their 
homeland, though tiny in territorial area, was divided among the Germans, Italians, 
and Bulgarians. Tito’s communist agents had promised to support the unification of 
all Albanians: “after the war a unified Albania-Kosovo would become a part of 
Yugoslavia, or even a general larger Balkan federation”, however, as it turned out, the 
post-1945 Yugoslav state made not only the Serbs but also the Albanians 
disappointed.12 Serbia became one of the six federal republics, with numerous Serbs 
absorbed into neighbouring Yugoslav republics. Although the new state structure was 
initially devised to promote equality among the federal units, the Serbs believed the 
purpose to be keeping Serbia weak. On the other hand, Kosovo, though awarded the 
status of “autonomous region” due to its considerable Albanian population, became a 
part of Serbia rather than integrated into Albania as it wished. To make matters worse, 
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the Yugoslav constitution, promulgated in 1946, categorised Albanians as a 
“nationality” rather than a “nation”, implying that the Albanians could never establish 
a republic of their own. Therefore, no matter how much effort they made, both the 
Serbs and the Albanians did not get what they pursued when the time came at the end 
of WWII. 
In 1948 Yugoslavia was isolated after splitting with Russia. The Kosovars 
immediately cut off their ties with Albania, the government members of which came 
from the Communist-led National Liberation Movement (LNC), an Albanian 
resistance organisation created in September 1942.13 However, the Kosovo Albanians 
still had no chance to get rid of ideological influences from either Russia or China, 
resulting in their hopelessness to achieve autonomy during the Cold War. Not until 
the 1960s did the situation move towards a better direction for them. In 1963, the 
Yugoslav government upgraded Kosovo to the status of “province”; in 1965, Kosovo 
was allotted financial assistance, which accounted for 40 per cent of the so-called 
special federal fund that was established for economic improvement in 
underdeveloped regions; in 1967, Tito made a notable visit to the province; in 1968, 
“Metohija”, a large basin covering the southwestern part of Kosovo, was dropped 
from the province’s name; and in 1969, Kosovo drew up a new constitution and 
established a new supreme court.14 To push it one step forward, the Constitution of 
1974 finally enabled Kosovo to have an equal vote in national governmental bodies, 
identifying Kosovo as one of eight units of the Yugoslav federation. On the other 
hand, either encouraged or stimulated by the victory of the Albanians, the Serbs began 
to urge Serbian unification. With the upsurge of the “Serbian nationalism”, Kosovo 
was soon regarded as the most appropriate place to start the Serbs’ plan because 
Kosovo was essentially “Serbia’s historical and spiritual heartland”.15  
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In fact, the ethnic tensions did not increase dramatically until Slobodan 
Milosevic, who stripped Kosovo of its autonomy, became President of Serbia in 1987. 
In the following years, to keep the nationalist course on track, Milosevic abandoned 
the party ideology and focused on purging the League of Communist (LCY) parties in 
Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Montenegro. He sought to retain “the remnant of the 
previous confederation by tightening this political and military control over Kosovo 
and Montenegro”. 16  Specifically, in the case of Kosovo, what Milosevic had to 
overcome first in order to achieve his objective was an obstacle created by the 
Constitution of 1973 that had given Kosovo autonomy. With regard to this, on March 
23, 1989, the autonomous status of Kosovo was abolished by a “packed” parliament. 
Shortly thereafter, the Serbs proclaimed Serbia to be whole again. Thus the year of 
1989 witnessed an unprecedented victory for Serbia, which gained control over four 
of the eight units of the Yugoslav federation in the end. Owning half of the votes, 
Serbia became the real dominator of Yugoslav politics.17  
In response, the Kosovars carried out protests, but only ended in meeting with 
Belgrade’s severe police and military restrictions. The harsh arrest and unfair trial of 
those Albanian communist party leaders eventually heightened tensions between the 
Albanians and the Serbs, and raised concerns in other Yugoslav republics as well. In 
the face of the Serb pressure, the Albanian political leaders nevertheless issued a 
declaration of sovereignty for Kosovo shortly after Kosovo lost its autonomy in 
March 1989. At the end of that year, the Albanian leaders successfully organised the 
Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) as their legitimate political party, which 
absorbed 700,000 members by 1991. Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of the LDK, set the 
political programme for the Kosovars based on his faith in pacifism. Judging that 
Kosovo was poor, its people had no weapons, and the Serbs were eager to find a 
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pretext to march into Kosovo, Rugova preferred a policy of “being calm and wait”. In 
short, although Rugova agreed to set the ultimate goal as “a republic for Kosovo”, he 
repeatedly advocated pacifism vis-a-vis the Serbs to be the basic principle.18 The next 
step before the Kosovars announcing their victory was to hold a referendum on the 
establishment of their own republic, which received overwhelming support from 
voters on September 22, 1991. However, none of these changes was acknowledged by 
the Serbs. 
With support from Serbia, which had officially sent a message of Serbian 
unification after abolishing the autonomy of Kosovo, both the Croatian and Slovenia 
Serbs issued declarations of independence and held republic elections to bring non-
communist governments to power in 1991. All these signals were suggesting that the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia was imminent and that warfare was unavoidable, but 
Kosovo remained relatively calm in 1991 and even in the following four years when 
Bosnia was put under the spotlight. Ironically, disturbances that had locked the 
Albanians and Serbs on a collision course in Kosovo since Tito’s death in 1980, did 
not escalate rapidly, instead, both the Albanians and the Serbs lived their lives 
peacefully during the Bosnia crisis. By defining “autonomy” as “run by ourselves and 
cut off any link with the Serbs’ disregarding how poor they were, the Kosovo 
Albanians, with financial assistance from other Albanian communities abroad, 
therefore concentrated on running their own schools and hospitals at home. On the 
other hand, the Serbs were busy with “a three-and-a-half-year-long siege against 
Sarajevo” and trusted in their police’s ability to patrol Kosovo. Hence they had no 
time or energy to deal with the sometimes unruly province. As a result, both of these 
two groups refused to see Bosnia as a possible chilling outbreak of their hostility, 
making military means unpopular at that moment. But this temporary peace in 
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Kosovo was soon broken after the ceasefire in Bosnia. And the situation became even 
worse when the Kosovo Albanians, unhappy with the Dayton Peace Accords, opted 
for a military policy toward the Serbs.  
 
From “Pacifism” to a military approach  
Although the warning signs had emanated from Kosovo since the 1980s, Western 
leaders failed to respond to them as quickly as possible, instead, they continued to 
view Kosovo as “only a footnote”. The reason why the West refused to take Kosovo 
seriously lay in some fundamental misperceptions. On one hand, unlike Bosnia and 
Croatia, Kosovo was widely accepted by the West as being part of Serbia, “without 
any of the sovereign rights the other republics that had seceded from Yugoslavia 
enjoyed”.19 On the other hand, the strategy adopted by the Albanian leader Ibrahim 
Rugova was “passive resistance”, which assumed that war would not be necessary if 
the Albanians could build democratic institutions within Kosovo. Therefore, lacking a 
keen sense of smell, Kosovo had missed the only two chances that could help attract 
the West’s attention before the conflict escalated unexpectedly. The first chance came 
in December 1992 when President George H.W. Bush sent out a “Christmas Warning” 
drafted by his Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger. The message sent to 
Milosevic was that “In the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action, the 
United States will be prepared to employ military force against Serbians in Kosovo 
and in Serbia proper”.20 Kosovars should have seized this opportunity to raise the 
issue of Kosovo, which might have been put on the international community’s agenda 
earlier, thereby preventing the outbreak of the war. The second chance referred to the 
passage of the Dayton Peace Accords in November 1995, which put an end to the 
three and a half years of bloody ethnic strife in Bosnia. Milosevic was invited to 
NATO’s Engagement in Kosovo 
107 
 
Dayton and treated as an honoured guest and a legitimate head of state, because the 
Clinton administration was seeking a peace settlement that left Milosevic in power.21 
Again, Kosovo should have taken Dayton as an opportunity to unmask Milosevic’s 
inhumanity and request the arrest of a war criminal while he was in the US.  
In fact, referring back to the London meeting in April 1992, which was called 
to discuss the impending war in Bosnia, the notion that the West did not approve 
Kosovo as a “nation/republic” had already become apparent, given that members of 
the Rugova delegation were treated as observers rather than participants. However, 
not until the Dayton Peace did the Kosovo Albanians realise how “unimportant” they 
were to the West: the status of their province was left unresolved yet Milosevic 
emerged as the region’s power broker. Although Richard Holbrooke raised the 
complexity of the situation in Kosovo and the overriding need to ensure Milosevic’s 
compliance with Dayton Peace, what the UN emphasised was only continuing 
sanctions against Belgrade until Serbia started to deal with positively and directly 
with the Kosovars, leaving Kosovo deliberately sidelined. 22  Thus, treated as an 
internal concern of Serbia, Kosovo was removed from the bargaining table. This left 
the Kosovars disillusioned with the heedless behavior of the international community. 
The disillusionment was further heightened when Serbia and Montenegro were 
officially recognised by the EU as the Yugoslav states in April 1996. On the contrary, 
Kosovo, as the head of the newly established US Information Office in Pristina 
claimed in June 1996, was still regarded as a part of Yugoslavia and it should 
continue to remain so.23  As a result, all this suffering drove Kosovo to make up its 
mind to resort to a military approach. 
What the Kosovars learned from Dayton Peace was that Rugova’s pacifism 
led nowhere. Following the rejection of previous pacifist policies, Kosovars changed 
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to favour a more military approach. In fact, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a 
Kosovo Albanian paramilitary organisation which sought the separation of Kosovo 
from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, had already been formed in 1990, but 
remained relatively passive until 1995. Founded as a military wing, the KLA began to 
undertake a series of guerrilla activities against Serbia in 1996, including sporadic 
attacks on police stations and Yugoslav government offices. Through alleging that the 
Serbs had killed the Albanian civilians as part of an ethnic cleansing campaign, the 
KLA successfully took the credit for its operations against the Serbs.24 In response, 
the Serbian authorities denounced the KLA as a terrorist group and intensified the 
police rule in the region by increasing its security forces. The Serbia efforts to isolate 
the KLA by gluing them the label of terrorism, however, resulted in the counter-
productive effect that helped boost the credibility of the KLA among the Kosovo 
Albanians. The condemnation of the Serbs trying to cleanse Kosovo of its ethnic 
Albanian population was highlighted by two funerals in October and November 1997 
for the KLA men killed by the Serbs, which saw 13,000 and 20,000 mourners in 
attendance respectively. Thus “the killings continued, the retaliations by the KLA 
increased, and support for the KLA grew”.25 This campaign eventually precipitated a 
major crackdown of Yugoslav military forces, leading to the Kosovo crisis in 1998 
and 1999. 
The deteriorating violence in Kosovo undoubtedly alarmed the West. But 
instead of criticising the military intervention led by Milosevic and Serb militias 
within Kosovo, which had facilitated “an exodus of Kosovo Albanians and a refugee 
crisis”, Robert Gelbard, the US representative in Pristina, attempted to lecture the 
Albanians about engaging in violence. He publicly called the KLA “without any 
question a terrorist group”, because “the KLA engaged in tit-for-tat attacks with 
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Serbian nationalists in Kosovo, reprisals against ethnic Albanians who “collaborated” 
with the Serbian government”. 26  This was warmly welcomed by the Serbs who 
interpreted it as “a go-ahead to clamp down on “terrorists” in “their” province”.27 At 
the same time, the UK sent its foreign minister Robin Cook, less assertive than 
Gelbart, to Belgrade to persuade Milosevic to negotiate with the moderate Albanians. 
However, Milosevic overreacted to the visit, rejecting Cook in person and refusing to 
see any other envoy. The West was finally awakened to realise how bad the situation 
had become and how tough Milosevic was. On March 7, 1998, Madeleine Albright, 
the US Secretary of State, strongly declared “We are not going to stand by and watch 
the Serbian authorities do in Kosovo what they can no longer get away with doing in 
Bosnia”.28 Albright’s view was not to make the same mistake as in Bosnia. Shortly 
after the “Contact Group” countries (US, UK, France, Germany, Italy and Russia) 
convened a meeting in London to discuss the issue of Kosovo, Robert Gelbard went 
to meet with Milosevic and warned him about NATO’s possible use of military force 
against Serbia.29 He also urged the Clinton administration to bomb Serbia, which was 
originally rejected by Sandy Berger, the US National Security Advisor. Later in 
March, the UN Security Council passed the Resolution 1160 to condemn both the 
excessive use of force by Yugoslavia and all acts of terrorism by the KLA. 30 
Moreover, in May, Richard Holbrooke, “Milosevic’s drinking buddy from Dayton”, 
was chosen to lobby and convince Milosevic to have a talk with Rugova. Thereafter 
on May 15, the first-ever meeting between Milosevic and Rugova was held on time, 
though dialogue quickly broke down. Rugova, unwilling to give up, continued to 
spare no effort to achieve a peaceful agreement. In May 1998, Rugova and other 
Kosovo Albanian officials went to Washington to see President Clinton, Vice 
President Gore and the Secretary of State Albright. The meeting held in the Oval 
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Office eventually authorised Clinton to offer support to those Kosovo Albanians. 
Early next month, Rugova met with the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, requesting 
immediate UN or NATO intervention.  
Although the US had promised “no more Bosnias”, it felt reluctant to get 
involved when a Serbia national referendum held on April 23, 1998 showed that 95 
per cent of the Serbs rejected foreign mediation to solve the Kosovo crisis.31 In fact, 
the US attitude by far had remained unchanged: let the Yugoslav government bargain 
with the KLA, which was “a policy Washington would never consider for itself—
negotiating with a group (the KLA) that it had identified as a terrorist organisation”.32 
Not until the NATO Ministerial Meeting did a tougher and firmer US stance become 
clear. William Cohen, the US Secretary of Defence, urged the NATO defence 
ministers to “examine all military options…not confine it to air or land or sea or any 
combination of the three”.33 Other ministers who worried about the tense situation in 
the region as well, decided to rattle Milosevic by conducting air exercises, namely the 
“Determined Falcon”.34 85 NATO warplanes were sent out to fly over Albania and 
Macedonia in the “Balkan Air Show”, forewarning Milosevic about NATO’s 
capability to rapidly project power into the region. Furthermore, Richard Holbrooke 
was again sent to negotiate with Milosevic, who agreed to a monitoring force for 
Kosovo, the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM). However, the Serbia 
cooperative gesture did not last long. One month after the KDOM launched 
monitoring operations, the Serbian forces intensified their summer offensive by 
attacking the KLA and Kosovo Albanian villages in the Drenica region, which largely 
reversed Albanian gains.35 On the other hand, at least 34 bodies of people the Serb 
police claimed had been killed by the KLA were discovered in a canal near the village 
of Goldjane, triggering serious allegation against the KLA.36 To cease the violence, 
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the UN Security Council approved the Resolution 1199 on September 23, demanding 
the Serb withdrawal and refugee return.37 However, what the Resolution resulted in 
was only severe violation. For example, the bloody Serb forces, ignored the UNSCR 
1199 and continued to kill another 35 villagers in and around Gornje Obrinje, 21 of 
which came from a single family.38  
Understanding that both the Serbs and Albanians would refuse to comply fully 
with the Resolution, NATO began to discuss the legitimacy of using military force. 
The permission to issue an “activation warning” (ACTWARN) was finally released to 
NATO’s Supreme Commander in the following NATO Defence Ministerial Meeting 
in Vilamoura, Portugal. 39  Regarding the ACTWARN as the first real step in 
preparation for airstrikes, NATO further doubled its legitimacy of intervention by 
adapting French President Jacques Chirac’s famous reasoning that a humanitarian 
emergency allowed it. Other NATO members like Germany also agreed on the 
necessity to wage the “first humanitarian war in history against a genocide”.40 At the 
end of that month, favouring airstrikes against Serbia, Albright requested the 
administration to brief the Capitol Hill about the plan.41 However, Albright’s proposal 
encountered Congressional resistance, leaving the administration no chance to send 
ground troops to Kosovo, even as peacekeepers. Ironically, the final decision for 
action was pushed by the Russian who gave “a backhanded go-ahead” to the Contact 
Group leaders when they met at London’s Heathrow airport on October 8. Igor Ivanov, 
Russia’s foreign minister, told the group that “should intervention in Serbia be 
proposed to the UN, Russia (China, too) would veto it; however, if NATO intervened, 
Russia would protest, but, naturally, would have no recourse”.42  
While NATO was designing an “activation order” (ACTORD) to authorise 
preparations for a limited bombing campaign, a sign of peace was emerging in 
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Kosovo, which made NATO cautiously suspend its plan temporarily.43 This sign of 
peace, the so-called “October Agreement”, was actually achieved and secured by 
Richard Holbrooke. After intense negotiations, on October 13, Holbrooke persuaded 
Milosevic to agree on “Serbian compliance with the UN Resolution 1199, a ceasefire, 
troop withdrawals, elections, substantial autonomy for Kosovo and other confidence-
building measures”.44 In addition, according to the Agreement, the Kosovo Verifying 
Mission (KVM) formed by unarmed monitors from the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), would work together with the KDOM in monitoring 
the violence in the region. Thus, NATO extended the deadline of ACTORD till 
October 27. In order to seize this rare opportunity for peace, General Wesley Clark, 
NATO Supreme Commander, and General Klaus Naumann, Chairman of the NATO 
Military Committee, travelled together to Belgrade on October 24. This timely visit 
resulted in Milosevic’s agreement on reducing forces in Kosovo to pre-March 1998 
levels. Thereafter, the end of that month witnessed thousands of the Serb security 
forces withdrawing from Kosovo and thousands of Kosovo Albanians descending 
from the hills. Clinton welcomed those developments which would offer a diplomatic 
solution to the crisis, yet he also warned that “Commitments are not compliance. 
Balkan graveyards are filled with President Milosevic’s broken promises”. UK Prime 
Minister Tony Blair shared the same view, saying that though the agreement provided 
a “breakthrough”, NATO was still “prepared to use force if necessary”.45 
These concerns proved to be well founded. As winter threatened, border 
clashes and skirmishes in Kosovo bounced back due to Serbia’s displeasure with the 
Macedonians who allowed NATO to position troops on its territory. To deal with 
Serbia’s challenge and to defend peacekeepers in Kosovo, NATO deployed an 
“extraction force” (XFOR) in Macedonia. The Serbs, rather than being deterred, 
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massacred 45 inhabitants in the Albanian village of Racak on January 15 in retaliation 
for the KLA attack on four Serbia policemen.46 This tragedy further convinced the 
Contact Group and NATO that direct intervention against Serbia was imperative. In 
light of the Racak massacre, Albright’s push for a US or NATO ultimatum finally 
won at a meeting of top US foreign policy advisers. The Contact Group, following the 
US statement, issued an ultimatum to the Kosovo Albanians and Serbs ten days later, 
calling them to start peace talks at Rambouillet, France on February 6. It was clear to 
everyone concerned that this would be “the last opportunity for a comprehensive 
setlement”.47  
On the Serbia side, although Milosevic refused to attend, he promised that 
representatives of the Serbs would show up at Rambouillet and the Serbian embassy 
in Paris would support the delegation as well. But those Serbs sent to the meeting 
turned out to be no one of importance besides the Bishop Artemije. Rude as usual, 
they also warned the Kosovars that any representative of them would be arrested if 
they did come to France. It was France that saved the conference in such an 
emergency. Providing the Kosovars with necessary travel documents and 
transportation without delay, the French finally received a delegation of 16, the 
leading Albanians of which were the pacifist Rugova; the 29-year-old militant KLA 
head, Hashim Thaci; and the editor of Koha Ditore, Veton Surroi. However, no better 
than the Serbian delegation, the loose Albanian one “made up of a disparate group, 
individuals belonging to rival factions, who in some cases had never met one another”, 
found it hard to reach an internal consensus to sign agreements. 48  This “peace 
conference” expected to see the birth of two documents, the first of which would 
contain non-negotiable principles that guaranteed the territorial integrity of 
Yugoslavia while rejecting to allow Kosovo independence at that time, and protected 
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human rights for both the Serbs and Albanians. The second document, the so-called 
“interim agreement”, aimed to deal with matters such as a ceasefire, a representative 
assembly for Kosovo, and elections to it. Though they debated on specific issues at 
length and expressed particular concerns about provision for a future referendum on 
independence, the Albanians also treated the conference as a joke.  
This time, the Americans took the initiative to salvage negotiations. President 
Clinton, after a fadeout due to the impeachment for his “inappropriate relationship” 
with Monica Lewinsky since August 1998, called a meeting with his foreign policy 
team to discuss “NATO planning, US costs and the Kosovo Force (KFOR) exit 
strategy” on February 11, 1999. 49  Following the end of his impeachment drama, 
President Clinton delivered a radio address immediately to specify his intention that 
4,000 US peacekeepers would be sent to Kosovo after a ceasefire.50 Furthermore, 
distrust of the Serb’s willingness to sign the agreement led Clinton to seek 
cooperation with the Albanians first. In an attempt to get the Albanians to accept the 
agreement, Albright flew to France for the last days of talks, during which she 
promised the Kosovars an independence referendum in three years.51 As requested, 
the Rambouillet conference was paused to offer the Kosovar delegation a period of 
time to consult with the Albanians at home. On March 18, the Kosovo Albanians 
finally signed the agreement, whereas, the Serbs still refused to do so. This 
“anticipated failure” of peace talks finally allowed the US to say that the Albanians 
were the “good guys”, which, according to some historians, met the US real purpose 
of proving to Europe definitively that the Serbs were intransigent.52 President Clinton 
then seized the opportunity to meet with Congressional leaders to discuss the US 
KFOR role. Meanwhile, Richard Holbrooke and Christopher Hill went to meet with 
Milosevic to urge him to accept the NATO settlement. However, the negotiation did 
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not bring any improvement, affirming that there was “zero point zero per cent” chance 
of a deal on the Serb side. What was worse, on March 20, 40,000 Serbian forces 
quickly moved into Kosovo after the leave of the KVM. Unfolding new offensives in 
north-eastern and north-central parts of Kosovo, the Serb troops became more and 
more aggressive. Meanwhile, Milosevic continued to purge his leadership by fostering 
hardliners in power in both the government and the army. In a last ditch effort to 
avoid military intervention, Richard Holbrooke was appointed to deliver a final 
ultimatum to Milosevic who again rejected any concession.53 So far, all the diplomatic 
efforts to achieve peace in Kosovo had failed without exception. This, as the French 
Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine said, further convinced the West that there was 
“little prospect of avoiding NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia”.54 
 
The “78-day war” 
On March 24, the Kosovo air campaign, also known as the “78-day war” began. It had 
no specific UN Security Council authorisation. Thus, based on previous UN 
resolutions that had called for full and prompt implementation of the agreements 
Milosevic had signed with the OSCE and NATO, the US-led NATO served as the 
main force to undertake airstrikes. One of the reasons why the US chose to bypass the 
UN Security Council was because the forecast of a consensus among Security Council 
members was not promising. As Igor Ivanov stated previously, Russia and China 
would veto the proposal of intervention if it was raised at the UN Security Council 
meeting, however, Russia and China would only protest rather than prevent if NATO 
did intervene. More importantly, the US-led NATO force would maximise strategic 
freedom and flexibility, compared with the efficacy of the UN-led one. When the 
decision to fight a war in Kosovo was made, Russia’s Prime Minister Yevgeny 
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Primakov cancelled his trip to Washington in mid-flight without hesitation to show 
Russia’s opposition to the launching of strikes against Yugoslavia.55 Hence, the rising 
condemnation on the NATO attack postponed the Russian Duma’s vote for the 
START II treaty. Furthermore, the Russians continued to press the US and NATO 
even after NATO had actually engaged into Kosovo. Russian President Yeltsin 
declared against bombing or a NATO ground war, and warned the US and its allies 
that Russia was ready to participate in a European or worldwide war. Gennadi 
Seleznev, President of the Duma, even proclaimed that Yeltsin had prepared nuclear 
missiles to target Serbia’s attackers. With regard to this, Viktor Chernomyrdin writing 
in the Washington Post warned that a continuation of the air raids would set the 
Russia-US contacts back by several decades: “The world has never in this decade 
been so close as now to the brink of nuclear war”.56 But none of these drew serious 
US attention, let alone stopped the campaign. In the meantime, the Alliance had 
persisted in maintaining a unified NATO command structure.57 As a result, later after 
denying the charge of nuclear missiles, Yeltsin desired to salvage the relationship 
with the West. Viktor Chernomyrdin was appointed as special envoy to the Balkan 
while the hard-line Prime Minister Primakov was fired.   
While acknowledging the UN’s insufficient capability compared with NATO, 
critics proposed another question: “Why did NATO, rather than any other 
organisations such as the EU, the WEU, become the primary instrument of choice for 
intervention in Kosovo?” Ellen Hallams believed that three key factors were critical in 
ensuring NATO’s irreplaceable position: “NATO’s position as the primary guarantor 
of European security; the experience engendered by NATO’s mission in Bosnia; and 
the US leadership of the alliance”.58 However, since the US leadership and capability 
dominated NATO’s military performance in Kosovo, why did the US not undertake 
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unilateral action against Serbia? This suggestion seemed to be more acceptable when 
taking strategic flexibility into account, but it simply was not the appetite both within 
the Clinton administration and amongst the American public who favoured 
“multilateralising” the use of force in line with scaling down the US international 
commitments. In other words, the Clinton doctrine in fact held that the US should, 
together with its allies, intervene wherever necessary to prevent genocide.59 Thus, the 
US chose NATO to commence airstrikes, the mission of which was not only to avert a 
humanitarian catastrophe but also to preserve NATO’s leadership in European 
security affairs.60 These two rationales for NATO’s intervention in Kosovo were not 
arbitrarily concluded. Instead, they were drawn from prudential considerations. As 
Albright stated, it was necessary to affirm the moral imperative behind NATO’s 
intervention, given that too many massacres in Kosovo had heavily shocked the 
world. 61  Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister and George Robertson, the UK 
Defence Minister, were also strong supporters of the humanitarian intervention course, 
emphasising the wider and fundamental need to avert a moral and humanitarian 
catastrophe. The other underlying rationale, namely, to guarantee NATO’s or 
Washington’s credibility and leadership, was regarded as the real driving force of 
intervention. “In Bosnia NATO’s credibility had been on the line because of its failure 
to intervene earlier in the crisis; in Kosovo the alliance’s credibility was at stake 
because it could not afford to repeat the mistakes it had made in Bosnia.”62 From the 
perspective of Americans who had just moved their NATO enlargement plan one step 
forward by inviting Poland, Hungry and the Czech Republic into NATO, they felt 
eager to spare no effort to safeguard their hard-won victory. The US efforts for NATO 
enlargement not only demonstrated the fundamental US commitment to NATO, but 
also affirmed the belief that the US had to remain at the heart of any emerging 
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European security architecture. As a result, the US deeply committed itself to NATO 
to participate in the Kosovo crisis, predicting that the success in Kosovo would help 
consolidate the US leadership in Europe and unite the Alliance.          
Although many other officials wanted a quicker resolution in line with the 
lesson of Bosnia, President Clinton ruled out the use of ground troops in Kosovo in 
his televised address, for fear of creating casualties and thus undermining public 
support as well as the unity of NATO members. Outlined by President Clinton, 
NATO’s strike plan OPLAN 10601 defined three principal objectives: “to 
demonstrate the seriousness of NATO’s opposition to aggression; to deter Milosevic 
from “continuing and escalating his attacks on helpless civilians”; and to damage 
Serbia’s capacity to wage war against Kosovo by seriously diminishing its military 
capabilities”.63 To that end, the action NATO envisaged at the very beginning was 
one which was confined to light bombing in the Belgrade suburbs, breaking Serbian 
air defence systems and decreasing Serbian command and control capabilities, which 
would only last a few days. However, another two sequential phases of operations 
were formulated just in case, though the first phase of establishing air superiority over 
Serbia was sufficient to achieve NATO’s objectives. The second and the third phases 
referred to “attack military targets inside Kosovo and Serbian reinforcements in 
Yugoslavia south of the 44th parallel, and expand air operations to cover a wide range 
of military targets throughout Yugoslavia” separately.64  
 
NATO’s sorry performance  
Stance Suspecting NATO’s ambition to carry out substantive military actions, the 
Serbs made themselves hard to intimidate. The next day after the war onset, the Serb 
troops provocatively killed more than sixty Kosovo Albanians near the village of Bela 
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Crvka. 65  Yugoslavia with uncompromising attitude then fearlessly broke off 
diplomatic relations with the US, the UK, Germany and France to demonstrate their 
readiness for war. On the other hand, the Kosovo Albanians generally welcomed 
NATO engagement, but as soon as the bombing began, they had no choice but to 
leave the province by special “refugee trains”. According to statistics, about 300,000 
Kosovars fled in the first week alone; and more than 848,000 Kosovars crossed 
Kosovo’s borders into Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro throughout the war.66 
The Serb authorities saw the Albanians’ departure as a great opportunity to confiscate 
personal property ownership documents for the Serbs, which aimed to make it 
difficult for the Albanians to return. Ironically, this inadvertent chain reaction ensured 
nothing but NATO’s bombing in Serbia should be blamed for the refugee exodus. 
NATO was further criticised for giving the Serbs a way to realise their dream of 
cleansing Kosovo of the Albanians, the accusation of which forced NATO to help 
feed and house the refugees.  
Plan There were many factors that created NATO’s unsatisfactory behaviour 
in the combat. As Carole Rogel indicated, the refusal of taking sides clearly led 
NATO being unable to coordinate adequately with the KLA, which could have been 
of great help on the ground. More importantly, “NATO, which had “stumbled into 
war” without a real plan, and certainly no Plan B, escalated war efforts gradually”.67 
Although Javier Solana had successfully secured the approval of all nineteen 
members to unfold the military action, he was not able to secure consensus on 
operational plans. In fact, debates had already arisen about how to execute the conflict, 
with various NATO powers pressing for different plans. For example, the US opposed 
sending ground troops; France was against bombing bridges, and Greece felt reluctant 
to join due to overwhelming public opinion against war.68 These different preferences 
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developed into disagreements on the battlefield, resulting in delayed operational plans. 
For example, one tremendous delay occurred on April 4 when policymakers decided 
to deploy 24 Apache attack helicopters (Task Force Hawk) and 2,000 protecting 
forces in Albania. The reason why the deployment was put off at the last minute 
referred to the officials’ debate over whether the helicopters would move the US 
closer to a ground war.69  
Capability Another controversial factor leading to NATO’s bad performance 
was related to NATO’s insufficient capability in guiding and coordinating a campaign. 
Reportedly, NATO bombs often went astray or targeted some wrong buildings, 
evoking suspicions and feeding anti-US sentiment. For example, marked as NATO’s 
first mishap in combat, three missiles hit a residential area in the town of Aleksinac on 
April 6, killing many civilians. A week later, NATO became breaking news again by 
mistakenly striking a number of Kosovo Albanian refugees and causing at least 60 
deaths. Following the command of bombing bridges, a civilian bus on a bridge near 
Pristina was accidently destroyed. Moreover, a market and a hospital near Nis were 
accidentally targeted when NATO tried to strike an airfield with a cluster bomb. 
Compared with those accidents, the day of May 7 witnessed the biggest blunder 
NATO had made in Kosovo when the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade was bombed. 
However, the accident, killing three and wounding 20, “could have been avoided if 
the CIA, which chose the target, had updated its map of the city”.70 The UN Security 
Council immediately called a meeting to discuss Washington’s “terrible mistake” that 
caused a serious diplomatic crisis between the US and China. Although they were 
concerned about the Chinese reaction, the US quickly ignored its mistakes and 
recklessly bombed Korisa when the Serb forces used 87 Kosovo Albanians as human 
shields. Also in May, a KLA position in Kosare was bombed accidently, causing 67 
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deaths; a bridge in Varvarin was destroyed, killing 11 civilians, and a residential area 
in Surdulica was damaged mistakenly when a NATO missile went off-course, killing 
at least 20 civilians.71 There seemed no reasonable excuse to explain these costly 
mistakes except that NATO was short of sufficient capability in guiding and 
coordinating a campaign. 
 
“End” of the war 
Although lacking a non-neutral stance, a detailed operational plan, and sufficient 
capability in guiding and coordinating the campaign, NATO won the Kosovo war in 
the end. On April 22, NATO’s 50th anniversary was celebrated in Washington, which 
overall helped maintain the unity of the Alliance and strengthen the relationship 
between Russia and the West. Yeltsin phoned Clinton with the summit underway, 
discussing the restart of contacts between Vice President Gore and the Russian special 
envoy to Kosovo Viktor Chernomyrdin. From a strategic perspective specifically, the 
summit also brought forward an intensification of the airstrikes, expanding target list 
to include petroleum depots, key road and rail bridges, railway lines, and radio and 
TV stations.72  Two days later, NATO formally announced its achievement of air 
superiority in the mid to high altitudes, marking the completion of the first phase of its 
operation plan. NATO then proceeded to the second phase though the Alliance’s 
objectives had already been fully realised during the first phase. While NATO began 
to assert its superiority over Yugoslav troops in Kosovo, Yugoslavia filed a lawsuit 
against the Alliance at the International Court of Justice in The Hague, requesting 
provisional measures to stop NATO countries bombing immediately.73 But NATO 
strikes on Belgrade were not called off. When the KLA was launching a counter-
offensive to win a supply route into Kosovo, Viktor Chernomyrdin went to meet with 
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Milosevic who admitted concerns about growing international pressure. 
Chernomyrdin was expected to present Yugoslavia with “concrete proposals” which 
included “a halt to NATO air strikes, followed by a withdrawal of Milosevic’s forces 
from Kosovo and autonomy for the province”. But NATO insisted it would not halt 
air strikes until Yugoslav forces pulled out of Kosovo. If Milosevic refused to 
cooperate, as US Defence Secretary William Cohen said, “We will start to attack for 
more hours, more targets and from more directions”.74 Further, to enhance the efforts 
the KLA had stalled, NATO decided to increase its ground forces (peacekeepers) in 
neighbouring Macedonia to 48,000, who were expected to serve as the core of an 
invasion force.  
Yugoslavia, however, was not threatened until NATO announced its decision 
to help the Albanians with their road network construction. Noting “the road’s “dual-
use” potential for carrying NATO ground troops”, Yugoslavia quickly sent out signals 
that they were ready to cooperate with NATO as long as the UN was the ultimate 
arbiter.75 The G8 countries, having agreed on a peace proposal that called for a civil 
and security presence in Kosovo, decided to have talks at Koenigswinter (outside 
Bonn) to reach a final settlement in ending NATO’s seven-week old Balkan campaign. 
The plan agreed by all G8 ministers was concluded as G8 principles: safe return of 
refugees; preservation of the current borders of Yugoslavia and its neighbouring states; 
disarmament of the KLA. The G8 countries also promised to set up a UN 
administration for Kosovo and a framework for autonomy. 76  Albright highly 
appreciated Russia Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov’s acceptance of a military force in 
Kosovo, and emphasised Russia’s agreement was the most significant point of 
Thursday’s proposal.77 In return, the agreement dropped any reference to NATO’s 
role in the proposed military contingent responsible for establishing a secure 
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environment in Kosovo. Thus, the word, Kosovo Force (KFOR), was adopted, but 
troops from NATO members were required to make up the core of the force. In 
response, Yugoslavia immediately informed Germany that they were ready to accept 
G8 principles for ending bombing. On June 3, after mediators, namely Vice President 
Gore, the Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot, the Russian special envoy Viktor 
Chernomyrdin, and a neutral mediator the Finn Martti Ahtisarri, pressed Milosevic to 
give up, Belgrade formally accepted the outline of a new Kosovo peace deal 
providing for an end to the conflict and for a NATO peacekeeping force to enter 
Kosovo.  
President Clinton and the allies cautiously greeted Milosevic’s change to a 
cooperative attitude on one hand, and seized the opportunity to hold another G8 
meeting in Cologne to discuss details of the UN authorisation on the other. On 9 June, 
NATO and Yugoslavia officials signed a Military Technical Agreement to govern the 
Serb withdrawal of all its military, parliamentary, and police forces.78 The next day, 
the UN Security Council finally adopted the Resolution 1244, bringing the war 
officially to an end. As the Resolution prescribed, international civil and military 
authorities in Kosovo could be deployed, and the KFOR formed by 50,000 NATO 
troops could be established to guarantee the safe return of hundreds of thousands of 
refugees and to ensure no further ethnic cleansing took place.79 The UN then set up 
the Mission in Kosovo, which was headed by Bernard Kouchner, a French founder of 
Doctors without Borders. He was assigned with three tasks: “to ease the Kosovars 
back into the idea of autonomy within Serbia or Yugoslavia; to seek the cooperation 
of local leaders, both Albanian and Serb; and to prevent the abuse of human rights”.80 
On the other hand, the KFOR, who were supposed to enter Kosovo on June 12, got 
surprised by an incident that occurred hours before their arrival in Kosovo. Two 
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hundred Russian troops, who were among the occupying forces in Bosnia, travelled 
through Serbia and moved into Kosovo with fifty vehicles before NATO, taking 
control of the Pristina airport.81 The Russians expected the Alliance to exclude them 
from the post-war reconstruction, whereas NATO welcomed Russia’s participation in 
the KFOR, for it would boost the rebuilding of Kosovo.   
The Albanians began flooding back into Kosovo. The first three weeks saw 
over 600,000 refugees returning, which marked one of the most rapid refugee returns 
in history. By late autumn 1999, all of the 848,000 Albanian refugees moved back.82 
In addition, the Kosovars persuaded themselves to adapt to the temporary condition of 
autonomy, and to postpone assembly elections and a referendum on independence to 
the near future. So far, the situation in Kosovo had been generally stabilised and the 
victory of NATO could be claimed. But not all analysts agreed that NATO was 
successful in Kosovo. For example, Michael Mandelbaum concluded NATO’s 
intervention in Kosovo to be a “perfect failure”. He regarded NATO’s Yugoslav war 
as a “military success” in that “the alliance’s air forces carried out their missions with 
dispatch and the assault forced the Serb military’s withdrawal from the southern 
Yugoslav province of Kosovo”. But it was also a “political failure” in terms of “the 
wider political consequences of the war”.83  Hence, evaluations on the merits and 
demerits of NATO, which was chosen to be the leading actor to perform in Kosovo, 
varied. 
 
A double-edged sword 
An official US Defence Department report to Congress in October 1999 concluded 
that “As a watershed in NATO’s long history, Operation Allied Force (OAF) was an 
overwhelming success, NATO accomplished its mission and achieved all of its 
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strategic, operational, and tactical goals in the face of an extremely complex set of 
challenges”.84 Thereby, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair regarded OAF as “the 
first test and the first occasion for a whole new approach to international affairs”—a 
new “doctrine of international community”.85 The crucial factors that facilitated the 
victory of NATO in Kosovo mainly referred to NATO’s unique advantages compared 
with any other organisation. On one hand, NATO’s institutional structures offered 
NATO a high degree of legitimacy; and on the other, its military capabilities provided 
NATO with sufficient ability to achieve its overall objectives. NATO, a 19-member 
alliance, had achieved a clear consensus on the need to intervene, and remained 
steadfast and unified till the end, demonstrating its institutional benefits of working 
within a collective alliance. Thus, it was NATO’s decision-making process and the 
requirement of generating consensus before acting that gave NATO’s intervention an 
important degree of legitimacy. Moreover, NATO’s incomparable military 
capabilities also contributed to its overall success in Kosovo. Other alliances such as 
the UN, the EU and the WEU would not be able to achieve what NATO had 
accomplished in Kosovo due to their lack of military capabilities to successfully 
engage in such a severe crisis.   
However, although NATO made great contributions to prevent ethnic 
cleansing in Kosovo from escalating, it was also true that NATO did make a number 
of inexcusable mistakes during the combat, which could have been avoided if NATO 
had developed a viable and comprehensive strategy. According to Ellen Hallams, it 
was flawed assumptions on the part of NATO leaders that led to a flawed strategy. 
Firstly, what the officials desired was to confine the combat to light bombing in the 
Belgrade suburbs, which would only last a few days. This assumption adversely led to 
“a strategy of gradualism that did much to undermine NATO’s strategic credibility”.86 
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But the irony was that only with this less ambitious strategy could the Alliance reach 
an agreement to intervene in Kosovo as soon as possible. There was no clear 
consensus within NATO for a more ambitious, long-term campaign, and it would take 
a long time to reach such a consensus if possible, given that too many operational 
constraints would be imposed by 19 members with different preferences. In fact, the 
Alliance itself was divided. “Governments in Germany, Italy and the Czech Republic 
were split on the issue, while large majorities of Czech, Greek, Spanish and 
Portuguese public opinion were against OAF”.87 Thus, a short-term campaign might 
not be the best strategy, whereas it was the only acceptable one. In addition to NATO 
members’ disagreements over ambitious strategy and tactics, the US lacked 
willingness to undertake a long-term campaign as well. Feeling powerless to deal with 
heated domestic debates on whether the US interests were even at stake in Kosovo, 
the US found it hard to convince Americans that the US national interests were truly 
threatened by the Kosovo crisis. It was also the case in other NATO member states, 
many of which tried to hold together internal consensus between their own 
governments and societies.88 Therefore, based on the common perception of NATO’s 
restrictive nature of decision-making, both the US and other NATO members agreed 
to choose a less ambitious strategy, even though it was destined to weaken NATO’s 
strategic credibility. 
The second flawed assumption officials embraced was that airstrikes would be 
sufficient to defeat the Serbs. President Clinton had ruled out any possibility of the 
use of ground force in Kosovo since his televised address at the beginning of the 
intervention, for fear of creating casualties and thus undermining public support and 
the unity of the Alliance. Later, “although support for a ground invasion within the 
US increased as the air campaign wore on, all NATO allies, with the exception of 
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Britain, were guilty of failing to agree on the need for a ground war”.89 In fact, the 
plan of sending ground troops to Kosovo seemed to be reasonable, but it was not 
feasible given the limited consensus NATO could generate from its 19 members. 
NATO’s institutional structure was a double-edged sword, which brought NATO the 
legitimacy it needed as well as the constraints it had to tolerate. Thus, the air 
campaign was believed to be the only option that all NATO members could agree on, 
resulting in a strategy with no ground force participation that further crippled NATO’s 
strategic credibility. Moreover, it was the US that contributed most to this flawed air 
campaign strategy, because the US refused to change the plan, even when introducing 
ground troops was urgently needed. The reason why the US resolutely denied the 
mobilisation of ground troops related to the concerns of its leadership and credibility. 
On one hand, the US was unwilling to confess that it had mispredicted the campaign, 
which would reduce its credibility to a large extent, and on the other, the US 
consistently desired to retain as much control as possible over planning, including 
“the presence of “US only” rooms and documents”, which would help maintain the 
US leadership in the operation.90  
Another flawed assumption related to the miscalculation of NATO members’ 
interoperability. In Kosovo, the US proved to be the dominant military force within 
NATO, whereas the European member states made little contribution to NATO’s 
success. Discovered from working through the Alliance, interoperability problems 
helped reveal the reality that the US military capabilities were far superior to those of 
the European members. First, there was no sufficient interoperable secure 
communications between the US and Europe due to their varied systems using 
different technologies. For example, ironically, to release Air Tasking Orders, the US 
commanders would have to print it out and physically hand it to the allies because 
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NATO’s own communication system was simply overloaded.91 Much of the planning 
for OAF was conducted in Heidelberg, not Mons, which “contributed a great deal to 
the perceived disconnect between the United States and its NATO allies”.92  Second, 
there were disparities in NATO members’ military capabilities, thereby burden-
sharing became an area in which NATO proved “spectacularly unsuccessful”. 93 
NATO allies should have deployed and began execution more quickly than task-
organised organisations created on an ad hoc basis, however, the reality only exposed 
European members’ deficiency in military capabilities, which slowed down the 
overall operation of the Alliance. But in fact, the spread of contributions was not so 
disproportionate. Washington contributed some 60 per cent of air sorties, while 13 
other allies provided “about the same share of their available aircraft for prosecuting 
the campaign” as well as “virtually all the basing facilities, air traffic coordination, 
and supporting elements to keep an air armada of over 1,000 aircraft functioning 
throughout the conflict”.94 
 
The legacy of Kosovo 
In addition to these weakness and deficiencies in alliance strategy, decision-making 
and military capabilities that had undermined NATO’s credibility, NATO’s overall 
success was also overshadowed by the concerns about various ethical, legal and moral 
issues. For the ethical issues, NATO seemed to presume that “the lives of one side 
were more valuable than even the lives of those being saved”.95 Therefore, a tragedy 
of approximately 10,000 deaths was caused by NATO bombing. For the legal and 
moral issues, “it was fought in support of one group (Kosovo Albanians) in a civil war 
within a sovereign state (Serbia/Yugoslavia), a legally inviolable entity according to 
international law” and “it was undertaken without UN consent, without the consent of 
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the peoples in those NATO states that participated in it”. 96  In fact, all these 
controversial issues not only questioned the legitimacy of NATO’s intervention in 
Kosovo, but also revealed some deep-rooted problems of NATO as an alliance 
responsible for European security. Although it was widely accepted that the 
legitimacy of NATO’s intervention stemmed from the humanitarian intervention 
course, the deeper source referred to the Alliance’s own virtue. As stated above, 
NATO’s institutional structure was a double-edged sword, which brought the US the 
legitimacy it needed as well as the constraints it had to tolerate. 97  However, the 
balance between giving the Alliance its required legitimacy and formulating a detailed 
plan that was sufficient to achieve all objectives was not easy to reach. Thus, over 
time, tensions among NATO members would increase dramatically, and conceptions 
of how NATO should operate in the future would vary greatly.  
From the perspective of Europe, the extent to which the US had dominated all 
aspects of the mission in Kosovo was “a rather shocking blow to European honour”, 
highlighting “the impotence of Europe’s armed forces”.98 Both the French and the 
Dutch believed that “they were left out of a crucial decision process and that 
information-sharing suffered as a result”.99 Although the US was criticised for its 
control over the Alliance’s planning and execution in Kosovo, it was not the one to 
blame for Europe’s voluntary dependence on the US military capabilities. The 
European members should share NATO’s responsibilities and burdens together with 
the US, rather than becoming free riders of the US contributions to the Alliance. 
Hence in June 1999, the European members of NATO proposed to advance a 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) at the EU Cologne Summit, 
demonstrating their desire to fill the gap of capabilities between Washington and 
European capitals.100 In other words, the ESDP, which was designed to increase the 
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European capabilities, “aimed at strengthening rather than weakening the transatlantic 
tie”.101 However, in response, the Clinton administration was initially reluctant to 
support the ESDP, believing that the attempt was driven by the French to challenge 
the US leadership.102 But the reluctance did not mean that the US refused to support 
the European efforts. In fact, the US had already sent out the signal of encouraging 
European members to develop their own capabilities since the launch of the Defence 
Capabilities Initiative (DCI) at the Washington summit. “The US support for the DCI 
reflected not only a continuing US willingness to work with its NATO allies, but also 
an overwhelming desire to see any new European defence identity firmly located 
within NATO”.103 Although the US expressed its positive support for those European 
members of the Alliance, it also made clear that Europe should avoid “the three Ds”, 
namely duplication, decoupling, and discrimination, with the bottom line being that 
“the new European initiative should not in any way “decouple” or “delink” the US 
from Europe in the Alliance or the European defence efforts from those coordinated 
through NATO”.104  
While transatlantic tensions might be eased to secure NATO’s short-term 
future, its deep-rooted nature made the problem almost impossible to be resolved once 
and for all. The question of how NATO should operate in the future received different 
answers from the members, further exposing the intra-alliance disputes. According to 
NATO’s “New Strategic Concept” released in 1999, the Alliance would “stand ready, 
case-by-case and by consensus…to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to 
engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations”, to 
strengthen the security and stability of the “Euro-Atlantic” region. 105  However, 
disagreements on the geographic boundaries within which such “crisis management” 
should take place, overshadowed the merits of NATO’s transformation in the new 
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round. The European members preferred the crisis response operations to be 
conducted within Europe, whereas the US expected to see NATO “go out of area”. 
Although NATO has certainly shifted away from its focus on European security and 
towards a global agenda, “the extent to which NATO is becoming a truly global 
alliance remains less clear”.106 NATO’s Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer 
further emphasised that NATO should remain “an Alliance with global partners” 
rather than becoming a fully-fledged global alliance, with a global membership.107 As 
a result, whether the European members’ complaint that the US was seeking to turn 
NATO into an alliance akin to a “global policeman” would increase the transatlantic 
tensions and thus halt the NATO transformation remained to be seen.108 
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6  NATO’s Ongoing Engagement after Kosovo 
 
The years between the operation in Kosovo and the Libyan mission witnessed the US 
rethinking about its commitment to NATO, as the international security environment 
had changed greatly since 9/11. What mainly happened during this period was that the 
US intervened in Afghanistan, firstly through an ad hoc coalition, then under the 
framework of institutionalised NATO, leading to a new round of debate over the 
purpose of NATO. The questions remained controversial, including: why did the US 
and its allies invade Afghanistan? What were they after? Did they want to wage the 
“War on Terror” or to help build a democratic country? Why did the Bush 
administration choose a coalition of the willing for combat operations but support a 
NATO takeover of the Afghanistan mission when reconstruction was undertaken? To 
put it simply, why should NATO get involved? What did NATO stand for?    
Although the case of Afghanistan is important in understanding the US 
commitment to NATO in the post-Cold War period, it is not so representative as the 
case of Kosovo or Libya, which took place at two ends of the period and 
demonstrated the US response to two types of crises under different circumstances: 
Clinton faced a more severe situation than Bush; and Obama, compared with Bush, 
encountered new and more complicated problems such as the rigorous economic 
pressures. In contrast, the operation in Afghanistan, though it has lasted for more than 
a decade and encouraged a large number of works focusing on this war, remains 
difficult to assess or judge. Perhaps one of the reasons is because of the most 
controversial presidency of George W. Bush, who seemed to prefer unilateralism in 
his first term but changed to pay more attention to multilateralism in his second term. 
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The Afghanistan mission, nonetheless, triggered as well as shed light on the 
rethinking about the role NATO should play as in the cases of Kosovo and Libya.  
The devastating terrorist attacks of September 2001 on the US deeply shocked 
both Americans and Europeans. The international community felt an impetus for an 
immediate response, calling NATO to invoke Article Five of its charter that an attack 
on one member was an attack on all members. Hence the North Atlantic Council 
made its decision without delay on September 12, 2001 to assist with the fight against 
terrorism in Afghanistan, and submitted a proposal to the US, listing a set of possible 
military functions NATO could provide.1 Although Washington was willing to accept 
an allied contribution, it was more eager to retain operational command and control 
for its military invasion of Afghanistan. As a result, with memories looming large of 
NATO’s performance in the Balkans when American operational freedom and 
flexibility had been greatly hampered by operating through the Alliance, and with US 
national security at stake, the Bush administration eventually declined the offer of 
direct support from NATO and pursued an ad hoc coalition. With the objective of the 
Afghanistan mission changed from countering terrorism to reconstructing the country, 
the US recognised the importance as well as advantages of NATO, based on which 
the US began to assist NATO with a takeover of the Afghanistan mission. The 
transition, however, encountered obstacles originating from long-lasting and deep-
rooted problems of the Alliance, including the non-equivalent distribution of burdens 
among member states. Some scholars could not wait to pronounce the failure of 
NATO in Afghanistan, raising the question of the viability of the Alliance.  
Along with NATO’s poor performance in Afghanistan, there were concerns 
about the rise about the new identity of NATO after 9/11. It was urgent to provide 
NATO with more relevance in accordance with the evolved security environment, 
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otherwise NATO would become more and more irrelevant. After 9/11, the 
international community had to deal with new threats from terrorism that were 
shapeless and without fixed locations. With regard to this, should NATO go beyond 
Europe? After all the Alliance was initially designed as the prime guarantor of 
European security. Additionally, when taking into account how the operations both in 
the Balkans and in Afghanistan reflected the problem of a “two-tiered alliance”, 
should NATO force be applied to future conflict prevention and crisis management? 
Another variable leading to the change in the international security environment was 
the Russians, who began to harbour ambitions of interfering with and even preventing 
the transformation of NATO. Although there was a possibility in the 1990s for Russia 
to join NATO, the relationship between NATO and Russia became tough in the 21st 
century, particularly in the context of possible Georgian and Ukrainian membership of 
the organisation. Thus should NATO keep enlarging regardless of Russia’s objections? 
Is the revival of Russia the reason for tying the US to Europe? In short, if the Alliance 
should persist, what is the purpose of NATO? What role should NATO play in the 
new security environment after 9/11?   
 
NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan 
 
From OEF to ISAF 
Debates and scepticism arose immediately after the US announced the unfolding of its 
large-scale operations in Afghanistan, namely Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 
that would commence on October 7, 2001. The initial plan of OEF was to carry out a 
series of air and cruise missile strikes against key Taliban positions in Kabul, 
Kandahar and other Al-Qaeda bases, which was revised over the first three weeks to 
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contain a more ambitious goal of overthrowing the Taliban regime. To many, 
Washington’s reluctance to work with the Alliance, as well as its attitude of “you are 
with us or against us”,2 proved to be a damaging effect on NATO, implying a denial 
of the way NATO had operated over its history.3 There had been a great hope that 
9/11 would present NATO with an opportunity to demonstrate both its capability and 
willingness to face dangers imposed by international terrorism, a mission NATO had 
previously identified as a key priority in its 1999 “New Strategic Concept”. But in 
reality, the US decision not to work through NATO left many European allies feeling 
deflated, making them sceptical about the future of the Alliance. Some European 
leaders even voiced caution over President Bush’s all-out “War on Terror”, 
questioning whether the benefits deriving from cooperating with America in its “War 
on Terror” outweighed the risks.4 In addition to reflecting the unilateral tendencies of 
the Bush administration, the US decision to bypass NATO also relegated the Alliance 
to the very margins of debate over whether NATO could be of any strategic utility.  
Generally speaking, Washington’s ignoring of NATO as well as its pursuit of 
“a coalition of committed countries, if possible, but acting alone if necessary”5 was 
based on the understanding that in confronting the threat of terrorism, NATO 
members lacked consensus on what kind of action should be taken, though they all 
admitted the need for action. The US decision in autumn 2001 to undertake the war in 
Afghanistan with only support from a “coalition of the willing” helped avoid the 
operational constraints that the Alliance might impose, which led to a quick success 
following the start of operations in October 2001. Thanks in part to assistance from 
partner countries, including the UK, France, Canada, Denmark, Norway, and 
Germany, the US forces in OEF were able to “disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a 
terrorist base of operations, and to attack the military capability of the Taliban 
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regime”.6 The military victory was further consolidated by the UN-supported Bonn 
Peace Agreement, according to which a UN-mandated international security force—
officially named International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)—would be 
established to assist the Afghan Transitional Authority, an interim Afghan 
government, with maintaining security in and around Kabul. 7  35 UN members 
volunteered at six-month intervals to lead the ISAF mission, yet the short rotation 
soon made transferring power counterproductive. Considering that many of the 
countries participating in the ISAF mission were also members of NATO, the idea 
quickly spread that it might be more efficient if NATO could play a larger role in the 
ISAF mission. At the request of NATO members to expand NATO’s role in 
Afghanistan, the Alliance ultimately claimed to firstly support Germany and the 
Netherlands’ command of the ISAF mission on October 17, 2002. This paved the way 
for NATO to assume greater responsibility in Afghanistan, which dispelled the 
impression that NATO was becoming less viable and less important. 
Looking back at these military actions of OEF that ended in March 2002 when 
the Operation Anaconda succeeded in assaulting on Al-Qaeda positions in the Shar-i-
Kot Valley, OEF obviously achieved mixed success in its efforts to “make it clear to 
the Taliban leaders and their supporters that harbouring terrorists is unacceptable and 
carries a price”8  and ultimately depose the Taliban regime. In total, about 4,000 
members of the Taliban were killed, while only 56 Americans were dead and 200 
wounded. Yet, there were also an estimated 1,000-1,300 Afghan civilian deaths from 
US bombing and over 3,000 from indirect causes,9 which hugely undermined the US 
intention to deliver a significant amount of humanitarian relief to the Afghan people. 
A study based on community surveys on the ground suggested even higher figures for 
deaths from this phase of the war, even up to 10,000, including victims of unexploded 
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ordnances and mines.10 Although the overall number was still smaller than in the Gulf 
War and did not bring the war’s “success” into question, the US was acutely aware of 
the importance of containing these casualties within a politically acceptable level,11 as 
OEF was accused of making Afghanistan more chaotic and less stable than 
previously.12 On this all-important issue, to share rather than unilaterally shoulder the 
burdens and risks would be a more favourable policy for the US. Another irony of the 
ad hoc coalition was that out of a coalition consisting of 69 nations, only 21 made 
military contributions to OEF, deploying more than 16,000 troops to the region. Of 
those 21 nations, 14 were NATO members. And of those non-NATO members, many 
provided only token support rather than direct military assistance. OEF demonstrated 
the inherent difficulties in maintaining a loose coalition, leading to a critical question: 
what did Washington gain from bypassing NATO? The Bush administration initially 
planned to reduce tensions between the US and European countries by keeping its 
prominent allies at arm’s length, yet in reality resentments resurfaced during military 
operations. Even the usually reliable British criticised the US for its narrow focus on 
targeting Bin Laden at the expense of the wider, more long-term task of rebuilding 
Afghanistan. Although working through NATO would not eliminate all those 
disagreements and disputes among its members, NATO’s ability to generate 
consensus could have provided a powerful unifying force in Afghanistan, given that 
the weakness of an ad hoc coalition was exactly the strength of NATO. In other words, 
the institutionalised alliance structure placed NATO at some advantage when 
compared with more transient coalition of the willing.13 
 
The US commitment to NATO 
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Despite its allies’ wish to strengthen NATO, the US was not determined to reconfirm 
its own commitment to the Alliance until November 2002 when the Prague Summit 
was held. Seven new members, including Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, were invited into the Alliance, which reinforced the 
relevance and capability of NATO, and more importantly, verified the US 
commitment to NATO as it was the US that firstly and constantly supported NATO 
enlargement. Additionally, the US emphasis on NATO was also reflected in its 
proposal to create a NATO Response Force (NRF), a “coherent, high-readiness, joint, 
multinational force package” of up to 25,000 troops that was “technologically 
advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable”.14 This motion derived 
from the performance in Afghanistan and urgent concerns over Iraq, which made 
Washington rediscover the significance of NATO so that in the long run, a 
consolidated, permanent NATO would enhance US security. With regard to this, 
concerted efforts should be made to maintain as well as strengthen the Alliance, 
especially to “develop new military capabilities” 15  of NATO. In addition to 
reconfirming the US commitment to NATO, the NRF proposal also demonstrated the 
US determination to repair divisions in the Alliance by underlining a new 
organisational structure through which members could make niche rather than 
proportional contributions.16 This enabled smaller countries, though possessing less 
state-of-the-art capabilities, to provide tailored ones to NATO’s overall military 
strength. Viewed as a sign that Washington stayed away from unilateralism and had 
no intention of downgrading NATO to a mere political club that threatened to alienate 
those European allies, the US suggestion on the creation of the NRF was soon 
endorsed by the Alliance.17 
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Nevertheless, for some NATO allies like France, the NRF was initially 
suspected to be a tool for US power projection, especially when taking EU efforts to 
create its own rapid reaction force into account. Whether NATO’s plan would conflict 
with, or preclude, the EU’s plan became the main concern.18 In fact, the US agreed to 
provide assistance with the creation of a new EU force in the first place and allowed 
the EU to borrow “alliance ‘assets’ such as airborne early-warning stations or US 
satellite data to help European commanders confront a crisis”, on the premise that the 
entire European military forces would be included in the NRF to ensure the role of 
NATO as the prime guarantor of European security.19 The Prague Summit and the 
NRF proposal together provided a chance for Washington to repair cleavages among 
NATO allies by reconfirming its commitment to the Alliance. The shift in US 
attitudes towards NATO, from undervalued to appreciated, was based on the 
understanding that an ad hoc coalition would not be able to replace NATO but would 
eventually decrease NATO’s effectiveness.20 NATO, though sometimes inefficient in 
achieving operational freedom and flexibility and lacking precision military 
capabilities on the part of the European members, remained the best option for the US 
to deal with conflicts, because throughout the history of NATO, “despite hand-
wringing and debate, despite name-calling and “op-ed” diplomacy, despite sometimes 
genuine differences over policy and strategy, when it came time for action, NATO 
would act as one”.21   
Although NATO had shouldered political responsibility for operations in 
Afghanistan since 2002, it did not achieve a substantial military presence there until 
August 2003 when NATO assumed the overall control of ISAF indefinitely. This 
“groundbreaking operation” 22  represented a landmark in NATO’s over 50-year 
history, as it was the first time for NATO to conduct an operation outside Europe. 
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According to General Sir Jack Deverell, the ISAF’s operational commander, the 
decision for NATO to take a leadership role in ISAF also demonstrated “a real break 
from the NATO of the past to an Alliance which is more relevant and has greater 
utility in the uncertain security environment of the future”.23 Pragmatically, a greater 
role for NATO in Afghanistan would guarantee more security and stability than the 
existing ISAF mission could provide the country with, regarding that no actor was 
more experienced than NATO in accomplishing military missions. On October 13, 
2003, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1510, officially authorising 
expansion of NATO’s role outside the vicinity of Kabul.24 By summer 2006, NATO’s 
role had expanded to include western and southern Afghanistan in addition to the 
capital and the northern areas of the country. Although the plan went smoothly for 
NATO to assume responsibility for the entire country, the highly unstable eastern part 
of the country was still beyond NATO’s reach. The completion of this last step 
actually depended on whether NATO and US forces could coordinate the operation in 
that area; after all it was the US that deployed a significant number of ground forces 
and provided sufficient air support and various intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance assets to the eastern areas. The final deal was made during the autumn 
of 2006 when the Alliance took responsibility for all of Afghanistan, but with 
sensitive counterterrorist tasks remaining under US command.25 The US eagerness to 
assist NATO was crucial to guarantee the Alliance a quicker takeover of the ISAF 
mission, as without US support, it would have taken longer for NATO to claim 
strategic control of ISAF as well as to achieve a safer and more secure environment. 
Another reason why Washington changed its stance from marginalising 
NATO to a strategy centred on ad hoc coalition to facilitating the Alliance to endorse 
a stabilisation and peacekeeping role was because of the demand of the Afghan 
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people, not just the government, who welcomed an expanded role for NATO in 
Afghanistan. Although the aim of keeping NATO involved was to make Afghanistan 
competent at all levels of governance rather than relying on ISAF for security, 
“Afghanistan recognises that at present it is unable to fully meet its own security 
needs and highly appreciates NATO’s contribution to providing security and stability 
in Afghanistan”.26 With respect to this, the US continued to assist the Afghan people 
in reconstruction and development on one hand, and promoted the growth of the 
Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) through the NATO Training Mission-
Afghanistan (NTM-A) on the other. However, after two years of training, Afghan 
forces remained heavily dependent on support from the US and the coalition while 
requiring more resources to aid the training mission.27 There were signs that this 
excessive bundle was increasing because the US had focused too narrowly on 
battlefield gains once war commenced, ignoring any post-war strategy for 
stabilisation and reconstruction of Afghanistan.28 Prior to the summer of 2003, focus 
on the success of the campaign was so obvious that no attention was paid to “nation-
building lite”. 29 The Bush administration was so ill-prepared that it could hardly meet 
the challenges posed by an Afghan society in disarray. One of the reasons why 
Washington devoted inadequate funds to rebuilding in Afghanistan was that by late 
2002, it was busy diverting resources to sponsor military operations in Iraq. After 
noticing the emergency of adding money to secure the success of this out-of-area 
mission, the Bush administration carved out $1 billion to double its support for the 
Karzai government, along with the $87 billion for Iraq, which, in the short term, 
partially eased the pressure posed by reconstruction requirements.30  
 
US strategy for Afghanistan revisited   
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Even though the US remained the largest external donor to Afghanistan, “its levels of 
foreign assistance were still lower than any other foreign assistance contributions the 
US had made, with the exception of US assistance to Japan and UN missions in the 
Congo, Cambodia and Sierra Leone”.31 As a result, with Washington distracted by 
counter-insurgency operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq on one hand, and with no 
mature Afghan security forces formed on the other, NATO maintained a steady 
presence in the country to counter resurgent Taliban forces. From the perspective of 
the US, while it was uncertain that working through NATO would produce a more 
efficient strategy, it was at least an opportunity to achieve a different outcome, 
especially when taking into account the fact that NATO had undertaken collective 
military actions against Bosnia and Kosovo that enriched NATO with relevant and 
unmatched experience in how to stabilize a chaotic situation.  
The belated US recognition that NATO needed in Afghanistan was, however, 
influenced and even undermined by its original decision to bypass NATO that helped 
create a great reluctance on some member states later on to make relevant 
contributions. Considering that the Alliance had played no collective role in combat 
operations in Afghanistan, the US found it increasingly difficult to persuade NATO 
allies to devote necessary resources and funds to the subsequent ISAF mission. This 
problem inherent in operations through NATO became thornier when forces were 
insufficiently generated for Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to spread out 
over Afghanistan following the UN authorisation of an expansion of ISAF in October 
2003. The main problem confronting NATO was the lack of individual national 
contributions, slowing down the implementation of the complex and challenging tasks 
of rebuilding and stabilisation. As the ISAF mission expanded beyond Kabul, some 
members, including the US, Britain, the Netherlands and Canada, were willing to 
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operate in the more dangerous southern Afghanistan, while others like Germany were 
reluctant to move beyond the more stable northern and western parts of the country. 
The tragedy of having to face a two-tiered alliance in reality again implied that if 
Washington had engaged the more institutionalised NATO instead of an ad hoc 
coalition earlier on, it would find it easier to gather support for the task or “at least (be) 
able to have a debate with the allies involved”.32 Despite the fact that an ad hoc 
coalition offered the US greater operational freedom and flexibility, it caused growing 
tensions between the US and other NATO allies. Moreover, when key members of the 
Afghanistan coalition claimed to withdraw their support for the intervention in Iraq, 
the weakness of working through a coalition of the willing became unprecedentedly 
intolerable. Any member could opt in and opt out because it acted without the binding 
institutional structures of an alliance like NATO. Hence the indication became 
apparent that NATO would be a better choice than an ad hoc coalition when it came 
to generating resources for those missions for which Washington sought help. 
For American troops in Afghanistan, the acronym of ISAF was parodied as “I 
Saw Americans Fight”. This reflected more resentments arising among allies as “the 
United States—along with just a handful of other countries—do the bulk of the heavy 
fighting, while a number of other ISAF detachments are limited by their own 
governments’ combat restrictions”.33 Then Secretary of Defence Robert Gates spoke 
out in frustration at a conference of army leaders from 38 European nations in 
Germany, that if NATO could not “summon the will to get the job done in a mission 
that we agree is morally just and vital to our security”, then “the worth of the mission 
and the utility of the 60-year-old trans-Atlantic security project” would be 
questioned. 34  His remarks not only pointed out “a genuine paradox surrounding 
NATO’s role in Afghanistan: NATO might ultimately succeed in Afghanistan but fail 
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as an alliance”, but also suggested that unless NATO succeed in the Afghanistan 
mission could the Americans recognise NATO as a viable instrument, otherwise the 
US might go back to the coalition idea.35 
Given the turmoil in the Alliance during the past decade, Afghanistan 
provided an opportunity to show that NATO was still capable of doing something, yet 
in reality it revealed inherent problems of the Alliance more profoundly. In terms of 
troop contributions, the burdens have not been shared equitably. Most of the 
responsibilities have been shouldered by a few key members, especially by the US. 
Actually the debate over troop commitments became more acute in late 2007 and 
early 2008. Considering that the ISAF in total only reached 33,000 troops in February 
2007, General John Craddock, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander at the time, 
pleaded in public for more contributions from member states to guarantee “significant 
difference in progress”, but with little success. 36  Soon after, General David 
McKiernan, commander of US Force Afghanistan (USFOR-A), also expressed his 
concerns about this “under-resourced war” that needed “more manoeuver 
units…more flying machines…more intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
apparatus”. 37  By late 2008, the tone of the debate had changed because of the 
resurgent Taliban threat. A consensus was achieved within the Alliance that 
Afghanistan was thirsty for troops and that more personnel should be deployed by all 
member states.    
 
A larger NATO-led ISAF 
In 2009 and 2010 Taliban attacks intensified greatly, making the situation facing 
NATO more challenging. In addition to the resurgent Taliban, major concerns also 
included the lagging reconstruction process; the time-consuming training of the 
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Afghan army, and erosive corruption within the Afghan government. Indeed, the 
weakness of Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the internal corruption complicated 
what was already a daunting task. Although NATO has been committed to provide as 
well as improve security for the Afghan people, its confidence in passing this 
“important test of NATO’s out-of-area capability”38 was slightly reduced when taking 
into account the fact that troops were still inadequately generated for the mission. 
Robert Gates reemphasised the tough situation in Afghanistan at the 44th Munich 
Conference on Security Policy, saying that there were not enough troops to allow the 
Alliance to make progress in all parts of the country. The reason for achieving a larger 
NATO-led ISAF was, according to Gates, “to accelerate our progress and lock in our 
gains, and to make them permanent”.39  Yet, having received few positive responses 
from NATO allies for further contributions, the US decided to take the lead to send 
additional troops to Afghanistan as a reply to the appeal for a reassertion of US 
leadership. From the perspective of Washington, Al-Qaeda still retained its “safe 
havens” along the border, making the status quo of Afghanistan unsustainable. At the 
meeting of NATO Defence Ministers in February 2009, President Obama announced 
the deployment of an additional 17,000 US troops, marking the beginning of the 
Americanisation of the war in Afghanistan. By issuing this order, nearly 50 per cent 
would be added to the 36,000 American troops already there.40 One month later, 
President Obama promised to deploy approximately 4,000 troops to train Afghan 
security forces for the purpose of having every American unit in Afghanistan 
partnered with an Afghan unit, which “for the first time…will truly resource our effort 
to and support the Afghan army and police”. Moreover, he also set a goal of building 
an Afghan army of 134,000 and a police force of 82,000 by 2011.41  
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US efforts culminated in December 2009 when President Obama further 
authorised an additional 30,000 troops to support the Afghanistan mission by the 
summer 2010. The decision was actually a reply to the report put forward in 
September by General Stanley McChrystal, the top military commander in 
Afghanistan, that unless significantly more troops were sent, the war in Afghanistan 
was likely to result in failure.42 The fact that “for several years (Afghanistan) has 
moved backwards” and that “(the US) security (was) at stake” finally convinced 
Obama to send more troops. 43  As a crucial step to “seize the initiative”, this 
deployment was expected to build the Afghan capacity that could “allow for a 
responsible transition of our forces out of Afghanistan” after 18 months.44 Driven by 
US determination, visible changes had taken place even in these few months. The 
total number of ISAF personnel increased from 56,420 in February to 71,030 in 
October 2009.45  
The year of 2010 witnessed the number of troop contributions to ISAF soaring 
to 119,745.46 By June 2011, ISAF further expanded to 132,457.47  Even though a 
larger ISAF provided more guarantee for the success of the mission, it did not solve 
the puzzle that “NATO might ultimately succeed in Afghanistan but fail as an alliance” 
because most contributions were still made by Washington only. For example, US 
force contributions to ISAF were 34,800 as of October 2009, equivalent to nearly half 
of total ISAF forces.48 This number rose to 78,430 in July 2010, which doubled the 
amount of European forces and accounted for two-thirds of the total troop 
contributions to ISAF.49 The proportion became more astonishing in 2011 when US 
forces supporting ISAF increased to 90,000, accounting for 10 times more troops than 
any other country.50 In general, during the two years from mid-2009 till mid-2011, the 
US increased its forces committed to Afghanistan by 67 per cent. On the other hand, 
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some NATO members, including The Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Iceland, 
actually shrank their existing contributions.   
Although the feeling that NATO had been starved of resources since the first 
day in Afghanistan is not at all new in the history of NATO debates, necessary 
responses from member states were unusually delayed to ensure the victory of the 
Alliance as a whole. One of the reasons Washington found it hard to generate forces it 
wanted from European allies was because declining European public support for the 
US leadership had restricted European governments from providing resources for the 
NATO-led ISAF mission. This obstacle was not easy to overcome, as the accusation 
that the US was using NATO as an instrument of unilateral power had been so 
widespread among European countries that it often surfaced whenever disputes 
between the US and European allies escalated. The deep-rooted disharmony became 
even more prominent in the case of Afghanistan due to the fact that two wars were 
going on at the same time. Robert Gates once explained why Europeans were 
reluctant to support operations in Afghanistan by arguing that they could not separate 
the fights in Iraq and Afghanistan appropriately. According to him, “Europeans who 
are opposed to what the United States has been doing in Iraq, have projected that to 
the operation in Afghanistan. So there probably has been some spillover in that 
respect.”51 Despite the reminder Gates sent to European countries that “there is a 
direct threat to Europe out of (Afghanistan)”, the US also fully understood the 
difficulties in eliminating constraints that the public had placed on the political leaders 
of Europe. As a result, in early 2009, the US shifted its strategy, the idea behind 
which was similar to the NRF proposal: instead of repeating what European countries 
should do, Washington began to require European allies to focus on what they could 
do. By recognising as well as utilising the different capabilities and expertise 
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individual member states could bring to NATO operations, not only Afghanistan’s 
long-term stability but also the rationale of NATO’s persistence were secured.   
 
The US exit from Afghanistan  
On March 2, 2011, the US launched a targeted operation against a compound in 
Abbottabad, Pakistan, which successfully killed Osama bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda 
leader and symbol. According to the President, “the death of bin Laden marks the 
most significant achievement to date in our nation’s effort to defeat Al-Qaeda”.52 
Asserting that “Al-Qaeda is under more pressure than at any time since 9/11”, 
President Obama stated that “the tide of war is receding”.53 Thus he announced a 
withdrawal of 10,000 US troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2011. After 
confirming that the US had already achieved preset objectives, including “to refocus 
on Al-Qaeda, to reverse the Taliban’s momentum, and train Afghan security forces to 
defend their own country”, the President further aimed to bring home a total of 33,000 
troops by next summer “as the Phase 2 drawdown”.54 According to General John 
Allen, commander of ISAF, the announced drawdown would bring 23,000 of the 
88,000 US troops currently in Afghanistan back home by September 30, 2012. But 
ISAF by then would still have 65,000 US troops in addition to about 40,000 troops 
from other nations like Britain, Germany and Canada.55  
Actually, the decision to transfer lead security responsibility and reduce US 
forces in Afghanistan was made as early as December 2009 when Obama promised to 
withdraw troops in July 2011 while ordering an additional 30,000 American troops 
into Afghanistan.56 Although most news coverage focused on the 30,000 troops in 
Obama’s 33-minute West Point speech, the headline in the New York Times was: 
“Obama Adds Troops, but Maps Exit Plan”. 57   Ever since then, debates have 
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continued over whether and how the US should exit from Afghanistan. Critics argued 
that “Obama’s decision to bring troops home from Afghanistan faster than the 
military recommended could jeopardise the next major push of the war, to unseat 
insurgents in the east”.58 They mainly opposed identifying a time frame for the US to 
transfer responsibility to the Afghans and called for an open-ended escalation of the 
US effort for the nation-building project. President Obama rejected this course 
publicly because “it sets goals that are beyond what can be achieved at a reasonable 
cost, and what we need to achieve to secure our interests”.59 The Afghanistan mission 
was redefined as neither “a full-blown counterinsurgency” nor “an open-
ended…unrealistic nation-building endeavour”60, so it must be clear that America had 
no intention in fighting an endless war in Afghanistan.61 Most importantly, in the 
wake of an economic crisis, the price of the wars could not be simply ignored. Rahm 
Emanuel, the White House Chief of Staff, who privately called the war in Afghanistan 
“political flypaper” (“you get stuck to it and you cannot get unstuck”), worried about 
the cost when Obama announced the deployment of another 30,000 troops. 62 
Representative Louise Slaughter (D-NY) even calculated that “the US government is 
already spending $3.6 billion a month on the war in Afghanistan. Sending an 
additional 30,000 troops will cost an extra $30 billion a year, which works out to 
roughly $1 million per soldier or Marine”.63 In the meantime, according to Senator 
Bernie Sanders (I-Vt), “17 percent of our people are unemployed or under-employed 
and one out of four kids is on food stamps”.64 In short, the US has failed to achieve 
the balance between national security and economy, resulting in the reduction of US 
forces abroad as a means to regain the balance.  
The Republicans, however, questioned the commitment to a timetable for 
bringing US troops home. Representative Lamar Alexander (R-Tenn) was concerned 
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that the administration paid more attention to an “exit strategy” than a success 
strategy. Senator John Cornyn (R-Tex) shared the same view, believing that it was a 
mistake to set a drawdown date before the surge began because it would “send a 
mixed message to both our friends and our enemies regarding the US long-term 
commitment to success”.65 Even the moderate Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC), was 
troubled by Obama’s July 2011 deadline to start leaving, as the rationale for why the 
deadline existed would make it difficult for the President to get Republican support.66 
What was worse, it would be a signal to the enemy that an additional 30,000 US 
forces were not a big deal because they were going back home soon.   
Those concerns were reasonable, as assassinations by the Taliban went up in 
early 2010. “The enemy is just beginning to adapt”, Derek Harvey, the director of 
CentCom’s Afghanistan-Pakistan Centre of Excellence, said. According to him, one 
harsh reality was that the Taliban leadership thought they were okay, even with the 
surge of 30,000 more US troops. 67  Skepticism arose about the viability of 
counterinsurgency. Richard Holbrooke, the US Special Envoy for Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, worried openly about whether the Afghans were ready to assume security 
responsibility by July 2011 when the US troops would leave. General Douglas Lute, 
Deputy National Security Adviser, was also concerned about when the US would 
move to the last phase of Obama’s “clear, hold, build and transfer” model.68  To 
ensure the withdrawal strategy would be sustainable with the Congress and his 
fellows, Obama agreed to conduct the first reassessment in December 2010 to reach a 
conclusion about the pace of withdrawing forces the next year. The result of the 
assessment would determine not whether but how the US should draw down. 69  
Apparently the President has stuck to his decision to draw down US forces, yet he 
also understood the importance of securing the interpretation of US strategy not as 
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“leaving Afghanistan prematurely”. Therefore, General David Petraeus, who was 
successful in bringing an uneasy peace to Iraq following the 2007 surge of US troops 
under his command and would have to work off the war plan McChrystal devised for 
Afghanistan, further clarified that the President’s West Point speech did not mean the 
US would “race for the exits” in 2011—”It’s not hands off, it’s thin out”.70  
The withdrawal decision came amid intense fighting in Afghanistan. Violence 
actually increased across the country following the killing of Osama bin Laden in 
Pakistan on May 2, 2011, resulting in the so-called Taliban’s “spring offensive” . 
What was worse, just a week after the withdrawal was declared, three bombers blew 
themselves up at the Kabul Intercontinental Hotel, killing at least seven people and 
raising questions about whether Afghan forces were fully prepared to assume 
responsibilities as US forces pulled out.71 But for the US, to announce the drawdown 
seemed to be a task that brooked no delay. Washington expected Afghan security 
forces to take over security responsibilities from foreign forces in seven areas of the 
country in the summer of 2011 and to take the lead in protecting the entire country by 
the end of 2014. One of the explanations was that by May 2012 nearly 2,000 US 
forces had been killed and 16,253 wounded, imposing huge pressures on the Obama 
administration.72 Many of Obama’s fellow Democrats have long been skeptical about 
the Afghanistan commitment, requesting a quick pullout. For them, it was highly 
controversial whether the war in Afghanistan was necessary for the war against 
terrorism to be a success. 73  Vice President Joe Biden, who initially argued that 
Afghanistan would gain little measurable benefit from the build-up of 30,000 troops 
as long as there was a lack of a credible Afghan government and Afghan security 
services, warned Obama that the military rationale for adding more troops to a 
backsliding war in Afghanistan was flawed.74 He soon became pessimistic and more 
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convinced than ever that Afghanistan was a version of Vietnam. Republicans 
themselves were divided. Some, including then-presidential candidate Mitt Romney, 
criticised Obama for setting a withdrawal date in the first place, for it would leave 
little room for future adjustments of US strategy. Yet a plurality thought the US 
should withdraw earlier than the end of 2014. After a series of violent episodes and 
setbacks, however, support for the war dropped sharply among both Democrats and 
Republicans. According to a New York Times/CBS News poll conducted in March 
2012, 69 per cent of those polled believed that the war in Afghanistan had not been 
worth the fighting.75 In a Pew Research Centre poll, 57 per cent of respondents said 
that America should bring home US troops as soon as possible, while 50 per cent in a 
Gallup/USA Today poll said America should speed up the withdrawal from 
Afghanistan.76 
This domestic debate was complicated by the strain between the US and 
Afghanistan, especially after the burning of Qurans at a US military base, which led to 
the deaths of several Afghan civilians. Hundreds of demonstrators yelled “Die, die 
foreigners” and required US forces to leave their country.77 In fact, for many Afghan 
people, US forces have been perceived as being imperial police for a long time.78 This 
incident merely triggered the doubt about whether Americans respect Islam as well as 
deep frustration about why violence remained widespread after having overthrown the 
Taliban for more than 10 years. In response, Present Obama reemphasised that the US 
had no intention to police Afghan streets or patroll Afghan mountains indefinitely, as 
making Afghanistan a secured place was the responsibility of the Afghan government. 
Further, he clarified the goal that the US could and would seek was to “build a 
partnership with the Afghan people that endures—one that ensures that we will be 
able to continue targeting terrorists and supporting a sovereign Afghan 
NATO’s Ongoing Engagement after Kosovo 
153 
 
government”.79 However, tensions between Washington and Kabul were accelerated 
in the following year due to the release of photos showing US soldiers posing with the 
remains of Taliban insurgents and a US staff sergeant who had been charged in the 
killing of 16 Afghan civilians.80 In order to improve the already difficult relationship 
with Afghanistan, President Obama signed a strategic partnership agreement with 
President Hamid Karzai on the first anniversary of Osama bin Laden’s death, 
heralding “a future in which war ends, and a new chapter begins”.81 According to 
Obama, this “Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement” would provide the long-
term framework for the US-Afghanistan relationship after the drawdown of US forces: 
the US “will shift into a support role as Afghans step forward”. US eagerness to leave 
was nonetheless criticised by some of the Afghans and even the international 
community, for the Taliban never stopped creating chaos. Just hours after the 
agreement was signed, at least two explosions shook the Afghan capital, near a 
compound used by UN workers and other foreigners, killing seven people, including 
six civilians and a security guard.82 This again raised the question of whether Afghan 
forces were ready to shoulder security responsibilities for the entire country and 
whether it was too early for the US to transfer the counterinsurgency mission and 
withdraw its forces from Afghanistan.      
As a result, although President Obama stated on September 1, 2012 that he 
had a “specific plan to bring our troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014”, he did 
not set a date for the drawdown of all US troops from the country. White House press 
secretary Jay Carney even clarified that the President actually had “never said that all 
the troops would be out”.83 To further reduce the Afghans’ concerns about having to 
deal with threats alone after the withdrawal and to dispel the rumours that America 
was going to abandon Afghanistan, the US encouraged ISAF and other partners to 
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boost the training of Afghan forces and police. According to General John Allen, 
commander of ISAF, the Afghanistan army and police have been growing rapidly 
from 276,000 to 340,000, some of whom were highly-trained.84 The number went 
even higher in 2013, amounting to more than 350,000.85 At the same time, the UN 
Security Council unanimously agreed to extend the authorisation of ISAF for another 
12 months ending October 13, 2013, considering the Taliban had escalated attacks 
recently as they tried to take advantage of the withdrawal of foreign troops.86 In June 
2013, Afghan forces ultimately took the lead for security nationwide, leaving the 
NATO-led ISAF entirely in a supporting, backseat role. So far the total of ISAF 
forces has dropped from 130,000 to just over 87,200, and about 60,000 US troops 
went home.87  
It seemed that the growing capability of the Afghan security forces would 
allow foreign troops to leave the country, yet “a future without the most of the 86,000 
NATO and American troops currently in the country looks uncertain”.88 The fear of 
uncertainty spread out as Umer Daudzai, Afghanistan’s Interior Minister, revealed 
that more than 1,700 Afghan police officers had been killed since March 2013. The 
same number died in the preceding 12 months.89 With regard to the rising death toll 
among Afghan forces as NATO withdrew, the Security Council then made a decision 
to extend ISAF’s mandate until December 31, 2014, the final day for transferring full 
security responsibility to the Afghan government.90 There remained little discussion 
about whether or when the coalition would completely withdraw, though civilian 
deaths had dropped 12 per cent, suggesting conditions in Afghanistan were improving 
steadily.91  In addressing the US role after 2014, Washington expressed its wish to 
normalise the relationship between America and Afghanistan, rather than purposely 
influencing or abandoning it. By reiterating that it was too soon to make decisions 
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about the number of forces that could remain in Afghanistan after 2014, the US 
refrained from sinking into the endless debate over what role America should play in 
Afghanistan. 92  But the rhetoric, without doubt, brought more suspicions and 
resentments. As a result, in January 2014, the Pentagon proposed keeping a 10,000-
strong training and support force in Afghanistan after the end of 2014 for two years, 
and then would start drawing the force down to nearly zero by the end of President 
Obama’s term.93 That is a much shorter period than earlier estimates. Although it 
would allow Obama to claim on leaving office that he had brought two wars to an end, 
it also leads to an urgent requirement to reassess the overall US decision-making on 
the Afghanistan operation. 
 
The legacy of Afghanistan 
It is hard to draw a conclusion about the entire Afghanistan mission especially 
because it was clearly divided into two phases: combat and reconstruction. Bearing in 
mind the lessons from Bosnia and Kosovo, the Bush administration announced the 
bypassing of NATO and chose an ad hoc coalition, in order to avoid the frustrating 
challenge of conducting “war by committee”. What the Balkans suggested to 
President Bush was that US actions were always constrained by having to generate 
consensus amongst 18 other nations, which prevented the US from retaining full 
operational control. Hence no matter how eager the other NATO members were to 
provide help to America after 9/1, the administration rejected invoking Article Five of 
the NATO charter. For President Bush, working through a coalition of the willing was 
a decision made after thoughtful considerations. Yet given that during the combat, a 
majority of operations were undertaken by the US, it was not unreasonable to question 
whether OEF was really a true coalition effort or an American unilateral operation. 
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Members of the ad hoc coalition were asked to offer assistance voluntarily, meaning 
there was no binding on any of them, including the US itself. Therefore the US could 
conduct the operation in a way it preferred, regardless of opinions or advices from its 
allies. Indeed, the coalition it generated following 9/11 provided the US with more 
operational freedom and flexibility than NATO, but OEF was not that different from 
NATO’s interventions in the Balkans, because it was the US and some NATO allies 
of the coalition that contributed most of the military resources and capabilities to the 
Afghanistan mission. The campaign in fact represented essentially an effort made by 
the US together with key NATO allies. Thus what did America truly gain from 
bypassing NATO?  
Although the Bush administration successfully refrained from “tying its 
hands”, it failed to properly engage its allies, many of whom felt deflated and even 
abandoned. The tensions between the US and its allies did not become an obstacle 
until reconstruction was put on the agenda. Since every member had a right to join 
and quit the ad hoc coalition, it became increasingly difficult for the US to generate 
resources and personnel from its allies for the rebuilding task. This mission actually 
reflected the inherent problems in maintaining loose coalition in the absence of any 
institutional structures. In contrast, NATO, when facing disagreements and disputes, 
could always hold its members together and present a united front, in order to 
guarantee that “the pull of alliance unity was stronger than the forces threatening to 
pull NATO apart”.94  As a double-edged sword, the institutional structure of NATO 
endowed its member states with incomparable power, though simultaneously placed 
certain constrains on employing that power. After recognising the advantage of 
NATO over a coalition of the willing, the administration handed over the Afghanistan 
mission to NATO, reconfirming US commitments to the Alliance.  
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As the rising of Taliban insurgents became severe, ISAF was required to 
expand. However, NATO members were not well prepared to share the burdens, 
creating a two-tiered alliance with the US and some key NATO allies offering most 
troops and the other members committing fewer resources. This time, instead of 
criticising its allies for being unwilling or unable to contribute, the US encouraged 
NATO members to focus on what they could do, which helped NATO utilise the 
different capabilities and expertise of individual member state. Although the solution 
to the two-tiered alliance was not ideal, it at least provided the US with an idea of how 
to stimulate its allies to participate in NATO operations as well as how to “make 
better use of” the Alliance, and strengthened US commitments to NATO. In short, if 
the lessons of the Balkans reduced US confidence in exploiting NATO, then the 
legacy of Afghanistan reinforced US faith in the Alliance. 
 
Evolving concepts 
In many important respects, the transformation of NATO has gone smoothly since it 
was firstly put on the agenda at the Rome Summit in 1991. 10 years later, President 
Bush further outlined a broad vision of a new security community, emphasising his 
belief in “NATO membership for all of Europe’s democracies that seek it and are 
ready to share the responsibilities that NATO brings”. 95  However, in the direct 
aftermath of 9/11, the Bush administration seemingly forgot what it had declared just 
a few months ago, declining the invocation of Article Five and rejecting to make OEF 
a NATO operation. The suspended US support for an expeditionary alliance became 
problematic for Eastern and Central European countries, as the lasting resolution to 
their security dilemma that emerged due to the breakup of Soviet Union, rested on 
NATO’s continued viability as a premier Euro-Atlantic security link. While the 
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Balkans becalmed those states in the “grey zone of Europe” by showing that NATO 
was going “out-of-area” and was extending the security umbrella over both “old” and 
“new” members, this time Afghanistan undermined those potential allies’ confidence 
in dealing with post-Cold War security challenges by simply joining NATO. For 
Eastern and Central Europe, it was obvious that without US support, NATO would 
not continue transformation, not to mention addressing the question of whether or 
when they could obtain NATO memberships. As a result, the Bush administration’s 
decision to bypass NATO not only brought the US commitment to NATO into 
question, though President Clinton more than once confirmed his sponsorship for 
NATO persistence, but also left anxiety in the former Warsaw Pact states that were 
altered for decades by Soviet domination and wished to embrace NATO as a solution 
to end the residual fear of Russia. 
 
The second and third rounds of NATO enlargement 
In order to assess how Afghanistan influenced the ongoing transformation process of 
NATO, it is necessary firstly to revisit the geostrategic context as well as the 
implications of the decision to transform and especially to enlarge NATO. The year of 
1989 saw the fall of the Berlin Wall, which changed traditional geopolitics and 
balance-of-power issues. Since then there has been shared concern in both 
Washington and European capitals that post-communist European countries were 
about to form the Continent’s “grey zone”. Similar concern was also apparent in 
Eastern Europe, fearing that the future might prove to have the same security 
dilemmas as those of the past. Hence finding a resolution to the residual regional 
security issues became the crucial challenge of the decade. Although countries like 
Hungary and the Czech Republic proposed to expand NATO as early as 1990, the 
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idea of absorbing former Warsaw Pact satellites in the Alliance seemed to be risky 
and unrealistic in the immediate post-1989 period. However, after the unification of 
Germany and the collapse of the Soviet Union, two landmark events that redefined the 
security environment of Europe, it became unprecedentedly palpable that NATO’s 
sustained viability remained of vital interest to the member states. On the other hand, 
given that the geostrategic vulnerability has resulted in limited capabilities of those 
Eastern European countries to deal independently with external threats, most of the 
post-Communism countries regarded NATO enlargement as the preferred resolution 
to the security dilemma, as by joining NATO they “could anchor themselves in the 
West and ‘return to Europe’”.96  
In spite of concerns emphasised at the Brussels Summit in 1994 about whether 
it was too quick to open the door, NATO enlargement was widely viewed as the 
framework for spreading as well as consolidating democracy across the post-
Communism countries and for stabilising the “grey zone of Europe”. The first round 
of enlargement invited Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to enter the Alliance, 
which was hailed as a great success. This naturally led to an optimistic view that 
NATO should continue expansion and there should be a second, and a third round of 
enlargement coming soon. Since then, the Vilnius group created by the Baltics and 
seven Eastern European countries in May 2000, has been busy cooperating and 
lobbying for further membership.97 Yet, the question remained about who would be 
allowed to join NATO. With regard to this, the 1999 Alliance’s Washington Summit 
approved the Membership Action Plan (MAP), a mechanism that allowed the current 
members to review and provide “both political and technical advice” to each 
candidate before issuing that country with an invitation to begin accession talks.98 The 
final accession process, once launched, consisted of five steps leading to the signing 
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of the accession protocols and the ratification, acceptance or approval of those 
protocols by the current NATO member countries.99 In November 2002, at the Prague 
Summit, seven countries including Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia were invited to begin accession talks, the whole process of 
which was planned to be completed by May 2004. As expected, the 2004 Istanbul 
Summit finally announced the memberships of those invitees, marking the Alliance’s 
second post-Cold War round of enlargement.  
In the fall of 2006, Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier published an article in 
Foreign Affairs, asserting that NATO would expand its membership on a global 
level.100 Thereby, considering that the MAP has worked well in helping the aspirants 
prepare for possible future memberships, NATO was looking forward to inviting the 
Balkan Three, namely Albania, Croatia and Macedonia, to enter the Alliance at the 
Bucharest Summit in April 2008. However, the meeting only encountered the 
worsening of internal tensions of the organisation, resulting in a limited invitation to 
Albania and Croatia only. Although the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia101 
had been participating in the MAP since 1999, it was blocked from joining the 
Alliance by the Greek objection to the country’s name. In the wake of Bucharest, it 
seemed that NATO might have reached the limits of expansion for the foreseeable 
future. This daunting prospect of NATO enlargement immediately raised concerns 
about whether NATO failed to achieve its presetting targets, one of which referred to 
extending its security boundaries eastward. If so, NATO would lose the rationale for 
persisting as a useful alliance. What prevented the Alliance from absorbing more 
allies, especially considering that the enlargement process has gone particularly well 
since its launch? In other words, what stopped NATO from transforming itself into a 
more valid and more important organisation?  
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A mismatch between NATO’s own two objectives 
 Actually since the initial attempt to frame a new purpose after the end of the Cold 
War, NATO has adapted by cohering around two objectives: expansion and “out-of-
area” missions. It was not enough to counter threats in the new security environment 
merely by relying on NATO enlargement, even though the total capability of NATO 
might increase due to the fact that more allies joined the Alliance.102 Thus, in addition 
to expansion, NATO had to make efforts to transform into a broader alliance that 
would shoulder more responsibility both in and out of area.      
As the 1999 round of enlargement coincided with the decision to fight a war in 
Kosovo, it sowed the seeds of dissention over the current and future allied mission, 
especially about how far “out-of-area” NATO would be ready to deploy. To evolve 
NATO into an expeditionary alliance, therefore, become the most worrisome trend, 
because the out-of-area NATO which went away from its traditional defensive 
mission was not the alliance those Eastern and Central European countries wanted to 
join. On the other hand, for Washington, NATO had to go “out-of-area” and pursue 
real rather than rhetoric transformation if it wanted to persist after the disappearance 
of the Soviet threat. But the poor performance in the Balkans saw NATO polarised by 
debates on whether shifting its original purpose of self-defence was a correct choice, 
resulting in reconsiderations in the US that NATO enlargement might need to be 
slowed down. Far from what the US envisaged, the Kosovo campaign turned out to be 
a Pandora’s box, by opening which a series of military as well as political problems 
within the Alliance that had not been solved by NATO enlargement came out. In 
particular, “war by committee” revealed an inherent problem of the Alliance due to 
“national caveats”, according to which “governments place limits on what military 
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activities their troops (are) allowed to do or where they (are) allowed to go in carrying 
out their missions”. 103  This restriction hindered commanders’ efforts to generate 
consensus among member states, not only causing headaches during NATO 
operations in the Balkans, but also foreshadowing the long-term consequences for the 
Alliance to take on more missions.  
NATO’s engagement in missions ranging from Bosnia to Darfur repeated the 
intrinsic discord among allies, it, nonetheless, proved that the Alliance has overcome 
the doubts about its continuance that arose after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Given that the Alliance was a beginner to perform out-of-area operations, its 
termination of crises and rescue of innocent civilians clearly suggested that NATO’s 
first attempt to transform into a viable alliance was a success. In other words, NATO 
withstood the test of dealing with new threats that were addressed at the 1991 Rome 
Summit. At that time, the faith in a better NATO was not low. Hence when terrorists 
attacked the US in 2001, there was a widespread belief that “War on Terror” would 
further reinforce NATO’s significance, as NATO has always been Washington’s 
premier alliance and most of Washington’s closest allies were members of NATO. 
However, NATO’s actual role in the multifaceted struggle against terrorists was 
minor, not only because the Bush administration lost confidence in utilising this 
deeply institutionalised organisation, but also due to NATO’s unsatisfactory 
contribution to this “War on Terror”.   
 
Why NATO failed to contribute to Washington’s “War on Terror” 
Different strategies to combat terrorism.    9/11 facilitated a second shift in US policy 
towards key national security threat. Since then, terrorism has replaced 
“instabilities”104 to be a core focus. Notwithstanding that terrorism soon emerged as a 
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shared alliance concern, the “War on Terror” was a US creation. How should NATO 
contribute to combat terrorism under the condition that it was not a “tool” of US 
policy? At the Prague Summit in November 2002, members of the Alliance endorsed 
the new Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism as official NATO policy, 
placing great emphasis on NATO’s role in helping “deter, defend, and protect against 
terrorist attacks”.105 In this rubric, NATO’s military guidelines referred to defensive 
and reactive counterterrorism activities. Yet US strategies differed from NATO’s, 
seeking to prevent attacks before they occur. The divergence between America’s 
offensive and NATO’s defensive strategies to combat terrorism did not mean NATO 
would be useless, it just suggested that NATO would play a supportive rather than a 
lead role in the “War on Terror”.  
But what caused the difference between America’s and NATO’s strategies to 
combat terrorism? Simply, there were disagreements in threat perception among 
NATO members, which actually derived from NATO enlargement. By expanding 
eastward, the Alliance removed the potential threat of unstable countries along the 
borders of member states, creating divergences in security concerns: while some “old” 
allies felt less threatened by traditional security concerns, some “new” members 
continued to have territorial security concerns due to their proximity to Russia.106 For 
the gravity of the terrorist threat, to be specific, member states also varied remarkably. 
Some saw the threat as significant, whereas the others perceived it to be limited. For 
example, only five countries in Europe being Britain, France, Germany, Italy and 
Spain had legislation about terrorism before 9/11. Since NATO allies held different 
threat perceptions, there was no doubt that they would differ on how to combat threats. 
Based on the distinct understanding of the nature of the terrorist threat, member states 
disagreed on whether the use of force was an appropriate method. Moreover, even 
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those allies who regarded terrorism as severe and urgent in the same way as the US, 
especially France and Germany, disagreed with the US on strategies to suppress 
Islamist terrorism. European allies were particularly concerned about US 
unilateralism, fearing that they might be “entrapped” by their alliance commitments to 
aid the unbridled “War on Terror”. 107  As a result, the Alliance could only issue 
strategies as supplements to the US policy of preventive war, which not only lowered 
NATO’s contribution to combat terrorism, but also reduced the US willingness to 
accept alliance constraints.  
US preference. US strategy documents indicated that NATO’s highly 
institutionalised, consensus-oriented model was not Washington’s preferred approach 
for multilateral cooperation in the “War on Terror”. For example, the US National 
Security Strategy (NSS) released in March 2006 clarified the US preference for a 
looser coalition that would rely on voluntary adherence rather than binding treaties, 
because “in many cases coalitions of the willing (might) be able to respond more 
quickly and creatively, at least in the short term”.108 Similarly, the 2006 Quadrennial 
Defence Review (QDR) also underlined the Pentagon’s preference for “dynamic 
partnerships” rather than “static alliances”.109 This time, European allies began to 
worry about US commitments to the Alliance, though they were more concerned 
about the US overusing NATO as a “toolbox” when Washington announced its 
invasion of Iraq in 2003.  
In fact, President Bush did not declare the bypassing of NATO in Afghanistan 
for nothing. It was the performance of those European allies that eventually 
heightened the US frustration with alliance constraints. Finding it extremely difficult 
to convince European member states to devote more resources and troops to the 
operation, the US became reluctant to count on its allies. According to then-Secretary 
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of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, “It’s kind of like having a basketball team, and they 
practice and practice and practice for six months. When it comes to game time, one or 
two say, ‘We’re not going to play.’ Well, that’s fair enough. Everyone has a free 
choice. But you don’t have a free choice if you’ve practiced for all those months.”110 
The perennial problem regarding the “two-tiered” alliance has hindered NATO’s 
capability in conducting “out-of-area” operations for a long time. What was worse, 
although many European allies realised this problem, they lacked willingness to 
bridge the gap. To solve this dilemma, the US initially expected to enhance the 
Alliance’s total military assets as well as capabilities through incorporating more 
member states. Yet NATO enlargement failed to transform new allies’ militaries to 
accord with NATO standards. 111  As a result, no improvement of the Alliance’s 
operational cooperation took place in the US war against terror, implying that the gap 
between what the US and its European allies were capable and willing to do was 
growing. Washington began to view NATO as unreliable, for working through the 
Alliance would compromise the mission and the safety of US forces. A senior State 
Department official thus explicitly expressed the US preference as follows: “We ‘ad 
hoc’ our way through coalitions of the willing. That’s the future”, which apparently 
reflected “Washington’s search for alternatives to the post-Second World War global 
architecture in the new era of its ‘war on terror’”.112  
In short, Washington and European capitals exhibited different threat 
perceptions, leading to their divergent strategies to combat terrorism. By embracing a 
defensive military guideline that was far from the US offensive strategy, NATO, 
though not purposely, sent a message to the US that it pursued a policy to shrink its 
contribution to the “War on Terror”. With regard to this, the US moved to reconsider 
the utility of NATO, especially about whether the benefits of NATO’s military 
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mechanisms and political consultation outweighed the costs of working to build 
consensus within the Alliance when more resources and troops were required in the 
war against terror. Thus the US was motivated to change its preference for ad hoc 
coalitions, making the US commitment to working through institutionalised alliance 
structures unclear. The irony of disagreements between the US and its European allies 
in how to fight against terrorism was that, in times prior to the “War on Terror”, 
European members were extremely concerned about Washington using NATO as an 
instrument of extra-United Nations unilateral power, yet they began to worry about 
the US scaling down its commitment to the transatlantic organisation that has 
successfully provided security guarantee for Europe since WWII. This ultimately 
influenced the tone of the debate over US commitment to the Alliance following the 
Afghanistan mission. 
 
The debate over US commitment to NATO following Afghanistan 
Although the Bush administration decided to bypass NATO at the very beginning, it 
then agreed to transfer the US-led OEF to the NATO-led ISAF and sponsored the 
expansion of ISAF to assume responsibility for the entire Afghanistan operation. 
Apparently, Afghanistan was NATO’s first ever deployment outside Europe, the 
range and scale of which peaked throughout the history of NATO operations. Hence, 
“By taking on such a huge and challenging mission, NATO (was) putting its future on 
the line”.113 There was a great hope that the Afghanistan mission would help NATO 
transform itself into a more relevant and robust alliance to engage in more missions 
around the world. However, NATO failed to generate sufficient resources and troops 
from its member states for the Afghanistan mission, especially for the post-campaign 
reconstruction tasks, which highly reduced US confidence in the capability of NATO 
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and thereby heightened US frustration with alliance constraints. One of the reasons 
was that the so-called “national caveats”, which has already been highlighted in the 
Balkans, became more problematic in Afghanistan where the operational 
effectiveness was damaged and allies did not share burdens and risks equally which 
caused friction among member states. European governments’ hesitation strictly 
limited what their troops could do, making Afghanistan a deeply troubled place. 
Moreover, with the European public becoming inward-looking and America seen as 
unpopular, it became increasingly difficult to get those European allies to take on 
global military missions alongside the US. The disparity in members’ contribution has 
long been a problem in NATO’s operations, but not until the lack of resources and 
flexibility hindered the fulfilment of the Afghanistan mission did Washington 
determine to seriously reconsider its commitment to the Alliance.    
The US was the loudest voice encouraging NATO enlargement to incorporate 
Eastern and Central European countries after the end of the Cold War. Its initial 
expectation was to see the total military capabilities of NATO increasing by absorbing 
more member states. Yet in reality Washington became annoyed with its NATO allies, 
because “the US-backed expansion of the alliance contributed to the erosion of 
NATO’s military capabilities”.114 The states that entered NATO in 1999 and 2004 
have not achieved the goals set for transforming their militaries to meet NATO 
standards. According to Andrew Michta, “the more NATO has expanded to foster the 
military-political security of the new democratic states of eastern and south-eastern 
Europe, the less it seems capable of dealing with real security threats such as 
Afghanistan”.115 For the US, lessened alliance capabilities would be troublesome as 
long as it wanted to include alliance forces in its major operations. If by increasing the 
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number of members, NATO would have its military capabilities decreased, why 
would the US continue to support enlargement?  
To answer this question, it is necessary to review the crucial factor that 
promoted the decision of NATO enlargement: Russia. As Soviet forces withdrew 
from Eastern and Central Europe, pressure to join NATO grew in this region. Those 
former Warsaw Pact states still could not get rid of the residual fear of Russia, 
embracing NATO as the preferred solution to their security dilemmas. Yeltsin’s 
Russia, however, differed from what was envisaged. Instead of rapidly re-emerging as 
an enemy to the West again, it sank into its post-imperial morass and ceased to be an 
immediate threat. Hence there was great expectation in the 1990s that Russia would 
be part of the new order and might gain membership of NATO. For example, Russia 
agreed in principle to participate in the Bosnia implementation force in 1995, and 
signed the NATO-Russia Charter in Paris in May 1997, both of which hugely 
facilitated the dialogue between NATO and Russia. But the “cooperation” between 
Russia and NATO has not survived the passage of time. The anticipation that Russia 
was unlikely to re-emerge as a threat for at least another decade proved hollow.  
The renewed hostility from Putin’s Russia, though indirectly, hindered NATO 
enlargement, particularly the possible Georgian and Ukrainian membership. The 
Russo-Georgian war of August 2008 revealed the sharp divisions within NATO. 
France and Germany were unwilling to accept Georgia’s excuse that it went to war to 
protect its territorial integrity and blamed Tbilisi as the party responsible for the 
conflict, while the US and some “new” allies including Poland, Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania took a much more pro-Georgia stance, believing that “Russia has invaded a 
sovereign neighbouring state and threatens a democratic government elected by its 
people”. 116  No matter whether it was Georgia or Russia that bore the ultimate 
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responsibility for the initiation of hostilities, the war nonetheless had a powerful 
impact on NATO’s internal debates over future enlargement. To be specific, the 
Georgian public was overwhelmingly in favour of NATO membership following 
Moscow’s military action against Georgia. This appeal quickly gained support from 
President Lech Kaczynski of Poland and his counterparts from Ukraine, Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania who warned that refusal to give Georgia fast-track access to 
NATO membership “was seen as a green light for aggression”.117 Yet this view stood 
in stark contrast to the statement from French and German officials. For them, those 
five Eastern European countries were biased because they all had memories of 
occupation by Russia. Paris and Berlin avoided designating a culprit in the conflict, 
but not all Western Europeans chose to stay “neutral”. Italy appeared to side with 
Russia. According to Franco Frattini, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, “We cannot 
create an anti-Russia coalition in Europe, and on this point we are close to Putin’s 
position”.118 The division between Western and Eastern Europeans over the Russo-
Georgian conflict actually sent a bad message that NATO membership might be 
jeopardised in the future. Given that France and Germany has already blocked a US 
proposal to give Georgia and Ukraine the MAP at the Bucharest Summit, those “old” 
European members were more likely to lose appetite for NATO enlargement into the 
Caucasus after the conflict, though they insisted that “if anything, the conflict had 
dimmed Georgian chances of joining NATO in the near future because the strategic 
environment in the region became more fragile”.119 What NATO members learned 
from the Russo-Georgian war was that the Alliance should not press further east, 
otherwise it would encounter striking frictions not only between the US and Europe, 
but between some leaders in Western and Eastern Europe.  
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Much of the uncertainty about NATO’s long-term future has been caused by 
the failure to match the Alliance’s two objectives set for the post-Cold War era: the 
enlargement and the military transformation especially in “out-of-area” missions. The 
paradox was that the more NATO has expanded, the less it seemed capable of 
countering security threats. NATO enlargement succeeded in transforming some post-
communist countries into democratic ones, however, it failed to achieve consensus on 
the shared missions such as Afghanistan and to provide sufficient military support. 
NATO has struggled more after the Cold War to generate resources and troops from 
its member states to guarantee the success of “out-of-area” operations because the 
total military capability of the Alliance did not increase with the number of member 
states. Consequently, NATO sank into more heated debates over its purpose following 
the enlargement in the 1990s and the engagement in the Balkans and Afghanistan. 
The Alliance was pulled in two directions: to continue expansion and transformation 
until assuming a global expeditionary role for a broad spectrum of missions; or to 
remain as a regional limited defensive organisation. The first vision of NATO’s role 
was promoted by the US and shared to varying degrees by Britain, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Denmark, and of course most of the “new” allies who saw NATO 
enlargement as the preferred solution to their security dilemmas. On the other hand, 
France, as the strongest European voice concerning US unilateralism, wanted NATO 
to play a regional defensive role and to support an independent European military 
capability at the same time. Germany, though changed to be a NATO booster, has 
shared the French vision for a long time. Tensions in the transatlantic relationship not 
only hindered the enlargement process, but also reduced NATO contribution to the 
“out-of-area” missions. The failure of Afghanistan was predicted to be a fatal blow to 
the Alliance and to the future of multinational peacekeeping, but it also reminded the 
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US that if NATO wanted to remain viable, it needed to have a more operational focus 
than ever before. What has driven the US agenda is expansion, and what has tied the 
US to Europe is the need to deal with common threats.  
Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the US has given greater attention to the 
fight against terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), so the 
decisive question for NATO’s future was whether that US view would be shared by 
both “old” and “new” European allies and whether all NATO members were willing 
to contribute not only politically but also militarily to the shared missions. This 
provoked a thorough analysis of NATO issues and tasks, and virtually, presented an 
opportunity for “rethinking, reprioritising and reforming NATO” in the context of 
economic crises.120 Thus new and emerging security threats drove NATO to reassess 
and review its strategic posture, which ultimately brought allied leaders to produce a 
“New Strategic Concept” at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010. The 2010 
Strategic Concept “Active Engagement, Modern Defence” was a clear and resolute 
statement on NATO’s enduring purpose and fundamental security tasks, which, 
according to NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “will put in an 
Alliance that is more effective, more engaged and more efficient than ever before”.121 
After stressing the urgency of countering existing and emerging threats, including the 
proliferation of ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons and WMDs, terrorism, cyber 
attacks and fundamental environmental problems, the “New Strategic Concept” 
presented NATO’s three core tasks—collective defence, crisis management and 
cooperative security. Since defence and deterrence has always been NATO’s greatest 
responsibility, the 2010 Strategic Concept placed more emphasis on the latter two 
tasks. The Alliance would proceed to deepen and extend “a more inclusive, flexible 
and open relationship” with NATO partners across the globe including Russia and 
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countries of the Mediterranean and the Gulf region, and accelerate its transformation 
to develop stronger operational capabilities in order to “engage, where possible and 
when necessary, to prevent crises, manage crises, stabilise post-conflict institutions 
and support reconstruction”.122  
The 2010 Strategic Concept adopted at the Lisbon Summit, one of the most 
important Summits in the Alliance’s history, reflected a transformed security 
environment and a transformed Alliance. Many security analysts portrayed this new 
Strategic Concept as a balancing act, for it aimed to balance new threats with old ones 
and to accommodate the interests of small countries and big ones. But more 
importantly, it stressed the need for the Alliance to remain cost-effective and made 
continuous internal reform a key aspect of the way NATO would do business in the 
future. As a result, how best NATO could reform to adapt military structures and 
capabilities to equip its member states for new missions would be crucial to determine 
NATO’s persistence.  
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7  NATO’s Engagement in Libya 
 
The Libyan crisis 
Early in 2011, overwhelming anti-government protests swept North Africa: Tunisian 
President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali who had been in power for 23 years was forced to 
flee the country immediately; Egyptian President Muhammed Hosni Mubarak who 
had maintained his 30-plus year hold on authority had no choice but to step down 
from office in just 18 days. These astonishing political changes in neighbouring 
Tunisia and Egypt encouraged similar protests in Algeria, Iraq, Bahrain, Yemen, and 
Libya. The crisis in Libya was triggered on February 15 by a chain of protests in 
Benghazi, the second largest city of Libya, and many other eastern cities that quickly 
spiralled out of Muammar al Gaddafi’s control. The reason why Libya fell into chaos 
was not unanimously agreed. Some people advocated that the Abu Salim Prison 
massacre that shocked the world in 1996 was the direct cause. Hundreds of prisoners 
were shot and killed by Gaddafi’s security forces that year, and the Libyan 
government refused to punish the criminals, though it promised to compensate. Hence, 
Libyan opposition groups called for a “day of rage” on February 17, 2011 to 
commemorate protests that had occurred five years earlier. Others believed that the 
real cause behind protests lay in the fraud of Libyan reform. Gaddafi had long insisted 
that he held no formal government position, but by all accounts he enjoyed ultimate 
authority, denying Libyans the most basic political rights. Therefore, the long-
simmering Libyan reform debate was brought to the boiling point, requiring Gaddafi 
to transfer power peacefully. 
In response, Libyan security forces opened fire with heavy weaponry on 
protestors. Fighter jets and helicopter gunships attacked people who had no means to 
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defend themselves. 1  Sayf al Islam Al Gaddafi, the eldest of Gaddafi’s sons, 
highlighted “We will eradicate them all” and warned the public that the conflict might 
escalate into a civil war during his televised speech on February 20.2 Hence, the UN 
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said Gaddafi had lost his legitimacy when he 
declared war on his people, urging Gaddafi that “the human rights and freedom of 
assembly and freedom of speech must be fully protected” and that the authorities must 
immediately halt violence against civilians.3 At the end of February, Hillary Clinton 
travelled to the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva to remind the international 
community that it had a responsibility to protect universal rights and to hold violators 
accountable. She said that Gaddafi had “lost the legitimacy to govern” and “the 
people of Libya have made themselves clear: It is time for Gaddafi to go—now, 
without further violence or delay”.4 However, Gaddafi ignored the condemnation and 
insisted on further repression against demonstrators, which caused a tremendous 
increase in the death toll.5 According to the United Nations report, protestors killed by 
Gaddafi’s family-led security forces amounted to a thousand in the first ten days, and 
civilians that died during the conflict reached three thousands in just half a month.6 
But Libyan state TV denied there had been any massacres, dismissing the report as 
“baseless lies” by foreign media. Gaddafi even called foreign news channels “dogs” 
when he appeared on state television on February 22.7 Regarding Gaddafi’s comment 
as an insult, Libya’s diplomats at the UN in New York including Deputy Permanent 
Representative Ibrahim Dabbashi and Libya’s most senior diplomat Ali Aujali, called 
for international intervention to stop Gaddafi’s violent action against street 
demonstration in their homeland.8  
Shocked by Gaddafi’s brutality, the United Nations Security Council 
unanimously adopted Resolution 1970 on February 26, establishing an arms embargo 
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to prohibit weapons transfers to Libya; granting the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
jurisdiction over crimes committed in Libya on or after February 15, 2011; imposing 
targeted financial and travel sanctions on Gaddafi and certain individuals; and calling 
on member states to support humanitarian response efforts.9 But the Resolution 1970 
did not authorise the use of military force by member states, leading to subsequent 
debate over the necessity of military intervention. This culminated in the passage of 
Resolution 1973 on March 17, which demanded the immediate ceasefire and a no-fly 
zone in Libyan airspace; granted member states to take all necessary measures to 
protect civilians; authorised robust enforcement inspection measures for the arms 
embargo established by Resolution 1970, and expanded targeted financial and travel 
sanctions on Libyan individuals and entities.10 
In fact, not until Resolution 1973 did the US make decisions to unfold military 
operations against Libyan military targets. Prior to this, America hesitated to make 
any stance, in addition to delivering several vague speeches: the highest-level 
statement at that moment by the US government on the accelerating strife in Libya 
was made by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who, though condemning the violence 
in Libya and calling for a halt to the “unacceptable bloodshed” in response to civil 
unrest, only aimed to “convey this message to the Libyan government” rather than 
claiming US support of the Libyan people.11  Yet after about one month, the US 
determined to get involved. What a difference one month made. The reason why the 
US felt reluctant to intervene in Libya at first; why it changed its mind to join the 
operation later, and why it transferred the task to NATO and adopted the strategy of 
“leading from behind” reflected not only the reconsideration of styling the US as a 
“global policeman”, but also the new definition of “American way of war” under 
which America would participate in operations conditionally.    
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US response: from hesitation to intervention 
 
Hesitation 
“America, it is time to focus on nation-building here at home.”12 President Obama 
restated his doctrine of opposing more military entanglements and scaling down the 
US commitments overseas when announcing the withdrawal of American troops from 
Afghanistan in June 2011. There seemed to be a strong sense among an overwhelming 
majority of policymakers and the public that America should no longer declare new 
conflict involvements, given the overstretched position due to the wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, and the pressures for austerity at home. In such circumstances, Robert Gates, 
then-Secretary of Defence, became one of the pioneers to oppose US involvement in 
Libya. In March 2011, he made a statement as follows: “My view would be, if there is 
going to be that kind of assistance (providing arms) to the opposition, there are plenty 
of sources for it other than the United States.” He further added that NATO would act 
only “if there is demonstrable need, a sound legal basis and strong regional support” 
for military action.13 Far worse was Gates’ answer when asked if there would be US 
“boots on the ground”. According to the New York Times, Gates swiftly replied “Not 
as long as I am in this job”.14 
The immediate US response to the Libyan crisis could date back to early 
February when the US evacuated its citizens in Libya. President Obama then 
condemned the bloodshed in Libya as “outrageous” and claimed that America would 
resort to a “full range of options we have to respond to this crisis”.15 However, though 
the President reiterated that the US “will stand with (the Libyan people) in the face of 
unwarranted violence”, he did not specifically describe what kind of assistance the US 
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was prepared to provide. He also called for Gaddafi to step down, but did not 
elaborate on the specific steps the US planned to take to support that outcome. In 
response to the growing violence in Libya, the President issued Executive Order 
13566 on February 25, which imposed significant economic sanctions on Gaddafi, his 
government, and close associates. Also on that day, Hillary Clinton approved a policy 
to revoke the visas held by those Libyan officials responsible for the recent human 
rights violations, and suspended the very limited military cooperation the US had with 
Libya.16 But on the other hand, as one senior defence official said on March 13, the 
US military did not want to send troops into Libya, even for humanitarian purposes, 
until Gaddafi had left power.17 In fact, what America militarily did in early March 
was to reposition naval assets in the central Mediterranean Sea. But this decision was 
irrelevant to military intervention because the US forces were only allowed to monitor 
the United Nations arms embargo and to provide support for humanitarian efforts by 
the UN, EU and others.18  
For Gaddafi, the growing US pressure on him was “only the latest in a series 
of twists and turns in the relationship between Washington and Tripoli over his 42 
years of rule”.19 Therefore, unafraid of the limited international response, Gaddafi 
continued to advance its military forces toward the opposition-held cities of eastern 
Libya, raising the possibility that civilians would be targeted and a humanitarian crisis 
would occur. In a series of statements via state television and radio, Gaddafi required 
citizens to disarm in exchange for “general amnesty” and “protection” or to choose 
exile.20 He also added “We will not show mercy” to the city of Benghazi and its 
population of 700,000, and those who refused Gaddafi’s terms were labelled as “rats”, 
“apostates”, and “traitors” and would face a “purge” that would proceed “room by 
room” and “individual by individual”.21  Thousands of people were forced to flee 
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Libya and remain in temporary Tunisian and Egyptian border transit camps. Gaddafi 
denied that he had purposefully targeted civilians, whereas his overreaction to protests 
unveiled his conspiracy to upgrade the conflict to a humanitarian crisis, wakening 
America and the international community to the view that “Gaddafi must go”.    
 
Intervention 
Apparently, the reason why America was reluctant to intervene in Libya at first lay in 
domestic pressures. The legacy of the US “War on Terror” scared both the US 
policymakers and the public, who could not bear the US sinking into another 
“quagmire” as in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq. Inside the administration, the 
debate mainly centred on the question of humanitarian intervention—whether it was 
worth “saving strangers” regardless of cost—one that continued to vex the 
governments of the US and other democracies.22 According to Susan Rice, the Iraq 
war had set back the cause of humanitarian intervention by discrediting American 
military missions abroad and making it more difficult to rally consensus to stop a 
massacre.23 But when economic sanctions and diplomatic means were proved failures 
in stopping Gaddafi and when those innocent civilians were pleading with the 
international community to save them, should the US continue to brush off the 
enquiry with meaningless verbal condemnation? 24  It was understandable that 
Washington was under considerable military, economic and political pressure due to 
its overstretched position around the world, but was that a persuasive argument on US 
inability to conduct necessary military intervention, given Gaddafi’s brutality and 
intransigence, the Arab leaders’ hostility toward Gaddafi, and the determination by 
Britain and France that military intervention in Libya was in their interests? 
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Answers to these questions could be found from previous experience. Taking 
the case of Cote d’Ivoire in 2010-2011 as an example, if international military action 
had taken place earlier to oust Laurent Gbagbo and install Alasssane Ouattara, the 
tragedy of a million refugees and a ravaged economy would not have continued for so 
long. The Cote d’Ivoire conflict provided a contrast to Libya and illustrated what 
would happen in the absence of a serious military option. “Military force is not a 
panacea, and its use is not a cause for celebration. However, in situations of ongoing 
mass atrocities it is a crucial option.” 25 President Obama was thereby motivated, 
stressing in his speech that without military action to stop Gaddafi’s repression, “the 
writ of the United Nations Security Council would have been shown to be little more 
than empty words, crippling that institution’s future credibility to uphold global peace 
and security”.26 According to him, the dominant motivation for using military forces 
in Libya was to avert a humanitarian disaster and fulfil the “Responsibility to Protect” 
(R2P). This irrefutable rationale for US military intervention in Libya helped remove 
all suspicions and enabled the Obama administration to declare its participation in the 
Libyan mission eventually.    
On March 18, President Obama made more explicit remarks about US 
intervention in light of the Resolution 1973, stating that “a ceasefire must be 
implemented immediately” and “all attacks against civilians must stop”. He also 
underscored that “Gaddafi must stop his troops from advancing on Benghazi, pull 
them back from Ajdabiya, Misurata, and Zawiya, and establish water, electricity and 
gas supplies to all areas. Humanitarian assistance must be allowed to reach the people 
of Libya”. Emphasising that the terms were “not negotiable”, the President warned 
Gaddafi that if he refused to “comply with the Resolution, the international 
community will impose consequences, and the Resolution will be enforced through 
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military action”. To deflect unnecessary debates over the US policy, President Obama 
specified that “the US is not going to deploy ground troops into Libya. And we are 
not going to use force to go beyond a well-defined goal—specifically, the protection 
of civilians in Libya”.27 He made things clear about US limited military objectives, 
requiring that all attacks against civilians must stop; Gaddafi must stop his troops 
from advancing on Benghazi and establish water, electricity and gas supplies to all 
areas; and humanitarian assistance must be allowed to reach the people of Libya. This 
statement was welcomed by House of Representatives Democratic Leader Nancy 
Pelosi in the first place: “I commend the President for his leadership and prudence on 
how our nation will proceed in regards to Libya and work in concern with European 
and Arab allies to address the crisis”.28  
 
Consultation with the Congress 
Although the administration did not claim a leading role in the Libyan mission such as 
the public worried about, it still faced the obstacle of persuading the Congress to 
accept the policy of intervention. According to John Boehner, the Speaker of the US 
House of Representatives, as long as Robert Gates’ three conditions on US/NATO’s 
participation in Libya were met (demonstrable need; a sound legal basis, and strong 
regional support), the US would be able to declare its moral obligation to stand with 
those who seek freedom from oppression and self-government for their people.29 This 
resulted in supporters of intervention busily listing how those conditions had already 
been met. Firstly, NATO Defence Ministers shared concerns about Gaddafi’s 
escalating attacks on the Libyan people, agreeing on the “demonstrable need” to 
intervene. Secondly, the United Nations Security Council passed the Resolution 1973, 
offering the international community “a sound legal basis” to prevent the slaughter of 
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Libyan civilians by Muammar al Gaddafi’s forces and a massive humanitarian crisis. 
Last, the anti-Gaddafi Transitional National Council (TNC) established in February 
successfully got recognition as “the sole legitimate representative of the Libyan 
people”, providing US/NATO with “strong regional support” during the operation.  
With regard to the fulfilment of those specific requirements, it seemed that the 
Congress would agree on US involvement in Libya. Yet, doubts about the utility of 
military intervention did not fade away as expected, quite the opposite; a broader 
discussion arose in the Congress, debating over the rationale, timing, authorisation, 
goals, costs and implications of US participation in Libya.  On March 20, House 
Republican Leader John Boehner stressed that before any further military 
commitments were made,  “the administration has a responsibility to define for the 
American people, the Congress, and our troops what the mission in Libya is, better 
explain what America’s role is in achieving that mission, and make clear how it will 
be accomplished”.30 President Obama wrote a response letter to congressional leaders 
the next day, clarifying that US military forces sent to Libya on March 19 only aimed 
to “prevent a humanitarian catastrophe and address the threat posed to international 
peace and security by the crisis in Libya” and to help prepare a no-fly zone. He also 
narrowed the role of US forces, stating that “US military efforts are discreet and 
focused on employing unique US military capabilities to set the coalition for our 
European allies and Arab partners to carry out the measures authorised by the United 
Nations Security Council Resolution”.31 However, two Senate resolutions including S. 
Res. 146 and S. Res. 148 which were sponsored by Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) and 
Senator John Ensign (R-NV) respectively, continued to underscore the sense of the 
Senate that “US military intervention in Libya, as explained by the President, is not in 
the vital interests of the US” and the President should submit “a detailed description 
NATO’s Engagement in Libya 
182 
 
of the limitations the President has placed on the nature, duration, and scope of US 
military operations in Libya, as referenced in his March 21, 2011, letter to 
Congress”.32  
The President finally convinced the Congress by confirming his stance that 
“broadening our military mission to include regime change would be a mistake” while 
emphasising the US ability “to stop Gaddafi’s forces in their tracks without putting 
American troops on the ground”.33 As a typical representative who worried about US 
policy on Libya, Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-NM) commended the President’s speech 
on March 28, saying that “I think the President made a strong case for why he had 
committed US military assets to this effort. I was encouraged to hear that this is going 
to be a limited mission…He was clear that we are not pursuing regime change 
through military action.”34    
However, with US participation being found to have involved more than 200 
Tomahawk cruise missiles fired at Libya and the bombing and strafing by US and 
allied planes of Gaddafi’s ground forces, the Congress began to accuse the President 
of not telling the public the truth about the operation. Representative Mike Coffman, 
Republican of Colorado, argued that the White House’s description of the Libyan 
mission, which would be a humanitarian one to protect Libyan civilians, was not true. 
“These are combat operations”, he continued, “I do not know why this administration 
has not been honest with the American people that this is about regime change”. He 
further concluded, “This is just the most muddled definition of an operation probably 
in US military history”.35 If Coffman was charging the White House with “mission 
creep” in Libya, Senator John McCain (R-AZ) would be regarded as the first on the 
offensive charging the administration with not doing enough. When the President 
announced the US plan of ending airstrikes in Libya unless requested by NATO at the 
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end of March, McCain argued that Obama’s plan “would be a profound mistake with 
potentially disastrous consequences”. Withdrawing the muscle of the US military, 
according to him, was in fact out of alignment with Obama’s policy goal of ousting 
Gaddafi. 36  Representative Howard McKeon, Republican of California and the 
chairman of the House Committee took the same view, criticising that the 
administration walked away from the conflict too fast. He warned, “If Gaddafi does 
not face an imminent military defeat or refuses to abdicate…it seems that NATO 
could be expected to support a decade-long no-fly zone enforcement like the one over 
Iraq in the 1990s”.37  
In response, in his Congressional testimony, Robert Gates, though in an 
awkward position of having to defend a military action that he had been reluctant to 
get into in the first place, showed strong support for Obama’s decision. Although 
Gates did not regard regime change as part of the military mission, he admitted that it 
was a policy objective in Libya. Further, he repeated that he expected US involvement 
to be limited and that the conflict would probably end with Gaddafi’s removal from 
power, either by economic and political pressures or by his own people.38 As a result, 
the pressure from the Congress did not alter the US decision on either expanding the 
Libyan mission to include regime change or scaling down US participation in coming 
days.  
 
Mission transition till “leading from behind” 
 
Mission transition 
Since March 19, coalition military operations under the auspices of the US-led 
Operation Odyssey Dawn (OOD) had achieved the objective of setting up a no-fly 
NATO’s Engagement in Libya 
184 
 
zone over Libya. The US McConnell Airmen packed pallets and loaded into 
deploying KC-135 Stratotankers, which would enable the 13-member coalition to take 
advantage over Gaddafi’s forces as soon as possible. However, the situation in Libya 
was not significantly improved. Admiral Gerard P. Hueber told Pentagon reporters 
that forces loyal to Gaddafi continued to advance on Benghazi, and refused to pull 
back from Misurata and Ajdabiya, and Gaddafi continued to fire on civilians and 
civilian sites in those cities.39 Though the US enjoyed a broad range of offensive and 
defensive assets, it could not guarantee that the Libyan mission could be smoothly 
transferred to NATO on March 31 as assumed. Hence, America unfolded some 
updates. The US Africa Command (AFRICOM) took the lead on the OOD, enforcing 
the arms embargo and no-fly zone and overseeing airlift operations to deliver US-
donated humanitarian relief supplies. Tactical US operations for OOD were 
coordinated by a Joint Task Force which provided operational and tactical command 
and control of US military forces supporting the international response to the unrest in 
Libya and enforcement of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, and 
would have operational responsibility for the NATO-led Operation Unified Protector 
in Libya and the Mediterranean.  
The transition from the US-led OOD to the NATO-led Operation Unified 
Protector went seamlessly. NATO allies reached a unanimous agreement on March 24 
to direct NATO to assume command and control of the civilian protection. The next 
day, President Obama and his team provided an update on accomplishments to date, 
including the full transfer of enforcement of the no-fly zone to NATO. Although US 
military forces were supposed to undertake fewer missions under the NATO 
command, it weighed up more Libyan moves during the early stage of transition. The 
US Treasury banned American companies from dealing with 14 entities controlled by 
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Libya’s National Oil Company. The Obama administration also required the Pentagon 
and CIA to propose ways that the US could increase its assistance to Libyan rebels, 
beginning with shipments of nonlethal equipment, and potentially escalating to large-
scale transfers of weapons.40 A US military fighter jet damaged two of Gaddafi’s 
surface-to-air missile sites near the Libyan capital of Tripoli on April 18.41 On April 
25, US Predator drones began to strike targets in Libya for the first time, wrecking 
rocket launchers that had been bombarding civilians in Mistrata.42 The US leveraged 
its military capabilities to halt Gaddafi’s offensive actions and damage his air defence 
systems before transferring full command and control responsibility to the NATO-led 
coalition. The US, instead of acting alone, helped mobilise the international 
community for collective actions and create conditions for all partners to work toward 
mutual goals. Since March 31, three-quarters of over 10,000 sorties had been flown 
by non-US coalition partners, and all 20 ships enforcing arms embargo had been 
European or Canadian ones. NATO Defence Ministers, who trusted NATO for its 
clear international legal mandate and broad multilateral support, determined to 
maintain this momentum by agreeing to extend the NATO-led Operation Unified 
Protector for another 90 days after June 27. They affirmed that operations would 
continue “until all attacks and threats against civilians and civilian populated areas 
have stopped…until the regime has pulled back all its forces…and until there is a 
credible and verifiable ceasefire”.43 All these paved the way for NATO to stay the 
course and keep up the pressure to achieve Gaddafi’s departure. 
 
Selection of an opposition group 
With NATO having successfully degraded Gaddafi’s forces by roughly 30 to 40 per 
cent and gradually obtained the equipment and capabilities needed to protect the 
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Libyan people, America handed over the mission and started “leading from behind”. 
Guided by the new role, the US turned to focus on providing humanitarian relief 
supplies. Joint State Department/US Agency for International Development (USAID) 
humanitarian assessment teams (HATs) were deployed to the Libya-Egypt and 
Tunisia-Libya borders. The amounts of total USAID and state humanitarian assistance 
for the Libyan operation reached $89,425,925 as of August 12, 2011.44 But the key 
question for US policymakers to resolve at this stage was not simply how to make 
contributions to humanitarian relief and other programmes for those fleeing the 
conflict, but which Libyan opposition group to select for the upcoming nation-
building tasks.  
This question became urgent when Gaddafi’s forces were enabled to recover 
from their late-March setbacks owing to the disorganised and undisciplined behaviour 
of the opposition forces. Although the coalition intervention had reversed Gaddafi’s 
advance on Benghazi, increasing the possibility that the opposition could press 
Gaddafi’s retreating forces westward, in reality, the opposition forces retreated 
eastward once again to the formerly rebel-held town of Ajdabiya due to their 
weakness on the battlefield. What is worse, Gaddafi’s forces made shifts in tactics so 
that they would disguise their movements and position themselves near civilians to 
complicate targeting. On April 7, US Africa Command Commander General Carter 
Ham warned that pro-Gaddafi forces “now operate largely in civilian vehicles. And 
when those vehicles are intermixed with the opposition forces, it’s increasingly 
difficult to discern which is which. Secondly, we have seen an increase tactic by the 
regime forces to put their military vehicles adjacent to civilian aspects…which would 
result in significant civilian casualties through the strike of those assets”. 45  The 
opposition force was definitely not a match for the regime force in terms of both the 
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tactical and operational wisdom. General Carter Ham realised earlier that “The regime 
still vastly overmatches opposition forces militarily. The regime possesses the 
capability to roll them back very quickly. Coalition air power is the major reason that 
has not happened.” 46  This disparity between pro- and anti-Gaddafi forces had 
complicated coalition air strike operations, resulting in a stalemate or a more 
protracted war.47  
Although the US had made its decision to substantially scale down its 
participation in Libya, the prediction that Libyan rebels’ gains would probably be 
reversed raised a question as to how the US should retreat, especially to whether it 
was necessary to arm the rebels as the US was transferring the Libyan mission to 
NATO. Hence, although publicly, President Obama had expressed his willingness to 
“significantly ramp down” US commitment in coming days, he also stressed that he 
was still weighting up what to do. His hesitation in arming Libyan rebels increased 
due to the fact that UN Security Council resolutions authorising the air campaign in 
Libya did not permit individual countries to arm the rebels, and that, thus far, France 
was the only nation that had said it intended to supply arms to the anti-Gaddafi 
forces.48 In Washington, the unified position of Robert Gates and Hillary Clinton 
appeared to dull a debate within the administration over the merits of America’s 
supplying weapons to the rebels, a disparate, little-known group. Gates emphasised, 
“What the opposition needs as much as anything right now is some training, some 
command and control and some organisation. It is pretty much a pick-up ballgame at 
this point.” Then he continued, providing training and weapons “is not a unique 
capability for the United States, and as far as I am concerned, somebody else can do 
that”.49 On this issue, Hillary Clinton sided with Gates, though they had disagreed 
with each other even on whether to intervene in Libya at the very beginning. One of 
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the reasons why Mrs Clinton was cautious about arming the rebels was “because of 
the unknowns” about who they were and whether they might have links to Al-
Qaeda. 50  But at the same time, she also emphasised that UN resolutions in fact 
allowed for the “legitimate transfer of arms” to the rebels should any country wish to 
do so.51 In the Congressional testimony on March 31, Gates and chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen argued that, over time, Gaddafi’s advantage 
could be erased by continued military pressure, thereby the US was unlikely to arm 
Libyan rebels.52    
Based on the actual performance of the opposition groups, it would be 
irresponsible for the coalition to approve any of them to deal with the post-war nation-
building tasks. But the task would become much easier for the US if it could offer 
foreign political recognition to one of the opposition groups. By doing that, it would 
avoid binding the US and other NATO members to the unknown future. The lesson 
learned from Afghanistan and Iraq—that anti-US and anti-NATO sentiments might 
arise after the war—suggested that no outsider should be too deeply involved in a 
regional conflict. The most acceptable choice for those who sought an exit strategy 
after their accomplishment of the R2P to avert humanitarian disasters and protect 
innocent civilians referred to letting the people in the region to decide their own 
country’s destination and remaining generous to offer support when needed. Thus, 
after the US scaled down its commitment to Libya on the battlefield, the Obama 
administration devoted itself to shoulder the responsibility of selecting a qualified 
opposition group as the hope of Libya. 
Prior to the 2011 uprising, most opposition movements in Libya were related 
to Islamists, royalists and secular nationalists, decreasing the effectiveness due to their 
ideological differences and inner-rivalry. The current round of opposition activities 
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had arisen in response to Libya’s reintegration to the international community and a 
broader debate over political reform in the Arab World. In both July 2005 and March 
2008, opposition groups in exile such as the National Alliance, the Libyan National 
Movement, the National Libyan Salvation Front, and the Islamist Rally held two 
conferences with the title of “National Conference for the Libyan Opposition” in 
London, calling for the removal of Gaddafi and the establishment of a transitional 
government.53 The opposition movement was then motivated by regional protests, 
extending quickly to win worldwide attention in early 2011. Among all these 
opposition groups involved in the Libyan war, the Transitional National Council 
(TNC) seemed to be the least criticised on grounds of disorganisation or incapability. 
Another well-known opposition group that could compete with the TNC in capability 
was the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). However, these Islamists were often 
accused of using violence as a means to overthrow Gaddafi, which might pose threat 
to the regional security at the same time.  
In addition, considering the key elements the US valued, including the 
identities and backgrounds of various opposition groups, the military capabilities of 
anti-Gaddafi forces, and the rationale, intentions, and goals of opposition supporters, 
the TNC was preferable as it basically met US minimum requirement. Established in 
February, the TNC had claimed since the outbreak of regional protests to represent all 
areas of the country and seek foreign political recognition and material support. In 
order to gain both domestic and international support, TNC chairman Mustafa 
Abdeljalil who declared he had evidence that Gaddafi ordered the terrorist attack on 
Pan Am Flight 103 in February, laid out the Council’s vision for an inclusive 
approach for a post-Gaddafi political transition, which helped the Council gain 
credibility and legitimacy: “As soon as the regime falls, we will have six or seven 
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months to call elections. Until then, we will represent all international agreements. 
After the elections, everything will be left in the hands of the new leaders. We will 
leave. None of the current members of the Council will run in the elections.”54  
Domestic mobilisation was achieved through a series of TNC statements that 
drew a nicer blueprint of future Libya for those aspiring citizens. On March 22, a 
Council statement reiterated the group’s aspirations and appeals to assure its 
legitimacy: “The TNC is committed to…build a constitutional democratic civil state 
based on the rule of law, respect for human rights and the guarantee of equal rights 
and opportunities for all its citizens.” It further stressed that “Libya will become a 
state…that is responsive to its citizen’s needs, delivers basic services effectively, and 
creates an enabling environment for a thriving private sector in an open economy to 
other markets around the world.”55 The rhetoric became more convincing after the 
release of another statement titled “A vision on a democratic Libya” on March 29. It 
stated that the TNC recognised its “obligation” to “draft a national constitution 
that…establishes legal, political, civil, legislative, executive and judicial institutions”, 
to “maintain a constitutional civil and free state by upholding intellectual and political 
pluralism and the peaceful transfer of power”, and to “guarantee and respect the 
freedom of expression through media, peaceful protests, demonstrations and sit-ins 
and other means of communication”.56  
On the other hand, international recognition was also realised though 
consuming more time compared with the acquisition of public support within Libya. 
Gaddafi accused the TNC of having a regional separatist agenda in mind and of 
serving as a front for Al-Qaeda. In response, the TNC issued a statement on counter-
terrorism on March 30, affirming “its strong condemnation and its commitment to 
combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations” and emphasising “its full 
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commitment to the implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions on 
Counter-Terrorism”. 57  Owing to the firm stance to “join and commit to all 
international conventions and protocols relating to Counter-Terrorism”, the TNC 
successfully put off doubts and fears about “who they were and whether they might 
have links to Al-Qaeda”. 58  Moreover, Mahmoud Jibril, the foreign affairs 
representative of the TNC, had travelled around Europe and the Middle East since 
early March working to secure international recognition of and support for the TNC, 
during which he firstly met with the French President Nicolas Sarkozy and then 
Hillary Clinton. As the first head of state to meet with insurgent leaders, Sarkozy 
made France the first country to recognise Libya’s rebel leadership in the eastern city 
of Benghazi.59 This move put Paris ahead of other European capitals that had been 
seeking ways of supporting the rebels in their goal of overthrowing Gaddafi. France’s 
Foreign Secretary Alain Juppe urged allies in the EU to follow his country’s example. 
Britain and Germany, though stuck to the principle that their practice was to recognise 
states, not governments, were encouraged to call the revels “valid interlocutors with 
whom we wish to work closely”.60  
On the other side, the meeting between Mr Jibril and Hillary Clinton, which 
was “the highest-level contact between the administration and the increasingly 
disorganised forces battling troops loyal to Mr Gaddafi”, achieved little in that it only 
“reflected the Obama administration’s struggle over how much support it would, or 
could, provide to the rebels”.61 Although appeals to President Obama to recognise the 
TNC as “the sole legitimate governing authority in Libya” had been made as early as 
on March 15 when Senator John McCain (R-AZ) introduced Senate Resolution 102, 
the TNC was still denied by the majority as a reliable actor. The US Vice Admiral 
Bill Gortney once mentioned that “the opposition is not well organised, and it is not a 
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very robust organisation”. But, as he underlined, the US “would like a much better 
understanding of the opposition”.62 Hence, to broaden US knowledge of the TNC, 
Obama appointed Secretary Clinton as a liaison to the TNC. She was permitted to 
engage in regular discussions with the TNC regarding its plans for a political process, 
its timetable for implementation and the role of the international community in 
supporting the transition. 
With US knowledge of the opposition group improving, the administration 
decided to drawdown “up to $25 million in commodities and services from any 
agency of the US government for Libyan groups, such as the Transitional National 
Council, to support efforts to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas under 
threat of attack in Libya”.63 At the same time, the UK and Qatar co-chaired the first 
meeting of the Libya Contact Group on April 14, during which an agreement on 
formulating a mechanism to provide financial assistance to the TNC was reached.64 
Furthermore, Qatar, Maldives, Italy, Kuwait, Gambia formally recognised the TNC as 
the legitimate representative of the Libyan people by the end of April, increasing 
Gaddafi’s isolation and eroding his influence. The Obama administration did not 
make its announcement of recognition until July 15, but Hillary Clinton had clarified 
earlier that the US would recognise the TNC as the legitimate interlocutor for the 
Libyan people at a time when the Gaddafi regime lost all legitimacy to rule, based on 
the trust in the TNC that it promised to “pursue democratic reform that is inclusive 
geographically and politically, and uphold Libya's international obligations and to 
disburse funds in a transparent manner, to address the humanitarian and other needs of 
the Libyan people”.65 This recognition permitted the US to unfreeze certain Libyan 
assets in US banks, and the TNC was then allowed to use them.  
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Choosing one reliable opposition group to shoulder the post-war nation-
building responsibility became the major task the US needed to accomplish during its 
“leading from behind” period. The Transitional National Council finally came to the 
fore due to confirmation of its identity as an organisation representing all Libyan 
people to achieve real freedom and democracy. Persuaded by such assurance after 
fully understanding the regional opposition group, the US found its exit strategy to be 
a “win-win” option that avoided deeper NATO involvement in the post-war nation-
building mission on one hand and produced more respect and legitimacy for the TNC 
to govern Libya on the other. It was true that the US fulfilled another tough task, but 
was it convincing to say that the US transferred the Libyan mission to NATO only 
because of the “more important, more urgent” task—to find a qualified regional group 
to shoulder nation-building responsibility? Rarely people would agree, so why did the 
US “retreat” so fast? What was the real intention behind this move? 
 
The shifts in US decision-making 
Cited as a crucial factor that often influenced policy-making process, domestic 
pressure was obviously worth considering. In the case of Libya, displeasure from the 
Congress criticising the President’s insufficient consultation peaked. Prior to the start 
of US military operations, some members of the Congress had frequently expressed 
their concerns about limited consultation between the President and the Congress with 
regard to the rationale, timing, authorisation, goals, costs, and implications of the US 
participation in Libya. For example, Republican Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), 
doubting that the US interests would be served by imposing a no-fly zone over Libya, 
emphasised that “If the Obama administration is contemplating this step, however, it 
should begin by seeking a declaration of war against Libya that would allow for a full 
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Congressional debate on the issue.” 66  Some congressmen even admonished the 
administration, saying it had gone to war without seeking Congressional 
authorisation.67 In addition, hearings held on the Libya issue also revealed different 
opinions in terms of the imperativeness to intervene, the benefits and costs, the need 
to use military forces, and the likelihood that terrorists would push the current unrest 
forward to threaten international security as a whole. However, though doubters 
continued to call for further consultation and clarity on a number of specific questions, 
such as the metrics, goals, funding, and command, they were unable to alter the major 
view prevailing in the Congress that immediate steps to implement a no-fly zone in 
Libya should be supported and a comprehensive US strategy to achieve the removal 
of Gaddafi should be developed. The first round of Congressional queries about the 
Libya issue temporarily subsided after President Obama wrote a letter to 
congressional leaders in response to Republican House Speaker John Boehner’s 
questions. But there was some additional information the President did not provide at 
that time, leading to the second round of Congressional queries seeking consultation 
on the US military participation in Libya.  
On June 3, the House of Representatives passed by a vote of 268-145 House 
Resolution 292, calling for the President to answer critical questions from the 
Congress within two weeks about military operations in Libya and provide a 
justification for not seeking authorisation of force as required under the War Powers 
Resolution. Otherwise, the President should “free our nation from a muddled 
operation that proceeds without a specific goal or exit strategy”, as Congressman Tim 
Murphy stated.68 Criticising the President for not responding to the question about 
whether the Office of Legal Counsel supported the White House’s extraordinary legal 
basis for ongoing military operations in Libya, John Boehner upgraded tensions 
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between the President and the Congress. Republican Congressman Mac Thornberry 
who also served as Vice Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, doubled 
the pressure on the President by stating “I believe that it was a mistake to become 
involved in Libya, and I believe that the President should have sought the approval of 
Congress to engage our military before taking action.” On the same day, House 
Republican Policy Committee Chairman Tom Price released another statement that 
shared the same tone as Mac Thornberry: “When deploying military force the 
President must demonstrate a consistent, responsible level of leadership, provide a 
clear justification in line with America’s national security interests, and consult with 
Congress. President Obama has not done so.”69  
So far, almost all significant voices against the President’s decision to 
intervene in Libya militarily had come from Republicans, thus, some people argued 
that there was no need for the President to take Congressional pressure seriously, 
because this disharmony originated from party tensions. However, results of a poll 
done by University of Iowa Hawkeye showed a different picture: Americans were 
split on support for the intervention, but that divide did not fall along party lines. To 
be specific, Democrats and Republicans expressed similar views on the Libya 
intervention: 36 per cent of Democrats and 38 per cent of Republicans supported the 
move, while 42 per cent of Democrats and 38 per cent of Republicans opposed it.70 
Bearing this in mind, the administration felt quite disturbed when the House voted to 
bar funding to support the freedom fighters in Libya on July 7. However, based on the 
long-time trust that all Americans would stand together to ensure that no wrong 
message was sent to both Gaddafi and those fighting for freedom and democracy in 
Libya no matter how intense the internal debate was, the President was confident that 
he could eliminate the Congressional frustration gradually. Actually the Obama 
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administration had consulted extensively with the Congress about US engagement in 
Libya since early March: it had testified in over 10 hearings, participated in over 30 
Member staff briefings; conducted dozens of calls with individual Members; and 
provided 32 status updates via e-mail to over 1,600 Congressional staff.71  It was 
understandable that the administration would take actions more prudently when facing 
great pressure from the Congress, but was the Congress the reason why the US 
handed over the Libya mission to NATO and chose to stand behind its allies? If we 
took Afghanistan and Iraq as comparison, “domestic pressure” would be 
automatically denied as the core reason of US “retreat” from Libya, because the US 
encountered similar situations in all these cases in terms of the pressure from 
Congress but the US only performed differently in Libya. There might be thousands 
of explanations for the US move, but domestic pressure alone is not entirely 
persuasive. 
The real intention behind the US move was far more hidden and complicated. 
One guess would be that the US intended to use Libya to teach its European allies that 
if they wanted to enjoy the right to deal with such issues like Libya by themselves, 
they should also get themselves prepared to shoulder all the relevant responsibilities 
and burdens. From the perspective of the US, handing the Libya mission to European 
countries would be a “never-lose” strategy. On one hand, if its European allies won 
the war efficiently, the future transatlantic cooperation would be more promising due 
to Europe’s abundant capability that withstands the test, hence the US would be 
enabled to require its allies to shoulder more responsibilities and burdens. On the 
other hand, if those European countries failed, it would be a great chance for them to 
better understand what tough days the US has gone through in terms of previous crisis 
management, therefore, the US could expect more assistance from its allies in the 
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future. However, some critics mocked “leading from behind” as a high-sounding 
excuse, considering the US approach to be a reflection of weakness. They even 
proposed a harsh question about the President: “Has he, at any point in his presidency 
so far, demonstrated real political courage?”72 Mitt Romney stated in March 2011, “In 
the past, America has been feared sometimes, has been respected, but today, that 
America is seen as being weak. We are following the French into Libya.” 73 
Republican Senators John McCain (R-AZ) and Lindsey Graham (R-SC) even 
criticised America’s limited use of airpower in the fight to overthrow Gaddafi. They 
expressed “regret that this success was so long in coming due to the failure of the US 
to employ the full weight of our air power” regarding the end of Gaddafi regime in 
Libya.74  
To clarify, the US pursuit of “leading from behind” did not necessarily mean 
that the US wished to stand aside and watch European countries fighting against 
Gaddafi. To help European allies grow up as responsible actors, the US left the 
initiative to them while they prepared certain assistance behind the scenes in case of 
unexpected setbacks. In fact, “NATO’s European members were highly dependent on 
US military help to keep going. America provided about three-quarters of the aerial 
tankers without which the strike fighters, mostly flying from bases in Italy, could not 
have reached their targets.” Moreover, “America also provided most of the cruise 
missiles that degraded Colonel Gaddafi’s air defences sufficiently for the no-fly zone 
to be rapidly established.” It was the US that provided fresh supplies “when stocks of 
precision-guided weapons ran low after only a couple of months”.75 Further, the US 
continued to provide nearly 70 per cent of the coalition’s intelligence capabilities and 
a majority of its refuelling assets even after the US had turned over the full command 
and control responsibility to NATO. In a word, it was the US that provided critical 
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assets and capabilities that other NATO members either did not possess or possessed 
in very limited numbers. 
People who criticised America’s relatively relaxed response to the conflict did 
not really aim to condemn or warn of US weakness, quite the opposite; they trusted 
US capability but mistrusted US willingness to apply its resources to the Libyan 
operation. The assumption behind the question why the US felt reluctant to intervene 
and chose “leading from behind” willingly was that the US did not really want to see 
Gaddafi leave. In other words, to achieve regime change in Libya was not a priority 
for the US. But it was obviously untrue. President Obama initially confined the 
operation in Libya a strictly humanitarian one, stating that “The United States is not 
going to deploy ground troops into Libya.  And we are not going to use force to go 
beyond a well-defined goal—specifically, the protection of civilians in Libya,” yet he 
changed to stress on the need to achieve regime change as time went by.76 In April, 
the leaders of the US, Britain and France published a joint statement in newspapers 
worldwide emphasising that regime change in Libya must take place in order to 
secure “a genuine transition from dictatorship to an inclusive constitutional process 
can really begin, led by a new generation of leaders”.77 The allies altogether declared 
“Gaddafi must go and go for good”, though Gaddafi offered in May a ceasefire with 
the rebels. NATO rejected Gaddafi firmly because his offer would only end the 
humanitarian crisis and advance negotiations, but could not guarantee regime change. 
As of September, these two goals of averting the humanitarian crisis and toppling the 
Gaddafi regime had been both realised. 
Some critics argued that two goals were attained for the price of one, and the 
mission creep would result in deleterious effects to the post-war Libya, reducing the 
possibility of the emergence of a stable democratic government. These concerns were 
NATO’s Engagement in Libya 
199 
 
proved reasonable when a 100-plus page Amnesty International report was released in 
September, which found that rebels fighting to topple Libyan leader Gaddafi 
committed unlawful killings and torture. Opposition supporters “unlawfully killed” 
more than a dozen Gaddafi loyalists and security officials between April and early 
July.78 If the US could not avoid being blamed for the mission creep, it should be 
blamed for its failure to convey mission expansion timely and clearly, but not for its 
unwillingness to see Gaddafi leave. Compared with the war in Afghanistan, mission 
creep in Libya was not surprising at all. President Obama claimed in March 2009 that 
the US, “have a clear and focused goal:  to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al-Qaeda in 
Pakistan and Afghanistan and to prevent their return to either country in the future”.79 
But later in October 2009, the administration narrowly defined the plan as a limited 
one to “destroy Al-Qaeda’s leadership, its infrastructure, and its capability” based on 
its reassessment of Afghan Taliban, “which the administration has begun to define as 
an indigenous group that aspires to reclaim territory and rule the country but does not 
express ambitions of attacking the United States”. 80  Over time, however, the 
administration expanded its purpose again to include defeating the Taliban and 
undertaking nation-building tasks. Why did the US get entangled in mission creep? 
Could the US prevent the recurrence of the problem? The answer would be 
disappointing because so far no good suggestion had truly helped the US get out of 
the dilemma between idealistic and normative approaches. Idealistically, the US 
believed that all people, if free to choose, would “naturally” prefer a democratic 
government, a free and equal society, rule of law. These “common values” led the US 
to continue to help others “catch up with history”. But normatively, “one could not 
achieve narrow security goals (i.e., defeating Al-Qaeda) without also engaging in 
nation-building…one cannot win wars against insurgencies merely by using military 
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forces, but must also win the hearts and minds of the population by doing good deeds 
for them (e.g., building roads, clinics, schools, etc.)”.81 Nora Bensahel took the same 
view, saying that once having intervened to prevent humanitarian disaster, it would be 
hard to stop extending the mission to regime change, because potential humanitarian 
catastrophe would come back immediately.82 The difficulty in suspending mission 
expansion from both strategic and humanitarian perspectives would be inestimable, 
given that once intervention started, there would be nothing to prevent the regime 
from making humanitarian crisis even worse to compensate for the fact that resistance 
had been stronger. As noted by the President, “the growing instability in Libya could 
ignite wider instability in the Middle East, with dangerous consequences to the 
national security interests of the United States”, hence the US should maintain its 
longstanding commitment to promote international peace and security while 
increasing the scope and effectiveness of its actions towards the Gaddafi regime when 
necessary.83 Based on these considerations, the US had to not only intervene, but also 
intervene “deeply” enough. To sum up, both the suspicion on US unwillingness to 
participate in the Libya operation and the argument that Congressional pressure 
forced the US to step back, lacked roots to explain the US decision on “leading from 
behind”. By ruling out those possibilities, the following chapter will address in detail 
US decision-making on Libya, including why the US hesitated to intervene at the very 
beginning and why the US transferred the Libyan mission to NATO and started 
“leading from behind”.  
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8  Libya: The US Policy-Making Process 
 
Background to the US involvement in international intervention 
 
From humanitarian intervention to “Responsibility to Protect” 
The category of security problems has changed ever since the end of the Cold War, 
requiring a redefinition of the concept of international intervention. The big issue that 
stands in the way is that of state sovereignty. That is also why it took months for the 
international community to respond to Kosovo, for example. Kosovo was a province 
of Serbia, which was a sovereign state. For that reason, Russia and China, two states 
that had always been very protective of the concept of state sovereignty, opposed the 
intervention in Kosovo and in the Balkans more broadly. Thus the difficulty in 
achieving a consensus resulted in two competing norms: state sovereignty, and human 
rights and protections of minorities from violence. The tension between these two 
norms did not become knotty until a series of tragedies shocked the world due to the 
lack of either an UN authorisation or sufficient responsive capabilities.  
In 1991, the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan firstly reflected on the 
dilemma of humanitarian intervention, warning that in the future the international 
community should not stand by and allow terrible crimes against humanity, given the 
UN failures in authorising effective responsive actions in Rwanda, Srebrenica and 
Kosovo. He sparked the debate between state sovereignty and human rights by 
developing the dichotomy of “two notions of sovereignty: one for states, another for 
individuals”.1 The conclusion of Annan’s series of speeches in the General Assembly 
emphasised that when the sovereignty of states and the sovereignty of individuals fell 
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into dispute, the international community should think hard about how far it would go 
to defend the former over the latter.2 Advocating that sovereignty should no longer be 
absolute, Annan appealed to the international community to take the “Responsibility 
to Protect” (R2P) if a country was unwilling or unable to protect its people from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Although the 
adoption of the “emerging norm that there is a collective Responsibility to Protect” 
had raised some political costs, heads of state and government finally endorsed the 
principle of “R2P” at the 2005 World Summit, promising that they “accept that 
responsibility and will act in accordance with it”. 3  “The US, supported in this 
endeavour by China and Russia, successfully whittled away the Council’s 
responsibility from an obligation to act to “stand ready” to act should the prevailing 
circumstances permit.”4 Some commentators, such as Todd Lindberg, hailed it as a 
“revolution in consciousness in international affairs”, which gave all states a 
responsibility to uphold and protect basic human rights regardless of where they were 
violated.5    
President George H.W. Bush once characterised his single term as a new era 
“where United Nations, freed from Cold War stalemate, is poised to fulfil the 
historical vision of its founders. A world in which freedom and respect for human 
rights find a home among all nations”.6 But the reality sees the UN, for one, would 
not emerge as a supranational overseer of international security. In light of what 
happened in the 1990s, there is a huge necessity for the international community to 
response substantively not just to the abuses of power, repressions or humanitarian 
crisis, but also to all kinds of crimes against humanity. However, the impetus for 
transforming humanitarian intervention to “R2P” is not simply the sympathy for those 
tragedies that occurred due to the lack of response. More attention should be paid to 
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the reasons why the international community was deadlocked about whether to 
intervene to prevent humanitarian crises from worsening. There is a number of ways 
to cut into that question, but one persuasive argument should address either the 
problem of unwillingness or the problem of inability. The former, which entangles 
fewer puzzles, can always be resolved if the action is legitimised. However, even after 
the international community has got a UN authorisation that offers the intervention a 
legal basis, the community could still find its feet stopped if no pragmatic support 
really exists. Thus the latter problem entails what the UN is capable of doing. Putting 
aside its structural constrains that five permanent members of the Security Council 
rarely reach an agreement on international intervention, the lack of military capability 
can also prevent the UN from authorising effective measures. Therefore what the 
states found was that the hopes for the UN were exaggerated and unrealistic.  
After Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990, the unusual 
combination of circumstances made it possible for the UN Security Council to take 
the lead symbolically and politically in passing a series of resolutions which required 
Saddam to make a series of concessions, starting with a complete withdrawal from 
Kuwait, making restitutions, heading back to presidencies, and paying back what he 
had done. In this case, Russia did not apply its veto due to the friendly relations 
between George H. W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev, and between the Secretary of 
State James Baker and the Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. Thereafter 
the UN Resolution 678 was passed in late November 1990, offering the US legitimacy 
to lead an international coalition. Though Saddam ultimately implemented the 
withdrawal from Kuwait after the rapid defeat, it was clear that the following story 
would not be satisfactory without the US-led coalition, given the fact that the UN had 
no standing forces. In addition, the case of Kuwait was one of few exceptions in the 
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history of the UN Security Council to reach a consensus on international interventions. 
In fact, disagreements among five permanent members always ruined those cases. 
That concern was again proved to be reasonable in Bosnia and Rwanda, where the 
UN was completely absent and incapable. It failed in both cases. Since the UN lacks 
capability, both politically and militarily, to shoulder the “R2P”, then who can? In 
July 1995, after the massacre in Bosnia, the Clinton administration finally acted to 
lead the Alliance against the Serbs. When it came to the late 1990s in Kosovo, once 
more the Clinton administration went to NATO. Apparently it was the objective 
dilemma that pushed NATO to do these missions where the UN was unwilling or 
unable to take actions. 
 
Were US interests fundamentally transformed by the end of the Cold War? 
However, with NATO transforming into a more appropriate actor to deal with 
regional crisis, other countries began to accuse the US of using NATO as an 
instrument of extra-UN unilateral power. The accusation became more intense when 
President Clinton said that “America remains the indispensable nation” in 1996 in a 
speech explaining the rationale behind NATO’s intervention in Bosnia. Believing 
“there are times when only America can make a difference between war and peace, 
between freedom and repression, between hope and fear” on one hand, President 
Clinton, on the other hand emphasised that the US could not take on all the world’s 
burdens and become its policeman.7 At the same time, there were general hopes that 
Europe could play a larger role in the challenges, but the Balkans became a terrible 
setback for Europe because it was unable to stop the crisis. The Europeans were 
working very hard on a common security policy in the 1990s, expecting to provide 
not alternative but part of crisis managements in the evolutionary post-Cold War 
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world. However, the European Union, as a regional body, did not work well in the 
Balkans, so it ultimately turned its attention more towards NATO.  
In the years since the end of the Cold War when there were urgent and deadly 
problems, the US engagements did not necessarily mean that the US was the world 
policeman or putting “boots on the ground”, but unless the US was engaged in a 
significant way, the likelihood of winning a war would be very low. Robert Lieber 
believed that the world from which the US disengaged would be a more dangerous 
world, a less prosperous world, one with less regional security, less human rights, less 
democratization, and fewer international laws.8 Thus to scale down or to increase US 
international commitments entails questions of whether US interests were 
fundamentally transformed by the end of the Cold War; whether the US missed an 
opportunity, including by sustaining NATO, to push the post-Cold War transition as 
far as they might have gone, and whether the transformations were actually 
undermined by continuing with the Cold War frameworks like NATO. The other side 
of that debate was that the fundamental conflicts that shifted the Cold War were not 
done when the Cold War ended. Russia and some other countries continued to pose 
strategic threats to the US, therefore NATO was served as an instrument to not only 
respond to those threats that continued but also integrate states existing in the Soviet 
Bloc into a more Western-oriented liberal international order. However, as Steven 
Heydemann said in an interview with the author, though it was true that the functions 
and the orientations of NATO had changed, the question of the extent to which the 
end of the Cold War had transformed the US strategic interests was also an important 
one to address.9  
Historically US foreign policy has tended to swing between realism and liberal 
internationalism, yet the US final decision is not simply driven by either the realist or 
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liberal internationalist approach. It may not be plausible to apply these two pure 
theories with a range of categories into any single decision-making process, because 
in actual political terms it is not obvious what distinguishes realists from liberal 
internationalists; nor do these two theories exhaust the opinion in both the mass and 
the legal level. What the US chose, as manifested in current interventions, “is a 
versatile yet potentially contradictory policy approach that mixes realism and 
idealism”10. For example, in terms of international intervention, the US decision on 
whether to take actions results from mixed considerations, among which realism and 
liberal internationalism serve as two major dimensions. In this context, realism means 
if the US wants to intervene in regional crisis, it has to answer the question of whether 
this action truly serves US interest before carrying out the operation. On the other 
hand, from the perspective of liberal internationalism, the US always believes that it 
has the duty to help the other countries “catch up with history” and share common 
values such as democracy, freedom, human rights. In the case of Libya, if the US 
decision to participate in the operation was based on the realists’ considerations, what 
US interest did the Libyan mission serve? If the decision was a result of liberal 
internationalists’ calculation, why not Somalia or Congo, where people were also 
suffering from humanitarian crisis the same as in Libya? And if the decision was 
driven by both approaches (which certainly would provide the US with more robust 
motivations), then why did the US still hesitate to intervene in Libya at the very 
beginning? Why did it take so long for the US to do something if it was consistent 
with the perception of the US global leadership or moral leadership?  
The balance between self-interest and morality is not a question of one or the 
other. Frankly in most countries, there is no clear dividing line between interests and 
values all the time. Nora Bensahel believed that one of the reasons why the US 
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pursued a lot of things that were in the liberal internationalist framework was because 
in some ways they benefitted US interests.11 In reality, having a global system of 
peace and prosperity benefits the US in a lot of ways, in addition to being consistent 
with American values. Thus self-interest and morality do not always clash, but are 
linked with each other, given that transition channels exist between these two 
approaches. In the case of Libya, though realists who argued for a very limited US 
role in the international system, tried to persuade the administration that there were no 
direct, first-order US interests at stake in Libya, they were actually unable to affirm 
that all traditional interests were absent there. In fact, the concept of strategic interest 
has been broadened rather than narrowed, which becomes a double-edged sword, 
providing the US with more motivations to participate in a campaign on one hand 
while slowing down the US decision-making process on the other. This offers a 
general explanation of why the US hesitated to intervene in Libya at the very 
beginning and why it then changed its mind to join the operation later, but practically 
there are more factors interplay. 
 
Why did the US hesitate to intervene in Libya at the very beginning?  
 
Low public enthusiasm for a third Middle East war 
There were many arguments that tried to disconnect what was happening in Libya 
from US strategic interests. Firstly, public support was very low in the context of 
financial crisis and in particular the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Ambassador 
Kathleen Stephens believed that the American people understood that to retain a 
leadership role in the world, fundamentally the US needed to be strong and 
competitive in economy and infrastructure, therefore performing the Libyan mission 
Libya: The US Policy-Making Process 
208 
 
would not be an acceptable choice among the mass.12 In addition, considering both 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had become increasingly unpopular with most 
Americans, Robert Litwak argued that fatigue of the two wars and uncertainty about 
what the outcome would be in Libya were the main factors that decreased the 
administration’s enthusiasm for getting involved in another Middle East war.13 Steven 
Heydemann also agreed that public tolerance for military engagement was quite low 
after ten years war in Iraq and Afghanistan, which produced a national fatigue for 
intervention.14  
As Robert Litwak concluded, “each intervention is affected by the previous 
intervention”, providing either more motivation or more reluctance to participate in 
another campaign.15 The US, after the Gulf War, intervened in Somalia to provide 
humanitarian assistance, however, it turned out to be America getting involved in 
basically a civil war. The lesson of Somalia, as the famous movie Black Hawk Down 
implied, was that the US should never get involved in such a messy internal conflict 
again. Then Rwanda happened. Assuming that Rwanda would be similar to Somalia, 
the Clinton administration decided not to take any action. However, the Rwandan 
genocide went completely out of control, resulting in decades of criticism that the US 
stood by while this major massacre was going on. What the US learned from Rwanda 
was to carry out plans rapidly to prevent the tragedy in the first place. Therefore when 
it came to the Balkans, the US quickly moved to Kosovo, which was implemented as 
a NATO operation. Since NATO operated on consensus meaning that any country 
could veto any proposed initiative, the efficiency of setting targets was reduced 
dramatically. Hence when Afghanistan took place, Washington decided to bypass 
NATO in order to avoid another troublesome Kosovo where European states were 
able to veto where NATO was going to bomb or not. The Taliban regime fell quickly 
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in the case of Afghanistan, so when Iraq came along, there was a sense that it would 
also be easy to beat Saddam Hussein. This poor judgment led to a mistaken American 
decision to stay as an occupation force to create democracy in Iraq. Even though the 
US is out of Iraq now, it has spent a long time there trying to create a type of mono-
ethnic, democratic country. Then Libya came at the time when the scar left by Iraq 
had not healed. As a result, the US was unwilling and unprepared to sink into another 
war immediately after Iraq, regardless of the costs and the lack of knowledge about 
the local politics. The progression of interventions, namely how an intervention is 
viewed through the previous intervention, affects the broader calculation on whether it 
is acceptable to carry out another operation.           
In reality, not only current public opinion towards war, but also how the 
administration viewed a further military engagement, have been greatly influenced by 
the legacy of previous wars. Barack Obama is the president who campaigned on 
ending the wars in Iraq, on reaching out of the Muslim World, and on building a 
better relationship between the US and the Arab World, thus starting another war 
against an Arab Muslim country was seen as highly undesirable for the 
administration.16 Both Matthew Kroenig and Nora Bensahel emphasised that it would 
be politically dangerous for President Obama to announce the intervention, not only 
in terms of how it would be perceived but also how it would be perceived as getting 
the US involved in a third Middle East war.17 Even though France and Britain took 
the lead to declare war against Gaddafi, the Obama administration remained silent 
because its policy was extended at hand.  
 
An American project or a European project? 
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Secondly, it was widely accepted that there were no direct, first-order US interests at 
stake in Libya, hence the US response to a state that imposed no threat to American 
people would not be necessary. Steven Heydemann supported this idea by saying that 
it was difficult to argue that Libya rose above the threshold that made it a vital 
strategic interest for the US. 18  Thus “Nowhere in the administration’s public 
statements was there any assessment of US interests in Libya that would justify 
American military intervention”. 19  In terms of hard-core national interests, as 
Christopher Chivvis mentioned, the US did not see Libya as attractive in the field of 
energy or gas, but the European allies were getting gas and oil from Libya through 
enormous contracts. 20  How the Libyan crisis had affected European countries’ 
economic interests was evidenced by the increase of oil prices to their highest levels 
since the global financial crisis of 2008 due to Gaddafi’s plan to end Libya’s National 
Oil Corporation’s (NOP) contracts with Western oil groups including oil giant BP.21 
Furthermore, European security was more directly challenged because geographically 
Europe was closer to Libya, therefore potential refugees would flow across 
Mediterranean and destabilize the European governments and economies. With 
respect to this, Karim Mezran compared the US attitudes toward Iraq and Libya, 
concluding that the reason why the US was active in Afghanistan and passive in Libya 
was because Afghanistan was an American project while Libya was a European 
project.22 But, since the Libyan mission was related to European interests, how could 
the US avoid getting involved, given the intimate transatlantic relationship?  
Theoretically, whether a mission is an American project or a European project 
depends on who is responding to the attack, but this definition is apparently 
inappropriate taking into account the narrow and limited basis. For example, 
Afghanistan was an American project in the sense that the US was responding to the 
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attack, but it was also very international from the beginning in terms of the 
understanding of why Afghanistan mattered. The US got expressions of support from 
every country around the world that understood what happened on September 11, 
2001 was an attack on the US and thereby a military response would be seen as self-
defence. There were tremendous international involvements starting in January 2002, 
in view of a shared belief that reconstruction was necessary to prevent the disaster 
from happening again. It was true that the US was leading the military operation, yet 
the US also received remarkable support from other countries. Even Russia and China 
had openly expressed their support, regarding US military activity in Afghanistan as 
self-defence. In that sense, it would be unfair to define Afghanistan solely as an 
American project, and similarly, Libya should not be considered as a European 
project though no direct US interests were actually at stake. Putting aside the debate 
over whether Libya was a European project or an American project or an international 
project, there was a more important question to address: who should respond to it? 
Who would be the appropriate actor to take the “R2P”? Would the UN members go 
there together? What about the EU and the Arab League? In fact, the possibility of 
these institutions using forces to resolve the Libyan crisis would be very low when 
taking into account the lack of a military guarantee. As a result, Libya witnessed a 
return to the consensus that NATO, rather than any other organisation, should 
continue to play an important role in terms of crisis management. 
The first round of debate over the termination of institutionalised US support 
for European security was seriously raised in the period when President George H.W. 
Bush was in office. He called for spending cuts, which would eventually result in 
significant reductions in funding and force levels for NATO’s conventional and 
nuclear forces. The possibility of NATO ceasing to exist seemed to be great at that 
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moment, but the turning point finally came when wars in the Balkans broke out. 
Ambassador Kathleen Stephens talked about her personal experience of being in 
Yugoslavia at that time, saying that many people, Americans and others, who worked 
on NATO affairs believed that NATO had no business getting involved in something 
like the Balkans. That was why it took so long for NATO or the US to make a 
decision to deal with the slaughter in the Balkans. But eventually “NATO and the US 
came to a conclusion that if NATO was not going to act there, then where? 
Diplomacy did not work there, so what should we do?”23 Therefore, NATO must go 
to the Balkans. Once NATO played a role in the post-Cold War period, NATO would 
continue to define and refine its missions, including not only to promote peaceful 
integration of Europe, but also to serve as an instrument of stability in other parts of 
the world. On the other hand, though agreeing with Kathleen that intervention in 
Kosovo was necessary, Charles Kupchan was not a supporter of NATO’s 
participation in Libya. In the case of Kosovo, “the risk of the spread of war to the 
southern Balkan Peninsula was real, and if the Albanians were driven out of Kosovo 
into Macedonia, Macedonia would have exploded, then Macedonia would have 
exploded Albania, Bulgaria and Greece”.24 Kupchan believed that it would have been 
too harmful for NATO to watch the Balkans fall apart, because NATO’s future, to 
some extent, has been determined at the end of the Cold War, whereas if NATO does 
not intervene in Libya, the perception of NATO will not be actually affected. Despite 
the concern that intervening in another Muslim country might turn out to be a disaster 
like Iraq and Afghanistan, the main reason why Kupchan opposed the intervention in 
Libya was because he saw no humanitarian emergency there that needed intervention: 
“People were talking about 75,000 were killed in Benghazi, but if you actually locked 
at what happened, that was not a massacre.”25 However, whether Libya went above 
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the bar as a humanitarian emergency did not receive as much attention as Kosovo did. 
Francis Winters argued that the intervention in Kosovo was illegal due to the lack of 
UN authorisation.26 But it was legitimate, according to Charles, because it enjoyed 
broad support in the core world opinion.27 Libya was less controversial in terms of the 
legal basis, given that the UN Resolution 1970 and 1973 had been passed at the early 
stage. The following question would be where the legitimacy came from. Which 
operational form could make the Libyan mission legitimate? Since the Europeans 
insisted on taking actions no matter how the other countries would judge on the basis 
of either self-interests or morality, should the Europeans, and only the Europeans, 
participate in the operation? Should the Americans join them? If so, should the US 
participate in a way of bilateral cooperation or through multilateral institutionalised 
alliance such as NATO?  
Charles Kupchan characterised President Obama as “a multilateralist, but not 
an Atlanticist” when Obama firstly came into office, whereas the President “turned 
into a multilateralist and an Atlanticist” in the following years.28 Initially President 
Obama believed that he could go out in the world and build partnerships, and perhaps 
even institutionalised partnerships with new partners such as the Chinese, the 
Brazilians, the Indians, and the Turks. Given the new distribution of power, President 
Obama expected that one day he could pick up the phone and call Ankara, saying “Let 
us go to save the Syrian people”, or call Beijing and say “Why do not Chinese troops 
and American troops go and intervene?”29 Yet after a year of trying, he realised how 
difficult it would be to deal with those people. It seemed that the advent of Obama’s 
harmonious future would not come very soon. Hence by one and a half years into the 
Obama administration, the President finally admitted that the Atlantic Alliance might 
not be perfect, but it was the best thing going. “When the US needs help in the world, 
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there is no better place to go than Europe.”30 Conversely, if the US wants to keep 
Europe on board all the time, it should not abandon its allies when they need 
assistance from the US. Therefore, the consensus that NATO should continue to play 
a significant role in the international system defined the Libyan mission as at least a 
transatlantic project that should be accomplished by both the Europeans and the 
Americans. That was also why the US decided to transfer the Libyan mission to 
NATO at the end of March 2011: Libya was not simply either a European project or 
an American project. 
 
Pragmatic reasons 
Whenever the US decides to intervene in a regional crisis, it knows that it has to do a 
large amount of the work, implementing most part of the campaign and investing 
ample resources, technologies, intelligences, surveillances, air-refuelling. Usually the 
US is not reluctant to take actions as long as it suspects that (potential) threats exist or 
US interests are at stake there. This assumption enables the US to play a dominant 
role in crisis management around the world, which also incidentally brings more 
responsibilities to the US at the same time. The pre-war estimation demonstrated that 
Libya would not be an exception in terms of resources spending. If the US, rather than 
France and Britain, took the lead in Libya, it would have provided the majority of 
forces as it did in the past to make it possible. But in the situation where the US had 
its forces committed in many other parts of the world, the recognition about what 
Libya would take for the US was uncertain. Dominique de Villepin, the French 
minister of Foreign Affairs, made a judgment prior to the invasion of Iraq, warning 
that intervention was not only about winning the campaign, but also about continuing 
with post-war peace-building tasks. “The option of war might seem a priori to be the 
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swiftest. But let us not forget that having won the war, one has to build peace. Let us 
not delude ourselves. This will be long and difficult because it will be necessary to 
preserve Iraq’s unity and restore stability in a lasting way in a country and region 
harshly affected by the intrusion of force.”31 Nonetheless, Washington dismissed such 
prescient warnings. It soon saw Iraq becoming a miserable story. The lesson from Iraq, 
particularly with regard to the underestimated costs and time spent on that mission, 
highly constrained the Americans’ tolerance for helping transform one more country 
like Iraq. Indeed, how could a country, with anticipation that the costs of war would 
be much higher than the benefits regardless of the necessity to join that war, agree to 
take actions concretely?  
The US had sufficient reasons for not participating in the operation, resulting 
in much reluctance to do it in the first place. To be more pragmatic, Ambassador 
Kathleen Stephens quoted British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd’s saying to explain 
why it took so long for the US to take actions in Libya: “Democracy always make us 
to act too late”.32 With respect to the way democracy tends to work, it is almost 
always difficult to make decisions when you have political leadership, attentions to 
public opinion, and vast interest groups to be considered. Robust debate helps achieve 
a better outcome, yet it is time-consuming in a second way. Thus fundamentally 
democracy takes time to make decisions, revealing the overall political climate on one 
hand and highlighting US reluctance to respond on the other. 
Although many critics argued that the US apparently hesitated to intervene in 
Libya either from a theoretical or a pragmatic perspective, the fact was that it did not 
take so long compared with Bosnia, Kosovo or any other case. Ivo Daalder, the US 
Ambassador to NATO, underlined that the response to Libya was significantly more 
rapid than responses to crises in the past. When facing Gaddafi’s launch of a brutal 
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crackdown, “the international community responded swiftly…In late February, 
Washington was the first country to cut off Gaddafi’s funding, freezing $32 billion in 
Libyan assets and promoting other countries to follow suit”.33 Steven Heydemann 
took the same view, identifying the decision-making on Libya as “accelerating”. The 
whole process played out was very short, especially the period of debate around 
whether to intervene to save Benghazi was even shorter. 34  Furthermore, by 
considering crisis management, Stephen Flanagan also agrees that Libya in fact 
proved that NATO could act very quickly.35 There were some expectations that it 
would take months for NATO or the US to decide to act, but in fact, once it decided, 
moving to the direction of taking actions was only a matter of less than three weeks, 
in which NATO put together its initial planning. This was actually very fast compared 
with the response to Bosnia or Kosovo where it took years or months before NATO 
intervened. In this sense, it would be inappropriate to criticise US reluctance in Libya, 
as those criticisms ignored the fact that US reaction was de facto relatively speedy 
throughout the history of international interventions. 
However, there were also some scholars like George Joffe who were tolerant 
towards the US decision on not responding so quickly and not representing as a 
driving force in the case of Libya. One incentive for Washington’s slowness, as he 
said, was the belief that Libya would be a long-awaited lesson to its European allies, 
one could help remind them of the burden-sharing responsibility.36 The US has been 
bearing the lion share of the burden to provide military capabilities to the Alliance 
since the very beginning, resulting in years of complaints about the European 
members. To be specific, the US share of NATO military spending has soared to more 
than 70 per cent, much more than during the Cold War heyday when Washington 
maintained hundreds of thousands of US troops across Europe.37 However, though the 
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tension within NATO has been repeatedly highlighted, no concrete steps have been 
taken to solve that problem. Former Secretary of Defence Robert Gates delivered a 
speech on reflections on the status and future of the transatlantic alliance when he left 
office, warning that NATO risked “military irrelevance” unless spending would be 
increased by members other than the US.38 There was a prominent concern that the 
US public would not stand for the imbalanced share of burdens much longer, raising 
an urgent request for Europe to invest more capabilities.39 Theoretically, when the 
Libyan mission came, there was no question that the US could use it to test the 
European capacity. As anticipated, Libya would at least become an example of how 
Europe could perform on its own. Yet as the operation unfolded, it only discovered a 
fact that European countries remained unprepared for a very modest operation like 
Libya. This on one hand reminded the Europeans of the urgency that they should 
commit themselves to increasing their capabilities, but on the other hand also brought 
an accusation that Washington’s reluctance in Libya was in fact a deliberate act.   
Was the US intentionally using Libya to teach its European allies a lesson that 
they would probably fail a mission if merely relying on their present capabilities? 
Both Matthew Kroenig and Nora Bensahel thought it would be a mistake to argue that 
the US intended to send a message of how insufficient the European capabilities were 
before deciding to conduct operations in Libya.40 To teach the European allies of 
burden-sharing responsibility was just a byproduct of the US action rather than a pre-
operation design, though the campaign played out exposed even more shortcomings in 
the European defence. Furthermore, if the US deliberately intended not to take actions 
quickly, why did it become more involved to implement the beginning phase of air 
campaign immediately when required by France and Britain? Why not just stand 
behind the curtain, watching the Libyan mission become a more astonishing lesson to 
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the Europe? It was simply because that the US did not forecast at the beginning that 
its relatively reluctant action would reveal how long the Europeans had been free-
riding the transatlantic security architecture. But it was also worth noting that from a 
broader US perspective, Washington benefited from the consequences, though it did 
not plan to communicate that lesson to its allies purposely.  
To sum up, the Americans clearly hesitated to intervene in Libya compared 
with the French and the British who took the lead straightway after the outburst of 
violence. There were many reasons for the US to be reluctant in the context of 
economic pressures and squabbles over poor military performance in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. The public enthusiasm for a third Middle East war was apparently low, 
forbidding the US to take actions in Libya when its hands were already full. Most 
importantly, there was a serious concern among decision-makers that no direct or 
first-order US interests were at stake in Libya. It was Europe rather than the US that 
was facing threats, thereby why should the US intervene in a “European project” that 
was costly and risky? In fact, the Libyan mission was neither a European nor an 
American project, instead, it was a transatlantic or an international project that should 
be accomplished by all countries dedicated to shoulder the “R2P”. Last but not least, 
though some people argued that pragmatically the US would act slowly due to the 
way of how democracy worked out, the US response to Libya was actually much 
quicker than in previous cases such as Bosnia and Kosovo where it took years or 
months before it intervened. Since the initial response had been characterised as 
relative reluctance, why did the US change its mind and join the operation later? How 
has the US been persuaded to follow in the footsteps of France and Britain?  
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Why did the US eventually decide to participate in the Libyan 
mission? 
 
The realistic dimension: traditional national interests were present 
From a pure realist perspective, the roots of intervening in Libya were inadequate in 
the sense that there were no direct, first-order US interests at stake. However, though 
acknowledging that America’s security was not threatened, President Obama 
emphasised that he had a responsibility to act when the US “interests and values” 
were at risk. According to him, “That is what happened in Libya over the course of 
these last six weeks.”41 Charles Kupchan mentioned that traditional national interests 
were not completely absent in Libya. He underlined two categories of national 
interests that were involved in Libya, saying that one was “the belief whether the 
Libyan mission was justified or not”, and the other was a respect that “the impetus for 
intervening was coming from others”.42 On one hand, taking actions in Libya was an 
important step in providing support for the Arab Spring and in sending a signal that 
crackdowns on democratic protests would not be tolerated. On the other hand, by 
highlighting external pressures from actors such as the French, the British, and the 
Arab League, the US did not want to be seen as blocked to act by others because it 
had, for a long time, been encouraging others to be more proactive and more 
responsible.  
Christopher Chivvis took the same view on where the national security 
interests were, emphasising the main one was to show support for the revolutions that 
were taking place across the Arab World. He also agreed that the US was facing 
pressures from other countries, yet he stressed on the original intention for intervening 
was to help the allies rather than to passively respond to those pressures.43 There was 
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a concern that if the situation went out of control in Libya, anxieties would spread 
across borders to the east and west of Egypt, thereby lots of refugees would go to 
Europe, which would become a tremendous threat to the allies. Reducing the allies’ 
security would reduce the US own security in a second way, given that they both 
belonged to the same alliance that embraced the principle that “an attack against one 
member state is considered an attack against all”. When the ABC News’ Senior White 
House Correspondent Jake Tapper asked Secretary of Defence Robert Gates on the 
“This Week” show about whether Libya posed an actual or imminent threat to the US, 
Gates answered “No…but the engagement of the Arabs, the engagement of the 
Europeans, the general humanitarian question that was at stake.”44 Generally the US 
perceived at least two traditional national interests at stake in Libya: to encourage 
those Arab countries that were fighting for democracy and to assist the allies who 
used to support the US when needed. More importantly, US policy on Libya was 
consistent with Obama’s grand strategy on “counterpunching” that the administration 
“has been willing to assert its influence and ideals across the globe when challenged 
by other countries, reassuring allies and signalling resolve to rivals”.45 
Encourage Arab countries  In Obama’s Interventions: Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Libya, Luca Tardelli was on target arguing that “Obama’s decision to intervene in 
Libya resulted from the administration’s desire to both avert a possible humanitarian 
disaster in Benghazi as well as to safeguard the revolutionary transitions taking place 
both in Libya and neighbouring countries”.46 Stephen Flanagan shared the same view, 
predicting that if Gaddafi were allowed to undertake actions against Benghazi and 
others in the west, it would have been a signal to other authoritarian leaders in the 
Middle East that the West would not bother if they could just kill enough people.47 
From the US policy perspective, there was a great hope about the Arab awakening in 
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the Arab Spring. In Obama’s speech on the Middle East and North Africa on May 19, 
2011, the President identified the Arab Spring as a “historical opportunity” to 
translate US support for “political and economic reform in the Middle East and North 
Africa that can meet the legitimate aspirations of ordinary people throughout the 
region” into concrete actions.48 Hillary Clinton, the Secretary of State, also reaffirmed 
the American conviction that “real democratic change…is in the national interest of 
the US”.49 Their analysis proved admirably accurate, in that if Gaddafi were able to 
depict himself as impregnable, it would have been very damaging to the rest of what 
was happening in the Arab World. Some of the other authoritarian regimes would 
decide to use brutal repression as a way to end protests as well. Robert Gates believed 
that a potential significantly destabilizing event taking place in Libya would put the 
revolutions in both Tunisia and Egypt at risk, given that Libya was a “part of a 
broader wave of unrest across North Africa and the Middle East that had led to the 
ousting of long-standing regimes in Tunisia and Egypt”.50 These concerns resulted in 
the formation of a very strong group of advisers, which was led by the Special 
Assistant to the President Samantha Power, the US Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice 
and Hillary Clinton, warning that the US inaction would undermine the process of 
political change in the Middle East.51 Thus, the consensus became clear that only 
through intervention could the US avoid sending this kind of wrong message that the 
international community would allow this kind of slaughter to continue recklessly. 
Assist European allies  It was worth questioning whether the US was “pushed” 
by the other countries to participate in the Libyan mission. Or was the US “self-
motivated” by the notion that “your allies’ interests become your interests”? In other 
words, did Washington give priority to the need of helping European allies when 
making decision on whether to intervene in Libya? James Lindsay insisted that in the 
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case of Libya, the administration would hardly do anything if it had not been through 
the French and the British lobbying Washington because there were certainly plenty 
of other places that were calling for humanitarian interventions.52 President Obama 
and Hillary Clinton found themselves driven by concerns on what the allies wanted, 
which had ever happened in Kosovo where the allies knew clearly about what should 
be done there. Similarly in Libya, the French and the British were well aware of the 
necessity to get involved: “Despite all negative comments, Libya shows that there is a 
political and diplomatic dynamic of European construction and an active European 
voice in world affairs”.53 Lindsay’s argument was mainly based on the realistic and 
strategic assumption that Washington had very little at stake in Libya, but he ignored 
the fact that if Washington understood it was crucial to help its allies in Libya, it 
would join the operation regardless of whether or when its allies made the request; yet 
if Washington denied the emergency to provide support to its allies, it would not 
announce participation even if its allies required. Perhaps a better explanation would 
be that US decision on Libya was accelerated, not determined, by the French and the 
British lobbying. The US might have already noticed its allies had immense interests 
in peril. For example, France and Britain were worried about the potential instability 
and the increasing violent extremism, and Italy was particularly concerned about the 
potential refugees. 54  Without doubt, when two very close US allies, France and 
Britain, were asking the US to get involved, the possibility of US engagement in 
Libya would certainly increase. According to Hillary Clinton, “How could you stand 
by when France and the UK and other Europeans and the Arab League and your Arab 
partners were saying you have got to do something?”55 Thus, the internal belief—
”though the strategic interest was not direct in Libya, there was a strategic interest in 
helping US allies”—ultimately facilitated US intervention in Libya.56  
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Moreover, Libya witnessed a critical moment when the Europeans were 
willing to do something on their own, which had long been expected by the US. 
France and Britain had mentioned clearly at the very start that they intended to take 
the lead in enforcing a no-fly zone. Spain, Norway and Denmark quickly expressed 
their support by saying that they would contribute to the operation.57 To have the 
Europeans shoulder more in terms of defence both in and outside of Europe was 
exactly what the US had wished to see since the end of the Cold War. With respect to 
that, Libya became an opportunity for the US to offer assistance in a way of 
encouraging its allies to make more contributions to future tasks. The good function 
of an alliance is based on all members’ respect for the principle that “you help me, I 
help you”. Each member is expecting from an alliance that it will get something in 
return, not simply “do somebody’s laundry”. There is no exception in the case of the 
US. On the issue of Libya, Washington was of course willing to see European capitals 
volunteer to assume the responsibility, yet at the same time it was also willing to 
provide necessary help when required. Last but not least, offering its allies support 
was also beneficial to consolidating the US position as a leader in the global security 
architecture. Although Washington repeatedly asked the European capitals to shoulder 
more responsibility, it did not mean that the US was hoping for a real shift towards a 
more balanced partnership with Europe, in which the US would give up its dominant 
role. Therefore, when the allies asked for US assistance in Libya, it simultaneously 
reaffirmed the perception of how important the US was to the international security 
system. In this sense, the US was certainly motivated by self-fulfilment rather than 
persuaded or pushed by its allies to take actions in Libya, though the request from the 
Europeans also played an essential role. 
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The humanitarian dimension: another “Afghanistan” or another “Rwanda”? 
There was no doubt that the Libyan mission served some US interests, yet the 
understanding of what US interests were involved in Libya was not wide-spread at the 
beginning. As a result, a heated debate arose among officials in the administration 
over whether to take actions in Libya, entailing how realism versus liberal 
internationalism could exert influence on US foreign policy. Inside the administration, 
senior officials were lined up on both sides. On one hand, Robert Gates, then-US 
Secretary of Defence, Thomas Donilon, National Security Advisor, and John Brennan, 
the chief counterterrorism adviser to Obama, strongly opposed the intervention in 
Libya. Bearing realists’ calculations in mind, they urged caution by arguing that 
“Libya was not vital to American national security interests”.58 Gates made his views 
known at the very beginning, saying that the US should stick to offering 
communications, surveillance and other support rather than putting its “boots on the 
ground”. He was opposed to attacking Libya and had said as much in several public 
statements. Donilon was also reportedly wary of the effects of committing to a 
lengthy military mission in Libya.59 As he stressed, the US had already been in wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, not to mention that there were other more urgent national 
security threats on the rise such as the Iran nuclear programme. Brennan even 
expressed his concern that the Libyan rebels remained largely unknown to US 
officials, and could have ties to Al-Qaeda. According to him, groups such as Al-
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb were active in Algeria and other countries in the region 
and had sought to bolster the opposition to Gaddafi, raising fears about the type of 
government that could replace the four-decade-old dictatorship if it fell.60 In general, 
people in Gates’ camp shared concerns about US involvement in Libya, further 
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warning the administration that the Libyan war might turn out to be another 
deadlocked “Afghanistan”, which had already become a nightmare of all Americans.  
On the other hand, Samantha Power, who was not only the Special Assistant 
to President Obama but also a writer of a Pulitzer Prize winning book about the 
genocide in Rwanda, formed the other influential camp within the government with 
Susan Rice, the US Ambassador to the UN, and Hillary Clinton, the Secretary of State, 
expecting to accelerate US steps to take actions in Libya. As major advocates, they 
were mainly concerned that the Libyan crisis would deteriorate into another 
“Rwanda”, where “the Security Council fails even to consider taking decisive action 
in the face of genocide, mass murder, and/or ethnic cleansing”61. Dating back to 
December 2007 when then-Senator Hillary Clinton was interviewed on “This Week” 
show, she had already expressed her regrets about Rwanda and stressed her 
determination to prevent “more Rwandas” in the future: “I think that for me it was 
one of the most poignant and difficult experiences when…I was able to go to Rwanda 
and be part of expressing our deep regrets because we did not speak out adequately 
enough and we certainly did not take action.”62 In the case of Libya, Hillary Clinton 
again recalled those instances from recent history when a lack of US intervention had 
left hundreds of thousands dead, emphasising that the “Responsibility to Protect” 
(R2P) was acquired as humanitarian emergency arose. She said that the UN-backed 
military intervention in Libya would be “a watershed moment in international 
decision-making. We learned a lot in the 1990s. We saw what happened in Rwanda. It 
took a long time in the Balkans, in Kosovo to deal with a tyrant”.63  
Susan Rice was a staffer at the National Security Council (NSC) when the 
world failed to stop the genocide in Rwanda. According to the Time magazine, Susan 
Rice once told Samantha Power, who was then a Harvard scholar, “I swore to myself 
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that if I ever faced such a crisis (as Rwanda) again, I would come down on the side of 
dramatic action, going down in flames if that was required.”64 As Gaddafi’s troops 
closed in on the rebel stronghold of Benghazi on March 15, 2011, Obama put the fate 
of the city’s one million residents in the hands of Rice who, as the US Ambassador to 
the UN, was determined to get a tougher resolution allowing broader intervention. 
Rice stated that humanitarian intervention was not about going to war for imminent 
national security needs but to save innocent lives. Hence, she moved on to stress that 
Gaddafi’s violence had already placed the question of when to intervene to save lives 
squarely on the table.65 Samantha Power was also one of the Obamians with deep-
seated ideas on the issue of Libya. In the light of press reports of Samantha Power, it 
would be extremely embarrassing to have people again criticise Washington for 
decades that it had stood by while the Libyan massacre was going on.66 
Now, the three women were pushing for US intervention to stop a looming 
humanitarian catastrophe in Libya. Senator John Kerry (D-MA) depicted the debate 
within the administration as “healthy”, reemphasising that “the memory of Rwanda, 
alongside Iraq, made it clear” that the US needed to act.67 As the potential slaughter of 
the Libyan Benghazi uprising framed around a need for humanitarian intervention, 
Power’s camp began to play a more important role. The broad outline of a reason for 
US intervention became visible. President Obama was eventually convinced by the 
humanitarian calculations that the US had the responsibility to prevent Gaddafi from 
slaughtering innocent civilians, stating that the UN, the Arab League and other 
countries “are saying we need to intercede to make sure that a disaster does not 
happen on our watch as has happened in the past when the international community 
stood idly by”.68 He further rejected the argument for inaction when defending US 
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military involvement in Libya as a necessary humanitarian intervention on March 28, 
saying that 
 To brush aside America’s responsibility as a leader and—more profoundly—
our responsibilities to our fellow human beings under such circumstances would have 
been a betrayal of who we are…Some nations may be able to turn a blind eye to 
atrocities in other countries. The United States of America is different. And as 
President, I refused to wait for the images of slaughter and mass graves before taking 
action.69  
Actually before the senior-level meeting was held at the White House on 
March 15, the consensus around Washington was that military action against Libya 
was not in the cards. However, after the meeting where “the President was referring to 
the broader change going on in the Middle East and the need to rebalance US foreign 
policy toward a greater focus on democracy and human rights”, the White House 
completely altered its stance and successfully pushed for the authorisation for military 
intervention in Libya.70 Steve Clemons, the foreign policy chief at the New America 
Foundation summarised that “Gates is clearly not on board with what is going 
on…Clinton won the bureaucratic battle to use DOD resources to achieve what is 
essentially the State Department’s objective…and Obama let it happen”.71 It was true 
that “Hillary and Susan Rice were key parts of this story because Hillary got the Arab 
buy-in and Susan worked the UN to get a 10-to-5 vote, which is no easy thing”, but it 
was also worth noting that the key decision was in fact made by Obama himself.72 
Matthew Kroenig recalled the story he had been told by a government official that on 
March 15, the President listened to the options being presented at the meeting, then he 
left the room and thought about it and then on his own made the decision that he did 
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not want another Rwanda and was prepared to intervene even though there might not 
be enough interests at stake.73   
For the President, the US had to take actions to show the world that this was 
something the Americans were not acting out of any narrow interests. There was no 
secret plan to get the Libyan oil or to do something else that would take over Libya. It 
was truly a response to an international demand. In other words, for the US, “Libya 
was a special case—urgent military intervention was required to stave off a 
humanitarian disaster”. 74  As James Mann concludes in The Obamians, President 
Obama’s intervention in Libya demonstrated for the first time that he was willing to 
put the American military to work on behalf of humanitarian goals, in a way that the 
realists he admired would not.75 But if the decision was simply driven by liberal 
internationalists’ considerations, why not Somalia or Congo, where people were also 
suffering from humanitarian crisis the same as in Libya? Why did Obama’s stance in 
Libya differ significantly from his strategy regarding the other Arab revolutions?76 A 
lot of people believed these differences undermined the humanitarian claims that the 
US leaders made about their objectives in intervening in Libya. Moreover, as time 
wore on and the Syrian death toll mounted, the explanation that the US intervened in 
Libya mainly because of humanitarian consideration became increasingly implausible. 
In fact, the reality was not that simple. There was actually a third dimension that often 
left out of discussion, namely feasibility. 
 
A third dimension: feasibility 
Legitimacy  Christopher Chivvis thought the reason why the US intervened in Libya 
rather than Congo or Somalia was because Libya was feasible. The source of its 
feasibility, as he identified, came from legitimacy.77 It was the fact that Gaddafi was 
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the spy of broader international community, including the Arab World, hence there 
was far-ranging support for this intervention not only in the US and Europe, but also 
in the region itself.78 This was a very important condition that made the intervention 
possible and legitimate. In addition, China and Russia did not stand in the way, 
facilitating the adoption of a UN Security Council Resolution that authorised member 
states to take military actions.79 There has always been functional value placed on 
getting international approval. What would happen in the Gulf War if George H. W. 
Bush were unable to get the UN Security Council Resolution? The authorisation was 
important, whereas it did not mean that the US would not occasionally intervene even 
without a UN Security Council Resolution. The reason why the President went to get 
the UN authorisation was not because he regarded it as vital to wage a war, instead, he 
made the calculation that it would enable the US to avoid political problems at home. 
Similarly in the case of Libya, the US did not take any action until the UN legitimised 
it, which helped Washington obtain both strategic and moral advantages.  
However, it was not sufficiently convincing to join a campaign just with the 
UN authorisation. The legacy of Kosovo and Iraq reminded the US that an 
intervention should be both legal and legitimate, otherwise people would be able to 
criticise it from either perspective. As Charles Kupchan said, the intervention in 
Kosovo was illegal but legitimate, because even though there was no UN Security 
Council Resolution, Kosovo enjoyed broad support in the core world opinion; while 
the invasion in Iraq was legal but illegitimate, because it received authorisation but 
did not gain enough support around the world.80 In the case of Libya, one of the 
reasons why the intervention enjoyed legitimacy was NATO. If it had been the US 
alone, it would have been much more problematic. That was also why Washington 
insisted on using NATO even though France initially opposed NATO carrying out 
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military support in view of the concern that “the Alliance has an aggressive image in 
the Arab World”.81   
Paris and London’s initial consideration on the crisis was that they should 
intervene regardless of the international community’ response because they felt that 
the emergent norm of the “R2P” applied to the Libyan case and because they believed 
the massive flows of refugees fleeing the violence were a threat to their border 
security.82   But they soon changed to view international and regional support as a 
critical prerequisite for intervention and made every effort to attain it. In fact, the 
Sarkozy and Cameron governments’ engagement in initial action has made them more 
likely to intervene by “jeopardising their future economic relations with the Gaddafi 
regime and making him more likely to threaten them with future terrorist attacks”.83 
In other words, taking initial action also meant that French and British prestige would 
ultimately have suffered had they not intervened to achieve a satisfactory solution to 
the crisis. Hence they needed international support, better in the form of an 
experienced organisation, and NATO seemed to be the best choice.  
Karim Mezran argued that Italy was the first country that demanded a NATO 
command.84 Although France and Britain wanted to go on their own, they found their 
feet stopped by the Italians who refused to approve either a French or a British 
command. What France and Britain were truly talking about was to have a combined 
Anglo-French command outside of the NATO command structure, yet Italy insisted 
on going through NATO precisely to make it more international on the European side 
and to keep the US operating within the NATO framework.85 Thus, the Europeans 
had no choice but to require US help to solve the dilemma, given that the allies had 
already broken up on this issue: France and Britain wanted to go alone; Italy rejected 
them to go; and Germany wanted to be neutral.86 Without doubt, the EU member 
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states split over the military intervention in Libya with France, the UK and Germany 
voting differently in the UN Security Council.87 It became clear that the US had to 
intervene to complete the mission by dragging in NATO, otherwise Italy would be the 
incredible cost for the US. There was a desire to preserve the alliance unity, but the 
alliance was not united on this. In fact, Italy’s bid to call for a NATO command 
mainly rested on its intension to have the US on board, which would guarantee that 
the allies could win the war. Umberto Bossi, the truculent founder of the Northern 
League Party was putting pressure on Silvio Berlusconi not to act, because he was 
badly worried about retaliation due to the close distance between Italy and Libya.88 
There was a feeling that Gaddafi might unleash some of his agencies to cause terrorist 
attacks on Italy. On the other hand, a lot of Italians had Libyan contracts for 
construction or energy, hence they would lose all those contracts if Gaddafi were 
going to survive though the allies intervened. The Italians were actually riding the 
fence, and they could not come down one side or the other. By assessing the full 
complexity of the situation, the Italians were certainly more cautious than the French 
and the British, thereby more eager to see Gaddafi lose the war. As a result, the 
Libyan operation was implemented under the framework of NATO rather than of any 
bilateral cooperation.  
Cost  Another source of feasibility came from the evaluation of military inputs. 
Nora Bensahel believed what ultimately convinced President Obama to intervene in 
Libya was that the mission was very low cost to the US.89 The European allies made 
clear they only wanted US help for the initial air campaign and some intelligence 
support thereafter. President Obama agreed that the US could have this limited 
involvement without taking responsibility for what would happen in the country after 
Gaddafi fell. The assessment that it would be done at very low cost turned out to be 
Libya: The US Policy-Making Process 
232 
 
correct: the total cost to the US, excluding man hours and military personnel who 
worked on it, was about $1 billion. It was very little in the scheme of the US defence 
budget which used to reach $550 billion a year before the US got to the costs of wars 
in either Afghanistan or Iraq. Why the cost was low, as Bensahel further explained, 
was because of limited involvement.90 It was hard to imagine what the scenario would 
be for the US to get involved at tremendously high cost. With regard to this, Syria was 
the comparative case to show why the US decided to take actions in Libya not in other 
states that were also suffering from humanitarian crises. Although Syria was of 
greater strategic importance to the US than Libya in terms of chain reaction that 
resolving the Syrian crisis would also deal a severe setback to Iran’s grandiose Middle 
East ambitions, it did not see Obama actively seek Assad’s overthrow. Libya was 
basically a big flight desert, making military options in Libya much easier. For 
instance, the Libyan air defences could be quickly taken out from the sky because 
they were not advanced, thus the allies could have free control of the sky without 
putting any personnel really on the ground. Syria, quite the opposite; had more 
effective air force and air defences, which would make enforcing a no-fly zone more 
difficult. Thus, there was no way to affect the course of conflicts solely from the air, 
and it would cost hundreds of thousands of troops if ground presence was the only 
solution, regardless of the fact that Syria was with no guarantee of a good outcome. In 
other words, the US had limited tools available to effect change in Syria, given “the 
capabilities of the Syrian army, its alliance with Hezbollah and Iran, and the fact that 
the US forces were now engaged in three wars in the Middle East already”. 91 
Moreover, the Libyan rebels had already controlled a good portion of the country, 
enabling the allies to work with them on the civilian side. Yet unlike in Libya, the US 
ambassador to Syria reported that “opposition leaders made clear they did not want 
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US military intervention”.92 All these including the prediction that Syria would be of 
great cost and that involvement might cause anti-US sentiment eventually made 
military intervention in Syria not a serious option.   
Timing  The US assessment on cost mainly included that Libya was a crisis 
that really could be handled mostly by the Europeans and that the US could provide a 
supporting rather than a leading role in another intervention in the area of the Middle 
East. In addition to the calculation of low cost, there was another factor that further 
made the Libyan mission militarily feasible: the particular timing when President 
Obama chose to get involved. James Mann believed that the Obamians, a trusted crew 
of advisers to President Obama, actually did not expect a military campaign at the 
beginning, instead, they “hoped Gaddafi might behave like other Middle Eastern 
leaders in the early weeks of the Arab Spring, either stepping aside like Mubarak or 
announcing some immediate reforms like Jordan’s King Abdullah”.93 Yet that was 
soon proved to be a misjudgement. What finally boosted the US move was when 
Gaddafi talked about going house to house in Benghazi to kill people like rats. The 
estimated number of innocent civilians who would be killed if that happened would 
be tens of thousands. To have that kind of slaughter undertaken with international 
community completely unable to do anything would be a real blemish on not just the 
US but also the whole world. Samantha Power later reflected, “We were trying to 
convince Gaddafi to act with restraint and moderation, but he had already, right from 
day one, decided to crush this thing. He was taking the other path, the non-Tunisia 
choice.” 94  Although it is true that NATO allies and the international community 
cannot prevent every humanitarian disaster or prevent all the political misleads of 
some leaders, there are instances where they can do something about it. According to 
Obama’s speeches delivered in March, Libya was exactly the case where the 
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international community had the capacity to achieve some goals. It was not about 
putting a risk higher level of interests, but an opportunity to work with allies and 
partners to realise an outcome in a reasonable amount of time. Moreover, Libya was 
actually regarded as an easy case because there was no leader like Gaddafi who truly 
enjoyed no regional affection. 95  He was “one of the most eccentric, cruel, and 
unpredictable autocrats in the world”, given that he once said “Those who do not love 
me do not deserve to live!”96 When Gaddafi was talking about “purge” that would 
proceed “room by room” and “individual by individual”, it was truly believed that he 
was desperate to do this.97 Mindful that Gaddafi was a threat to not only his own 
people but also the region as a whole, the consensus among international community 
became unprecedentedly apparent that “Gaddafi must go and go for good”. 98 
Meanwhile, the debate over what the US should do also changed dramatically as 
regime forces approached Benghazi, for the possibility seemed to become more and 
more likely that there would be some massive civilian casualties because of an 
anticipated regime attack on Benghazi. That really changed the tone of the debate in 
the US and a lot of objections to intervention were more or less pushed aside as the 
dynamic sound ground changed. As a result, the pace of decision-making was forced 
to accelerate when the Libyan military started moving incredibly fast.  
Once the UN Security Council Resolutions, the regional organisation, and the 
Arab League had justified on the necessary means, all political elements with respect 
to the legal basis for intervention were appropriately addressed. Moreover, most of the 
European allies agreed that Libya was the place NATO could act to prevent 
humanitarian catastrophe within the norms of international law, even though Germany, 
Poland and some others did not choose to contribute. Further, the potential fall of 
Benghazi made the Libyan crisis rise above the bar as a humanitarian emergency, 
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urging the US to get involved at this particular timing. When all those came together, 
it became quite possible for the Obama administration to take actions. 
Military capability  In addition to the low cost and the particular timing, 
Washington also took the evaluation of military capability into account when making 
decision on Libya. There were some people like Kori Schake, who doubted whether 
the Europeans were really incapable of tackling Gaddafi on their own. By considering 
that “Libya spent only $1 billion on its military in the year before the rebels and 
NATO militaries felled Muammar Gaddafi—that is around 2 per cent of the UK’s 
defence budget”, he argued that “Britain’s superb military alone could probably have 
found a way to succeed”.99 In terms of pure balance of power, the British military was 
much more powerful than the Libyan military, however, when it came to this specific 
operation, specific capabilities rather than the overall strength would play a more 
effective role. First of all, in order to unfold the operation, the Libyan air defence 
network had to be taken down otherwise the pilots from any country would be at great 
risk. Frankly, besides the US, the ability to defeat the air defence system was 
something right now no European country or any other country in the world could do. 
For example, the US had vast piles of air-launched cruise missiles that were vital to 
create a no-fly zone in Libya, while the British only had very small reserves. Hence 
on this specific cruise missiles, Britain run out very quickly in the campaign, which 
dramatically decreased its capability to force the capitulation of the dictator. Hence, 
for the purpose of guaranteeing that the allies would not fail, the US ultimately 
decided to intervene as the cruise missiles provider who could just stand off either 
from sea or air to attack tanks and aircrafts. The reason why the Americans agreed to 
at minimum come for the first week to 10 days of the air operation to knock put 
Gaddafi’s air force and radar was mainly because that no European country, or even 
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the collection of European countries, could have done that. In short, it was not the 
British in aggregate terms that did not have more powerful military than Libya, but 
they just did not have the right technology and the right capability to implement the 
mission. 
With respect to how the campaign was truly carried out, Robert Gates 
complained that “the mightiest military alliance in history is only 11 weeks into an 
operation against a poorly armed regime in a sparsely populated country. Yet many 
allies are beginning to run short of munitions, requiring the US, once more, to make 
up the difference”.100 The gap between Washington and European capitals in terms of 
military capability was not build in a day.101 In other words, it would be unrealistic to 
expect those European allies to take the full burden or to stop relying on US 
assistance immediately. Moreover, in the case of Libya, the US actually had a long 
history with Gaddafi dating back to the 1980s when the Reagan administration 
bombed Tripoli and Benghazi in retaliation for the attack on a West Berlin nightclub 
that killed two American servicemen and injured 79. 102  Viewing Libya as “low-
hanging fruit”, the US was basically more experienced than those European countries 
to fight against Gaddafi. Therefore, based on the fact that the US was still 
indispensible in providing some critical military assistance to guarantee a victory, the 
Obama administration finally decided to move forward and fight together with its 
allies.  
 
Why did the US transfer the Libyan mission to NATO and start “leading from 
behind”? 
Since March 19, coalition military operations under the auspices of the US-led 
Operation Odyssey Dawn (OOD) had achieved the objective of setting up a no-fly 
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zone over Libya, laying a solid foundation for transferring the Libyan mission to 
NATO. The transition from the US-led OOD to the NATO-led Operation Unified 
Protector (OUP) thereafter went seamlessly.103 NATO allies reached a unanimous 
agreement on March 27 to direct NATO to assume command and control of the 
civilian protection.104 The next day, President Obama and his team provided an update 
on accomplishments to date, including the full transfer of enforcement of the no-fly 
zone to NATO.105 
Ever since the end of Cold War, the US has played a dominant role in almost 
every military intervention around the world. Even “President Obama has hardly been 
shy about the projection of American power. Indeed, he oversaw a “surge” of US 
troops into Afghanistan and has dramatically ramped up the use of drone strikes to 
combat militant extremists.”106 However, in the case of Libya, the US was, for the 
first time, not predisposed to the assertive and excessive use of military force, instead, 
it was perceived as “leading from behind”.107 The phrase certainly was not what the 
President or his advisers had ever mentioned, in fact, it was seized on in the media by 
unknown journalists. But it became widely accepted even in the official assessment 
on Libya military campaign.108 Compared with Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq where 
the US was directing or leading in a very obvious way, Libya saw the US declining to 
play a dominant role. James Lindsay argued that the reason why both President 
Clinton and President Obama tried to minimise the visible level of the US military 
involvement abroad was precisely because intervention had become “the worst choice 
and the worst necessity” both in Kosovo and Libya.109 In the case of Libya, if the US 
led from the front rather than led from behind, Gaddafi would have gone sooner and 
there would have been fewer deaths, yet how could the President deal with the 
following public condemnation of intervention? How could the President persuade 
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those opponents who were extremely concerned that the US would sink into another 
“quagmire” as in Afghanistan and Iraq? According to the Gallup poll conducted on 
March 29, 2011, only 10 per cent of Americans said the US should take the lead role 
in Libya, while the plurality, 36 per cent, favoured a minor role for the US, and 22 per 
cent thought the US should withdraw entirely.110 No one knew how precious the 
opportunity cost would have been if the US decided to lead from the front, but 
certainly the President would have faced tougher objections, threatening to shrink or 
even abolish the pursuit of intervention. Those domestic concerns could be addressed 
by applying the framework of NATO, which could help obscure the essential role of 
Washington. Mindful of what happened in the Iraq war where the Bush 
administration’s unilateral proposal of global War on Terror resulted in a dramatic 
increase in transatlantic tension, it was politically important to transfer the Libyan 
mission to NATO and start “leading from behind”, because on one hand, public 
support for intervention would be secured and on the other hand, criticism about 
overextending US military would fall of itself. More importantly, “leading from 
behind” was in line with Obama’s grand strategy on “multilateral retrenchment” 
which was designed to “curtail the United State’s overseas commitments, restore its 
standing in the world, and shift burdens onto global partners”.111 President Obama 
was elected to end the war in Iraq; he also placed great importance on multilateralism. 
He saw it as an opportunity to create more political benefits to the US by handing the 
Libyan mission to NATO, which would be characterised as a multilateral effort rather 
than the US acting unilaterally.112 
Paula Newberg introduced an interesting explanation about “leading from 
behind” that the US could only provide moral rather than material support.113 Yet the 
US contribution was not really “constrained”. In theory, “leading from behind” 
Libya: The US Policy-Making Process 
239 
 
allowed the US to limit its dominant role, yet in practice, it was still the US military 
that provided the most capabilities. According to Ivo Daalder, the US Ambassador to 
NATO, in the initial operation which was conducted in a coalition format before 
NATO came in, the US was by far and away the dominate military contributor to the 
operation, providing all kinds of assets in order to make it possible.114 After 10 days 
operation, the US stepped back and NATO took over. Although the full transfer of 
command to NATO was planning to be completed just in several days, Robert Gates 
was not able to give a firm deadline for just how long US involvement would last.115 
Thus, even in the second part of operation, Washington continued to play a significant 
role behind scenes, leaving the American Navy and Air Force very much involved in 
enforcing a no-fly zone over Libya. For example, to minimize civilian casualties, it 
was required to obtain a high degree of surveillance, the vast majority of which was 
provided by the US. Generally, it was true that the US was not playing a dominant 
role in Libya, however, it did not mean that the US was not playing a significant role 
there. Although it were the Europeans who flew large number of combat sorties, the 
US support was absolutely essential, particularly in the area of the intelligence and 
surveillance. Further, as Nora Bensahel identified, another area where US assistance 
was also greater was in air-refuelling, which the Europeans had low capability of.116 
The US offered this decisive backing to some small countries that were flying sorties, 
particularly to Scandinavia, the Netherlands and Belgium that served to provide 
position ignitions. Basically, without the US air-refuelling and reconnaissance, there 
would have been little military effect from the NATO operations, given that the US 
provided the best bulks of air-refuelling that allowed aircrafts to be on station to 
complete both the surveillance and strike missions.  
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Although Washington continued to provide significant and critical support 
even after transferring the Libyan mission to NATO, the signal came from the 
strategy of “leading from behind” was clear that the US would not always play a 
dominant role and the European allies should shoulder more responsibilities. To send 
that message around the world was meaningful to the US especially in the context of 
current economic pressures and domestic US debates about post-War on Terror 
interventions, but most importantly, it helped the US reconsider its role as a “global 
policeman” and redefine the “American way of war”. Thus whether there was a so-
called “Libyan model” that could be applied to future crisis management became an 
interesting question.  
 
The so-called “Libyan model” and the future of NATO 
As a rule of thumb, when the US is involved in a war, it always “throws enough 
money, weapons and people at conflicts to guarantee an overwhelming advantage for 
itself and it also has the technology to do much of the fighting from afar and therefore 
in relative safety” (though this was not true of Vietnam).117 But the Libyan war did 
not match this default “American way of war”. There were many fresh elements that 
constituted the so-called “Libyan model”. During the conflict, the US left its 
European allies to lead, taking on a limited, supporting role for the first time. Even 
though the Obama administration made clear it would not allow allies to fail, it 
contributed only enough assistance to prevent operations from failing, not enough for 
them to speedily succeed. Nourished by the leading thought that the Libyan war 
provided a likely blueprint for many future NATO operations, Kori Schake took the 
Libyan war as “the clearest signal to date that the US will not do more, proportionally, 
than other allies when it, too, faces austerity”.118 From now on, America seemed 
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likely to behave like any other ally, sitting out some of NATO’s wars, and doing just 
enough to help other operations to succeed. The US armed forces will no longer 
automatically make up the difference between NATO’s ambitions and European 
military means. As Ivo Daalder concluded, “if there ever was a time in which the 
United States could always be counted on to fill the gaps that may emerge in 
European defence, that time is rapidly coming to an end”.119 Beyond the theoretical 
dimension, the Obama administration has declared Libya to be a demonstration of its 
strategic doctrine: in response to humanitarian crisis, the US will work with allies to 
gain international acceptance for intervention in support of indigenous forces and join 
a coalition to use military force. It will not play the dominant role in such coalitions. It 
will not support revolutionary movements without mandates from the United Nations 
Security Council.120  
Some scholars such as George Joffe, viewed the US decision on “leading from 
behind” as not only a promise that America was happy to see European countries deal 
with such conflicts as Libya on their own, but also a reminder to its European allies 
that they should shoulder the responsibility to take all the relevant burdens resulted 
from their passionate action.121 It is true that many European governments have long 
hoped for a “European pillar”, a defence capability that is less dependent on US 
support. Ideally, the US retrenchment would certainly increase the likelihood of 
European countries leading future missions, however, many allies perceived Libya as 
an unsatisfactory experience. Robert Gates pointed out “While every alliance member 
voted for the Libya mission, less than half have participated, and fewer than a third 
have been willing to participate in the strike mission…Frankly, many of those allies 
sitting on the sidelines do so not because they do not want to participate, but simply 
because they cannot. The military capabilities simply are not there.”122 This sad story 
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made NATO’s European members rethink about their inability to project force and 
stability. Yet Tomas Valasek believed that most Europeans seemed to lack in their 
DNA the sense of global responsibility, which explained their shyness in using 
military force. The allies seemed to have no interest in fostering their ambition to play 
a bigger role in their own defence. Instead, they were more satisfied with the current 
situation that burdens and responsibilities were shifted to the US and that they could 
just stay calmly under the US security umbrella. But no matter how unwilling 
European countries were to spend their resources and use military forces, they were 
unable to find a reasonable excuse to free themselves from the burden-sharing 
responsibility. Thus, with Washington getting tired of shouldering the unequal 
division and growing to be more sensitive than ever to free-riding behaviours, the 
European allies should start playing a more active military role if they wanted NATO 
to persist. The Libyan war was exactly the beginning of “the time”. It introduced a 
new definition of “European way of war”. It reweighed the military disparity between 
America and its European allies. It also marked the advent of a new round of debate 
over the burden-sharing problem. 
The “American way of war” has been the most often cited term when talking 
about the adversaries that NATO has fought in the past 20 years. Washington enjoys 
unmatched capability, raising the standard of performance so high that no other 
country dares to engage even in those military operations for which they have 
sufficient capability. On one hand, America has never been reluctant to pour such 
resources as personnel, money and weapons into conflicts; on the other, America has 
casted a long shadow not only within NATO but also around the world due to its 
unbeatable strength.  
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The US has 11 aircraft carrier battle groups; no other nation has more than 
one. The US also has three times as many modern battle tanks, four times the number 
of fourth-generation tactical aircraft (and is already fielding the fifth generation), 
more than three times as many naval cruisers and destroyers, 19 times as many 
tanker aircraft and 48 times as many unmanned aerial vehicles as any other 
country.123 
As a result, some European allies, who regarded “unable to perform as 
perfectly as America does” as “unable to perform”, hesitated to advocate the 
“European way of war”. Nonetheless, the risk of fighting without America’s weapons 
was not as terrified as envisaged. The war fought to the European doctrine might 
bring troops in closer contact with the enemy, inflict more civilian casualties, and last 
longer, making it harder for the governments to keep public support. But these 
foreseeable difficulties were less knotty than the potential trouble that might be 
created if they refused to act without US participation.  It was because that the refusal 
means nothing but those members failed to intervene to protect people from autocratic 
governments, investigate or even destroy suspect nuclear facilities, and support 
freedom and democracy taking roots. It became clear that European allies had no 
better choice than taking necessary actions even without US support.  
In fact, the situation was quite promising when taking the evaluation of 
European militaries into account. “The European allies have a million more troops 
under arms than the US…Any one of the major European militaries could have 
defeated any of the adversaries that NATO fought in the past 20 years. In combination, 
the Europeans’ fighting power is more than adequate to impose their will even in 
some of the world’s most challenging battlegrounds such as the Middle East.”124 
However, Europe underestimated its own strength for most of the time, relying on the 
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American pledge to defend its allies. Thus, most NATO countries were well below 
the Alliance’s guideline of spending 2 per cent of GDP on defence. In 2011, only 
Greece (2.4 per cent) and UK (2.6 per cent) spend above the threshold, while the US 
represents 4.8 per cent of GDP in its defence budget. Defence spending per capita in 
the US is nearly double that of any NATO ally, at $2,062 per person, followed by 
Norway ($1,035), UK ($970), France ($663) and Denmark ($635).125  
It seems that the unequal division between American and European military 
outputs is more like a self-created obstacle due to the unwillingness of European allies 
to increase their contributions. But this is not the whole story. The disparity between 
military capabilities does exist. Taking the Libyan war as an example, although the 
US took its stance of not playing a leading role, “it fired nearly all the cruise missiles 
that destroyed Libya’s air defences in advance of allied strike missions, provided the 
great majority of the aerial tankers and nearly all of the surveillance and electronic 
warfare elements on which allied fights depended, and flew 25 per cent of all 
sorties”.126 The Libyan operation was illustrative that it could not have been fought in 
the way it was without the US support. However, this does not mean that the war 
could not have been fought at all. As is mentioned above, the Libyan defence budget 
reached only $1 billion in the year before Gaddafi failed, which was approximately 2 
per cent of Britain’s. No one could really doubt that the European military forces led 
by Britain and France was unable to force the capitulation of a dictator and find a way 
to succeed. Thus, the European allies are not unable, but unwilling, to intervene to 
protect persecuted civilians the same as the US does, removing the veil of the long-
standing debate about the burden-sharing problem. 
Kori Schake emphasised three new elements that made the current round of 
burden-sharing debate more serious than previous ones. “First, the major threats to the 
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US are no longer European in origin…Second, US armed forces find coalition 
warfare more and more difficult and decreasingly helpful…The third and most 
important reason…is that pressures for austerity are likely to endure, not only in 
Europe but also in the US.” 127  Others believed that the core variable refers to 
America’s own strategic adjustment—it changes to style itself more as a Pacific than 
a European power. In the President Obama’s 2012 review of military strategy, he 
expressed the will of focusing on more pressing threats in Asia and the Middle East 
whilst hoping that Europe would take control of its own security. The President also 
sent a message to the US allies in Asia that American forces there would grow and 
new American marines would be deployed. Europe, on the opposite, did not receive 
any substantive reassurance from the US but a vague promise that “We’re going to 
continue investing in our critical partnerships and alliances, including NATO, which 
has demonstrated time and again—most recently in Libya—that it is a force 
multiplier”.128  And even worse, the Pentagon’s new “defence strategic guidance” 
required the US to cut down the maintenance of its troops in Europe while denounced 
the dissatisfied performance of European forces.129 Many of the 80,000 US personnel 
stationed in Europe would be withdrawn, probably pushing the alliance back to its 
earlier model that no permanent presence of US forces in Europe was guaranteed. 
Hence Freddy Gray called Obama “the Pacific President” who was taking a decisive 
turn away from Europe in his second term.130 The current US foreign policy tends to 
focus more on the Asian Pacific region, yet it does not ignore Europe completely. On 
February 16, 2013, President Obama gave the annual state-of-the-union message to 
Congress, announcing that America and the EU would begin talks to create a 
transatlantic free-trade zone.131 This proposal was not new, but reemphasised how top 
Europe ranks on the list of American foreign policy. Further, although the Obama 
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doctrine encourages US cooperation with its allies in Asia, it had little success 
because of mutual distrust. Thus, European allies remain to be the priority of the US 
strategic arrangements, and consolidated transatlantic relations continue to serve US 
interests. 
In the long run, NATO’s future depends in large part on whether the European 
allies find their willingness to play a role commensurate with their strength. But the 
process of transformation will take a long time in practice. Therefore, in the short run, 
a compromising mechanism among NATO members will prevail, requiring the “a la 
carte approach” to be accepted as part of how NATO works. One lesson learned from 
Libya was that not all members would join all future NATO operations (only 8 out of 
28 allies followed the French and UK lead in bombing Libya). NATO members, who 
are no longer unified by a common enemy like the Soviet Union, begin to worry about 
different threats. And it becomes harder for allies to agree to fight wars that they care 
unequally passionately. Thus, NATO should allow some members to stay on the 
sidelines and contribute only symbolically (give their approval for NATO to unfold 
the operation legitimately), rather than demanding every ally to take an effective role 
in NATO’s every military mission. Some people are opposed to the “division of 
labour”, for it would upgrade the risk of moral hazard in future military operations. 
However, this compromising solution is still better than the alternative that NATO 
members fail to launch, let alone accomplish missions altogether because some allies 
refuse to participate. Moreover, with regard to the strong possibility that Washington 
would lead fewer operations in the future, European allies should design a more 
agreeable rule of transatlantic cooperation in specific missions. They should take the 
initiative to make their military plans more explicit about how much support they 
expect from the US, and negotiate with the US on how and what kind of assistance 
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the US should provide during operations. In short, to see NATO persist and capable of 
dealing with more issues in the future, European countries should make more 
contributions to the Alliance, and to the sustainment of a healthy relationship with the 
US.       
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9  Conclusion 
 
Ever since the end of the Cold War, there have been continuing debates over US 
commitment to NATO both at home and abroad. After addressing key rounds of 
debates by researching in some depth the Clinton administration’s recommitment to 
NATO in the aftermath of the Cold War, and the operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan 
and in particular Libya in the previous chapters, it is time to discuss the contemporary 
debate over US commitment to NATO in the context of the growing burden-sharing 
problems within the Alliance, unambiguous US policy of “Pivot to Asia”, the 
potential US decision on bypassing NATO to resolve the crisis of Syria, and the 
possible utilisation of NATO to contain Russia in the case of Ukraine. But before 
looking forward to “predict” the future of NATO, let us remind ourselves of the key 
evidences from previous chapters to interpret US policy on NATO first.  
 
NATO after the Cold War 
 
The first debate  
In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, Americans had high expectations of 
seeing the US scaling down its international commitments, raising concerns about 
whether the US should remain committed to NATO, the most prominent legacy of the 
Cold War. The first post-Cold War round of debate over US commitment to the 
transatlantic alliance focused on why the Clinton administration supported the 
continuation of NATO. Generally speaking, the reason why the Clinton 
administration was in favour of NATO’s persistence was because firstly, NATO was 
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still relevant to the post-Cold War world as there were new security threats on the rise 
though the Soviet threat disappeared. Secondly, to remain committed to NATO was in 
line with the Clinton doctrine which required the US to be aware of “the 
consequences to our security of letting conflicts fester and spread” and to “be 
prepared to do” something “where our values and our interests are at stake and where 
we can make a difference”.1 More importantly, the Clinton administration’s judgment 
was also based on the crucial fact that maintaining NATO also meant maintaining US 
influence in the wider European region. Thirdly, after going through “compromise, 
coalition, competition and confusion”, internal government officials involved in this 
bargaining game eventually agreed on a uniform policy, preferring to see the US 
continuing its support to NATO.2  
Therefore, the Clinton administration not only committed itself to the 
continuation of NATO, but also began to sponsor a major programme of NATO 
renewal and enlargement. On the micro level, officials in the White House, Congress 
and Pentagon had consulted heatedly about why, how and when NATO expanded, 
and which countries could gain membership of NATO in the first place. The reason 
why NATO should expand also implied the urgency that NATO should transform in 
order to adapt to the post-Cold War security environment. The 1991 Rome Summit 
put forward a “New Strategic Concept”, granting NATO new purpose in the face of 
new threats and requiring NATO transformation including expansion of its 
membership and participation in “out-of-area” operations. 
 
The first opportunity 
Bosnia saw NATO’s first “out-of-area” action in the post-Cold War era, but Kosovo 
was the first formal test of the just transformed “new” alliance that had its 
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membership expanded and its tasks broadened “out-of-area”. Kosovo provided the 
first opportunity to get a clearer understanding of both the strength and weakness of 
the Alliance. The success of the Kosovo operation was mainly attributed to NATO, 
which provided institutional benefits and incomparable military capability. But at the 
same time, Kosovo also revealed inherent problems of the Alliance, especially the 
tensions between Washington and European capitals over burden-sharing 
responsibility. Thus, in terms of US attitude towards NATO, Kosovo suggested that 
Washington would like to utilise NATO to deal with crises when the advantage 
outweighed the disadvantage of employing the Alliance, and that Washington might 
become hesitant to do so if those NATO problems discovered in Kosovo could not be 
properly handled in the future. 
The prediction that the US might decrease its commitment to NATO after 
Kosovo proved to be a very real possibility: when the US suffered terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001, the Bush administration decided to bypass NATO and choose an 
ad hoc coalition to intervene in Afghanistan in order to avoid the operational 
constraints that the Alliance might impose. 
The first real challenge 
President Bush’s rejection to invoke Article Five of NATO charter after 9/11 
made the first real challenge to the continuation of the Alliance, provoking a new 
round of debate over the purpose of NATO. The Afghanistan mission, suggested that 
if NATO could not play a role in dealing with new threats including terrorism that 
was shapeless and without fixed locations, it would become irrelevant to the 
contemporary security environment. However, with the objective of the Afghanistan 
mission changed from countering terrorism to reconstructing the country, President 
Bush, especially in his second term, recognised the importance of NATO and began 
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to assist NATO with a takeover of the Afghanistan mission. The apparent shift in the 
Bush administration’s attitude towards NATO suggested that NATO would shoulder 
more responsibility in carrying out “out-of-area” operations after Afghanistan and that 
the US would be willing to utilise NATO to accomplish crisis management tasks in 
the future. Although actually European allies did not want a global role for NATO, 
not to mention a global “War on Terror”, their participation in Afghanistan made the 
US relatively optimistic about the effectiveness of NATO.  
In addition, after inviting seven countries, namely Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia to join NATO at the 2004 Istanbul 
Summit and announcing memberships of Albania and Croatia at the 2008 Bucharest 
Summit, NATO continued to transform by adopting a new Strategic Concept “Active 
Engagement, Modern Defence” at the 2010 Lisbon Summit, which was a clear and 
resolute statement on NATO’s enduring purpose and fundamental security tasks. With 
respect to all these evolvements, it became clear that continuous internal reform 
would be a key to ensure the relevance as well as the persistence of NATO in the 
future. 
 
The first “real” change  
Although to some extent President Bush’s behaviour in his second term showed his 
determination to reinvigorate the transatlantic relationship, the possibility of making 
NATO return to the “good old ways” immediately after the Bush years and especially 
the Iraq war was not real. Without doubt, in the case of Libya, the US was internally 
divided on the issue. Hence, Libya saw the US unexpectedly reluctant to intervene at 
the very beginning, not to mention to adopt NATO to conduct the mission 
immediately. The “pulling and hauling” among the Obamians was crucial as to 
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whether to participate in the Libyan mission. The main reason why the domestic 
consensus ultimately tilted in favour of the intervention hawks was because 
Washington valued the “Responsibility to Protect”.   
Although the US finally participated in the Libyan operation, it quickly 
transferred the mission to NATO and started “leading from behind”. There seemed to 
be a profound shift in the US attitude towards intervention, raising concerns about 
whether the “American way of war” had ended. Libya suggested a change in the 
transatlantic relationship, as the European allies took the lead in meeting security 
challenges close to Europe whilst the US played a limited, supporting role for the first 
time. But this change was not “real”, for NATO’s operation in Libya actually 
witnessed no prominent change in the unequal division between American and 
European military outputs.3  It suggested that the “Libyan Model” was not a real 
innovation to cure NATO’s problems; instead, it further revealed the long-lasting 
tension between the US and its allies over burden-sharing responsibility. The inherent 
problems of the Alliance were repeated in the post-Cold War period, firstly in Kosovo 
then in Afghanistan, now peaking at Libya. This again affirmed that the future of 
NATO would be promising only when European members changed to share more 
burdens coming from “’hard’ combat missions”.4        
 
Theories  
 
Alliance Theory  
According to neorealist theory on alliances, “states facing an external threat will align 
with others to oppose the states posing the threat”.5 That was exactly what happened 
during the Cold War period when NATO was built up to balance the USSR. Similarly, 
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when the Soviet threat subsided, NATO was expected to disappear, as traditional 
Alliance Theory believed if alignment were formed because of a threat, it would falter 
in the absence of a threat. However, NATO is not a “traditional” alliance, though in 
terms of original design, it is not different from other alliances that are formed in the 
face of a common enemy. Specifically, NATO also enjoys some unique features that 
no other alliance can display: its member states share common values in addition to 
common interests. With a belief in the natural affinity of democracies, members of 
NATO view each other as inherently good states that have no intention to pose a 
threat to one another. This enables NATO members to develop a high level of both 
organisational and institutional cooperation, which in the end help characterise NATO 
as a symbol of credibility. According to Walt, once the alliance became a symbol of 
credibility, it was more likely to persist.6  
To clarify further, those who predicted an end to NATO after the end of the 
Cold War took too narrow a perspective of the Alliance’s function. NATO started 
transforming as soon as the security environment changed, which quickly increased 
its relevance to the post-Cold War world. With the constant evolvement of “New 
Strategic Concepts”, the Alliance was no longer a pure regional defensive 
organisation, instead, it became a diplomatic and political alliance that was capable of 
dealing with issues “out-of-area”. In addition, as the fundamental idea of 
institutionalism implied, once a regime was set up, there were both internal and 
external incentives to perpetuate it rather than start anew when problems arise. 7 
NATO members have already spent a long time learning how to “work as one”, thus 
there was no reason for them to abandon the existing structures and to form an 
alternative alliance, not to mention that creating a new regime was more costly than 
maintaining the old one. In short, NATO will persist as long as its members continue 
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to regard the Alliance as a symbol of credibility and wish to transform NATO as 
necessary to deal with new problems.  
Although NATO’s superiority can explain why NATO persisted in the post-
Cold War period, it is not enough to convince the US to remain committed to the 
transatlantic alliance, for US foreign policy-making on a specific issue is influenced 
by both the overall trend in US foreign policy and the “pulling and hauling” among 
players positioned hierarchically within the government. Thus to understand US 
policy on NATO, these two levels of analysis should be paid particular attention to. 
 
Overall US foreign policy on NATO: the realist perspective  
On the macro level, the US foreign policy has long been influenced by interactions 
between realism and liberal internationalism. Before the turn of the 20th century, the 
US adopted “non-entanglement” as the guidance for its foreign policy, which 
prevented Washington from participating in any international organisation. The US 
first commitment to NATO in 1949 was regarded as a watershed in US foreign policy, 
as it not only marked the end of the US anti-entangling alliance tradition, but also 
demonstrated that the US was prepared to get into warfare to favour allies. Although 
non-entangling tradition was abandoned completely in the post-Cold War period, US 
foreign policy was not free from the influence of realism. Hence, this section focuses 
on how to interpret US foreign policy in the post-Cold War era from the realist 
perspective.  
Firs of all, the most obvious reason why NATO persisted after the end of the 
Cold War was because of the need to contain Russia. Although NATO had the PfP 
programme with Russia, which seemed to lay a solid foundation for Russia to join the 
Alliance, in fact the PfP would never bring Russia into NATO. The likelihood of 
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granting membership to Russia was always remote, regardless of how often NATO 
leaders had indicated their wish to see Russia becoming a full member of the Alliance 
in the future. It was simply because that “Russia’s membership would constitute a 
significant counterweight to American influence and dilute the alliance’s cohesion, 
complicating decision-making procedures”. 8  Moreover, although Washington had 
established a strategic partnership with Moscow, it understood that the difficulty in 
using that strategic interest-based partnership as a policy tool for achieving the policy 
objectives set out by the US administration was insurmountable, given the fact that 
“all partnerships entail prior acceptance of the different positions and are dependent 
on both sides having something to gain”.9 What is worse, the recent Ukrainian crisis 
affirmed that “there can be no return to a “strategic partnership” between NATO and 
Russia so long as Russia’s actions threaten European security”.10 In other words, the 
US, the leader of the transatlantic alliance, would probably never regard Russia as a 
partner in the same way as the other NATO allies.  
For example, in the case of Kosovo, Russia was very skeptical about the 
intervention and more than once warned the West that it would veto the proposal if it 
was raised at the UN Security Council. Russia also continued to press the US and 
NATO even after NATO actually engaged in Kosovo. What the US and its allies 
learned from Kosovo was that their expectation of seeing Russia becoming a part of 
the new order was ridiculous. Russian leaders were clearly not those who would 
easily alter their behaviours or objectives according to what the others asked for. The 
same story was repeated many times in the 21st century, including Russia’s objection 
against the invitation of Georgia and Ukraine to join NATO, and its suspicion of 
almost all NATO operations. Russia regarded US policy in the Middle East as 
reckless and irresponsible and believed that it should not be involved in the US-led 
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“War on Terror”. In the case of Libya, although Russia did not prevent the UN 
Security Council resolutions, it initially opposed the intervention and subsequently 
criticised the “disproportionate use of force”. 11  In addition, while Washington 
favoured sanctions and resolutions calling Assad to quit, Moscow refused to support 
such moves. The “preventive” strikes against Serbia, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya 
reinforced in the minds of many Russians the image of Washington that the US 
became predatory and aggressive. In other words, “America is seen as Russia’s enemy 
because it tries to dominate globally”.12 Hence, even nowadays, Russia continues to 
spend resources monitoring the Americans, British and others as if the Cold War 
never ended, and as if “personal or political enemies were a threat to President 
Vladimir Putin and the oligarchy through which he rules still-imperial Russia”.13 With 
regard to all these unsatisfactory interactions between the West and Russia, it was 
necessary and even imperative for Washington to get prepared for a possible 
confrontation with Moscow, which might flare up at any time. In this sense, NATO 
was clearly the best ready-made tool to achieve that end. In conclusion, realism did 
not bring the transatlantic alliance any new purpose, making NATO still an anti-
Russia organisation in the post-Cold War period.        
 
Overall US foreign policy on NATO: the liberal internationalist perspective  
Similarly, it is also necessary to understand how to interpret US foreign policy in the 
post-Cold War era from the liberal internationalist perspective. NATO was built up in 
accordance with liberal internationalist claims, given that it was designed as a 
multilateral platform for the US and its allies to discuss issues relevant to their safety, 
and a toolbox for them to pick up effective tools to achieve collective security. 
However, liberal internationalism was not the most appropriate way to explain the 
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formation of NATO, as the Alliance was originally established due to defensive 
purposes. With respect to this, NATO did lose its purpose in the post-Cold War era 
because it had successfully transformed from a pure regional defensive organisation 
into a diplomatic and political alliance that was capable of dealing with issues “out-
of-area”. For example, the 1991 “New Strategic Concept” enabled NATO to get 
involved in any conflicting place where instabilities arose; the 2002 new Military 
Concept for Defence against Terrorism helped NATO adapt to the new security 
environment by linking the role of NATO to counterterrorism activities; the 2010 
Strategic Concept further advanced NATO to be a more relevant and capable 
organisation to fulfil more broader tasks including collective defence, crisis 
management and cooperative security. All these contributed to NATO’s “increasing 
robustness, adaptability and vitality” in the face of “repeated missions”.14 
No matter whether NATO’s continuation was more based on realist or liberal 
internationalist purposes, the US commitment to NATO was nonetheless influenced 
by liberal internationalist considerations. President Clinton, who was characterised as 
“Wilsonian”, generally preferred the liberal internationalist approach. Hence, even 
though he noticed that many Americans were asking the administration to scale down 
US international commitments immediately after the end of the Cold War, he chose to 
sponsor a major programme of NATO renewal and enlargement, for he understood 
that the US should never live in the shadow of non-entanglement again. That was also 
why Clinton supported NATO’s “out-of area” operations in Bosnia and Kosovo 
where UN Security Council resolutions called for international cooperation to protect 
innocent civilians. President Bush also paid close attention to multilateral cooperation, 
though he had announced the bypassing of NATO after 9/11, which was once 
regarded as a renaissance of US unilateralism. With the objective of the Afghanistan 
Conclusion 
258 
 
mission changed from countering terrorism to reconstructing the country, Bush began 
to turn to the Alliance in 2003 when NATO assumed the command of the 
international security assistance force as he recognised the irreplaceable role of 
NATO in implementing post-war tasks.15 He also publically expressed his support for 
an expeditionary transatlantic alliance in 2001 and issued a policy of pursuing NATO 
membership for Ukraine and Georgia. President Obama’s preference for the liberal 
internationalist track was clearly demonstrated in his grand strategy. Specifically, 
Obama’s first term was marked by a reset policy that sought to demonstrate 
multilateralism, aiming to improve the image of Washington “damaged” by his 
predecessor. Moreover, in the case of Libya, Obama quickly declared the transition of 
the Libyan mission to NATO, making US behaviour in Libya hailed as a multilateral 
rather than a unilateral effort. Obama also made a strategic decision that Washington 
would play “a larger and long-term role” in shaping the Asia Pacific region and its 
future.16 This of course sent a signal that the US aimed at strengthening multilateral 
cooperation with other countries not only in Europe but also around the world. As a 
global power, the US relied on “a worldwide network of alliance arrangements”, and 
NATO was thus “one of the many moving parts of US global strategy”.17 Crucially, 
Washington felt the benefits of NATO: “Working with allies boosts legitimacy, 
spreads the burden of intervention and relieves the pressure of overstretch in the light 
of America’s multiple global commitments”.18  
If US foreign policy were merely guided by realism, the US would hardly 
remain committed to NATO. That was because, from the realist perspective, 
Washington was not really threatened and US interests were not always at stake in all 
those operations NATO conducted during the post-Cold War era. Similarly, if US 
foreign policy were merely influenced by liberal internationalism, the US would not 
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be willing to spend so many resources to support the continuation of a “two-tiered” 
alliance. The US could, instead, engage more closely in a more liberal, more 
multilateral organisation. The reality was always much more complicated than what it 
was ideally supposed to be. It was impossible to clarify which approach, the realist or 
the liberal internationalist one, played a greater role in US foreign policy-making 
process. But anyway, considering that the Russian threat was imminent especially 
when taking into account the recent Ukrainian crisis, and that “there is no better place 
to go (than NATO), when the US needs help in the world”, the US should and had 
better remain committed to NATO.    
 
The Bureaucratic Politics Model 
As is mentioned above, to understand US policy on a given issue, it is also essential to 
look at the internal bargaining game among players involved in this specific game. 
The “pulling and hauling” was vital to understand why the US pursues certain foreign 
policy, who might influence it, and how it is conceived. For example, on the issue of 
NATO enlargement during the Clinton years, officials in the White House, Congress 
and Pentagon had consulted heatedly about why, how and when NATO expanded, 
and which countries could gain membership of NATO in the first place. Without the 
support from key players such as Clinton, Anthony Lake, Madeleine Albright, Strobe 
Talbott, Richard Holbrooke and Jeremy Rosner, NATO expansion would not be 
realised in time. The bureaucratic wrangling also exerted great influence on US 
participation in operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya. For instance, it was 
Albright’s efforts to push for a US or NATO ultimatum at a meeting of top US 
foreign policy advisers that finally helped facilitate the peace talks at Rambouillet, 
which laid a solid foundation for Clinton to announce intervention in Kosovo. In the 
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case of Afghanistan, there was an internal debate arose over whether and how the US 
should exit from Afghanistan. Some congressmen including Representative Louise 
Slaughter, Lamar Alexander, Senator John Cornyn and Lindsey Graham openly 
worried about US “exit strategy”. Hence, without the Obama administration’s 
adequate consultation with the Congress, the result of which was to conduct a 
reassessment in December 2010 to reach a conclusion about the pace of withdrawing 
forces, Obama’s strategy on Afghanistan would not be implemented smoothly.  
Similarly, Libya also witnessed a heated debate among the Obamians over 
whether it was worth getting involved in a third Middle East war. President Obama 
was unprecedentedly pressured to issue a more delicate policy, one which could solve 
the dilemma of showing US willingness to participate in multilateral operations when 
Washington was overstretched both militarily and financially and when no direct, 
first-order US interests were at stake. It was the bureaucratic wrangling between two 
camps, one led by Robert Gates and Thomas Donilon and the other led by Hillary 
Clinton, Susan Rice and Samantha Power, that provided Obama with a better 
overview of possible resolutions to the Libyan crisis, otherwise, Obama would not be 
able to issue a just and reasonable policy so fast. 
In short, US commitment to NATO should be analysed by looking at US 
foreign policy-making on two levels. On the macro level, the overall US foreign 
policy was guided by interactions between realism and liberal internationalism; and 
on the micro level, US policy on a specific issue was more like an outcome of the 
bargaining game participated in by governmental officials.  
 
The explanation for the US commitment to NATO 
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Generally speaking, the US has been committed to NATO since the end of the Cold 
War. Although both internal and external debate or even criticism about US 
commitment to the Alliance has never stopped, it does not really alter US attitude 
towards NATO. Again, why did the US remain committed to NATO in the post-Cold 
War period? Firstly, the US recognises the unique value of NATO, which provides 
the US with legitimacy, capability and credibility to deal with crises around the world, 
enabling the US to exercise global leadership in every instance. Secondly, constantly 
influenced by the interaction between realism and liberal internationalism, the US 
overall foreign policy is in favour of NATO, which on one hand ensures US 
protection of its own interests as well as US active response to imminent threats, and 
on the other facilitates the spread of US-identified “common values” throughout the 
world. Thirdly, the outcome of bureaucratic wrangling among players involved in the 
specific game about US policy on NATO demonstrates internal preference for US 
utilisation of the Alliance, further reaffirming US commitment to NATO. It is worth 
noting that the explanations of US commitment to NATO match the theories that are 
applied to this research. But more importantly, one may wonder which explanation is 
the most convincing one.  
From the perspective of Alliance Theory, NATO is still relevant to the post-
Cold War world, as it has successfully transformed to adapt to the new security 
environment. NATO’s high degree of organisational and institutional developments 
set NATO off from traditional alliances, whereas it does not mean the Alliance’s 
record cannot be duplicated or even approached. Even though it would be of great 
cost to replace NATO by creating a new institution, the plan is at least theoretically 
feasible. In short, NATO’s unique features do not necessarily lead to US commitment 
to the Alliance. From the perspective of bureaucratic politics, the nature of the 
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governmental decision-making process suggests that every policy can be described as 
a result of bargaining among major players involved in this specific game. While 
internal government officials can always exert great influence on decision-making due 
to their relatively direct access to the core of the game, their impact is constrained in 
terms of various conceptions of national, organisational and personal goals. That is 
also why the outcome of the “pulling and hauling” is more often depicted as a 
“compromise” rather than a “consensus”. With respect to this, to what extent are those 
specific “compromise, coalition, competition and confusion” really crucial to the 
broader US foreign policy-making, which matters to the whole future of the country? 
The bureaucratic wrangling can only give an insight into concrete steps toward final 
decision-making, not an effective guideline for long-term policy choices. As US 
commitment to NATO is a long-term policy rather than a short-term expedient, it is 
hard to say that results of those bargaining games determine US attitude towards the 
Alliance. Bureaucratic politics can only explain decision-making on a given issue, not 
enough to explain the overall direction for US foreign policy. Thus, to understand the 
primary impetus behind US commitment to NATO in the post-Cold War era, it is best 
to resort to the interaction between realism and liberal internationalism, which 
provides the general guidance for US decision-making. In other words, it is the 
interaction between these two major foreign policy guidance that provides a broad 
picture of possible directions for US foreign policy. In fact, even on the micro level, 
most of the time bureaucrats are actually divided according to their different 
preferences for either the realist or liberal internationalist approach. In other words, 
essentially those “compromises” are microcosms of how realism and liberal 
internationalism interact with each other. In this sense, the most influential factor to 
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US commitment to NATO in the post-Cold War period, which works both on the 
macro and micro levels, is the interaction between realism and liberal internationalism.  
 
Syria and Ukraine 
The overwhelming explanation for US intervention in crises such as Libya was based 
on humanitarian claims which were regarded as more important factors than realistic 
evaluation on self-interest. As Gareth Evans, co-chair of the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) echoed, “the Libyan case 
was, at least at the outset, a textbook case of the ‘R2P’ norm working exactly as it was 
supposed to”.19 In terms of humanitarian considerations, Syria would undoubtedly 
attract US attention in the same way as Libya. Yet so far the US has not decided to get 
involved militarily even though the Syrian death toll mounted day by day. The 
possibility of intervening in Syria in the future is also low. According to the Gallup 
poll conducted on September 6, 2013, 51 per cent of Americans opposed military 
action “to attempt to end the conflict” if “all economic and diplomatic efforts fail to 
end the civil war in Syria”. 20  One obvious reason why Washington hesitated to 
intervene was because it had limited tools available to effect the change in Syria, a 
country with very effective air force and air defences. Ideally, the operation might 
become possible if Washington could generate military support from its allies. 
However, the lesson of the previous cooperation including the just-concluded Libyan 
mission suggested the US should carefully consider the adoption of NATO, for the 
task literarily assigned to all members would mainly fall on the shoulders of the US in 
reality.     
After the August 2013 chemical attack on Gouta, a US-led military 
intervention seemed to be in the offing. However, “no sooner had US President 
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Barack Obama declared his intention to respond to the chemical attack with the use of 
force than a powerful constituency within and beyond the West mobilised against the 
imminent war”.21 More ironically, the US and European countries were relieved when 
Russia put forward a plan to place Syria’s chemical weapons under international 
supervision. Yet the destruction of chemical weapons would be only marginally 
consequential to the resolution of the crisis. The Geneva negotiations in January-
February 2014, which aimed to call for unfettered humanitarian access, also ended in 
failure due to the objection by the Syrian regime and Russia. Although Russia was to 
blame for “failing to take a single step towards implementing the Geneva agreement”, 
it was not the main block to progress in Syria.22 More importantly, the US and its 
allies are unwilling to issue coercive measures in the same way as they did in Libya, 
given that “the Assad regime, backed by Russia and Iran, is incommensurably more 
resilient than its Libyan counterpart”.23  
If Syria were a case where costs outweighed benefits, which led to US 
“indifference” to the crisis, Ukraine would conversely attract sufficient US attention 
in the first place regarding the fact that it was a mission of greater strategic 
importance and benefits. However, despite imposing sanctions on Russian firms and 
individuals close to President Vladimir Putin and suspending military cooperation 
with Russia, the US did very little to solve the crisis. With the Russian troops moving 
forward, the Ukraine crisis has “created the most significant crisis in US-Russia 
relations since the end of the Cold War”.24 If Syrian use of chemical weapons did not 
cross a “red line” to urge the US to strike the Assad regime, this time Russia’s 
unprovoked action in Ukraine is very likely to anger President Obama to seek military 
means. The Ukrainian crisis makes for fretful times in the Baltic states which joined 
NATO in 2004. Now these two ex-Soviet republics worry about being the next target 
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of Putin’s irredentism. Considering that today’s Baltics “are all small and have 
undergone a deep economic slump” and “depend entirely on NATO for air defence”, 
the US as the leader of NATO, is expected to do something to stop Russia’s 
aggressive action. 25  In other words, Ukraine provides the US with a chance to 
reconsider how far it is willing to tolerate the Russian president who sees the 
establishment of a Eurasian Union as his ultimate goal. Hence the domestic appeal to 
Obama becomes serious as many feel it is time to stop Putin pursuing a foreign policy 
strongly at odds with Western interests firstly in Syria and now in Ukraine.      
However, according to George Friedman, the US does not have interests in 
Ukraine that justify a war, and neither Washington nor Moscow is in a position 
militarily to fight a war.26 Whether Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its military 
deployments in Ukraine go beyond the US “bottom line” and may eventually cause 
US direct military response remains ambiguous, yet the transatlantic alliance has an 
important role to play.27 Apparently, the Ukraine crisis helps revive NATO’s central 
role as a counterweight to Moscow and “persuade NATO to move forces closer to the 
frontier”.28 The Alliance was designed, as the old phrase went, “to keep the Russians 
out, the Americans in, and the Germans down”.29 The irony is that nowadays these 
elements remained more or less the same. NATO remained a vehicle to keep the US 
anchored to Europe in the face of uncertainty; to constrain and condition the pace and 
trajectory of a unified Germany’s (re)emergence as Europe’s dominant state; and 
more urgently to manage Russian revanchism. Putin is now acting more like a Cold 
War antagonist, arguing that “Russia has the right to defend Russians everywhere”.30 
Putin has offered a new mission: “to restore the country’s greatness, which he says 
was surrendered by weak leaders who were tricked by the West”. Thereby Putin 
regards Ukraine as an opportunity to “change status”.31 Whether Russia can seize this 
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opportunity to keep Ukraine out of NATO and guarantee long-term Russian influence 
in the east of the country is unclear, nonetheless, Russia’s aggression undoubtedly 
offers an opportunity to enhance the cohesion of the transatlantic alliance.  
After all these years of debate over the relevance of NATO to the post-Cold 
War world, NATO at least has a purpose today: to contain Russia. A poll taken in 
March 2014 showed that 50 per cent of Americans believed that the US and Russia 
were heading back toward a Cold War.32 In this sense, it seems that the Alliance has 
circled back to where it started. With regard to NATO’s “new” purpose, the Ukraine 
crisis helps bring the US and European members together again. Over the past two 
decades, most of the European countries have been less interested in the former Soviet 
states than the US which “maintained a more pro-active and explicitly political stance 
on the region”.33 Yet as the crisis in Ukraine has unfolded, the Europeans realise it is 
now imperative to clarify their strategic position on the region and strengthen their 
coordination with the US on ways forward. At a recent security conference in Tallinn, 
General Riho Terras, the Estonia defence chief, expressed his willingness and 
determination to see Europeans sending ground troops to the Baltic: “We need to see 
the German flag here. Some Leopard tanks would do very nicely.”34 On the US side, 
as President Obama emphasised, the US also understands the merit of transatlantic 
cooperation, thereby will uphold its commitment to NATO.35 Ukraine gives the US an 
opportunity to reflect on its more recent retreat towards a policy of putting its weight 
behind the Europeans’ efforts, increasing the possibility of more intimate transatlantic 
cooperation.  
In short, although the Ukraine crisis shows the limitations of NATO that so far 
has not seriously looked at military options when its candidate is clearly threatened, it 
“is a complete reminder of why NATO is useful”.36 In other words, “NATO thus 
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seems to be living by the promise of its guarantee of mutual defence”.37 As NATO 
Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated at the 2014 GLOBSEC forum, “no 
one should doubt NATO’s resolve” and the Alliance should stand up “for a Europe 
that is truly whole, free and at peace” firmly grounded in the European Union and 
firmly connected with North American Allies through NATO.38 It is possible that the 
Ukraine crisis will help forge a new transatlantic reset, given that NATO members 
and partners are spontaneously motivated to send Putin a signal that there will be a 
great price to pay for his aggressive actions in the region. For example, the US, the 
UK, Germany, France, Canada, Italy, Japan as well as the President of the European 
Council and President of the European Commission have suspended their 
participation in the preparatory meetings for the G8 summit scheduled to take place in 
Sochi during the summer.39 Moreover, Russia may possibly be turned down from 
joining the OECD and the International Energy Agency. Putin’s aggression, instead of 
embarrassing the US and the international community, is likely to be more damaging 
to himself. Obviously, the Ukraine crisis helps “reunite” the US and its allies who 
have been frustrated with the frictions between each other for a long time. It seems 
that the NATO members are experiencing an existential threat like they did during the 
Cold War, which certainly helps divert their attention from whether they should 
cooperate to how best they can cooperate. Now, by giving NATO the old but new 
purpose of attacking a common enemy, Ukraine is likely to inject new life into the 
transatlantic alliance. The fast-evolving crisis in Ukraine may certainly become a 
point of no return, but whether a well-improved NATO will emerge remains to be 
seen, regarding that the inherent problem of burden-sharing is still a thorn in the 
Alliance. 
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The future of NATO 
 
Contemporary debate and “Smart Defence” 
Clearly, NATO is still useful to the US after the Cold War ended. It could serve as a 
hedge against Russian aggression, and it could help anchor the US in Europe and 
provide an entry point into Eurasia. In the US these arguments played in various ways 
allowing those who wanted NATO to continue, to fight off isolationist tendencies in 
Washington and make the continuing case for NATO. Additionally, because NATO 
has also effectively transformed and successfully participated in “out-of-area” 
operations, the US felt happy and confident to utilise this experienced organisation 
when needed. Connecting to these debates were those about the different trajectories 
of the US and Europe: the former increasingly called upon a global role after 1991 in 
what people then spoke about as a pax Americana, and then the global War on Terror; 
while Europe looked increasingly inwards in its creation of a zone of peace and 
stability in Europe while the world outside Europe was left to the US.40 Further these 
debates connected to those of burden-sharing and Europe’s de facto defence reliance 
of the US and thus the US-European relationship were centred around very real 
difference in defence capability. And this became the core issue of the transatlantic 
alliance which remains to date largely unaddressed. 
The Libyan mission not only underlined the unforeseeable nature of conflicts, 
but also demonstrated the need for less reliance on the US for costly advanced 
capabilities. Although Washington was still the largest contributor to the operation, its 
strategy of “leading from behind” in Libya at least sent a message to its allies that 
“rebalancing defence spending between the European nations and the US is more than 
ever a necessity”.41 European members of NATO have long been required to reduce 
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the gap with the US by equipping themselves with more capabilities, yet not until 
Libya did they realise the seriousness of the problem which might terminate the 
continuation of the transatlantic alliance: they were more or less surprised by the US 
first-ever apparent retreat. In fact, to maintain NATO requires the European states to 
“share the United States’ conception of a stable, sustainable international order, and 
be willing to devote resources to maintaining that order, even in situations in which 
their own immediate territorial security is not at risk”.42 Therefore, to ensure there 
would be equitable sharing of the defence burden, NATO introduced “Smart Defence” 
at the 2012 Chicago Summit, which advocated “pooling and sharing resources, setting 
better priorities and encouraging countries to specialise in things they are best at”.43 
The “Smart Defence” aimed to renew the culture of cooperation by adopting “a new 
way of thinking about generating the modern defence capabilities the Alliance needs 
for the coming decade and beyond”.44 
The “Smart Defence” initiative was inspired by the remarks of Gates who 
believed that NATO faced “the real possibility (of) a dim, if not dismal future”.45 
Gates’ prediction was based on the fact that European members were chronically 
underfunded in their defence apparatuses, and that Washington had to cut down its 
contribution to NATO’s operating budget because of the economic pressure and the 
need for rebalancing military commitments to the Pacific. At that time, whether the 
US would reduce its defence budget by a wide margin was uncertain, but as the 
Libyan operation showed, it would probably “do what it must—playing roles and 
providing surge capabilities that only it can provide” while asking Europe to “bear the 
rest of the burden for operations that are more in its own interests than those of the 
United States”.46 With respect to this, Smart Defence was basically intended to make 
European countries more responsible for their security as the US withdrew from the 
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continent.47  Ideally, Smart Defene would help solve or at least ease the tensions 
between Washington and European capitals over burden-sharing, whereas, it has not 
brought visible change so far.48 European governments remained committed to deficit 
reduction, having their military spending slighted due to Europe’s financial crisis.  
Skepticism of Smart Defence abounded. Francois Heibourg, chariman of the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the Geneva Centre for Security 
Policy, said that governments all too often chose jobs in defence companies at home 
over military logic. In addition to this structural trouble facing NATO, the idea of 
Smart Defence was uncomfortably hung over by Germany’s noncooperation: “the 
voters of the biggest and richest country in European NATO—Germany—are 
resistant to the use of force in almost any context”.49  This raises the question of how 
seriously can the “Smart Defence” be taken. Will the “Smart Defence” make a real 
difference to the transatlantic cooperation, given the fact that the US was more eager 
to “pivot” toward the Asia-Pacific region after a decade of war in the Middle East?  
 
“Pivot to Asia” 
At the EU-US Summit in November 2011, the transatlantic partners discussed ideas 
of a joint pivot to Asia and agreed to increase their “dialogue on Asia-Pacific issues 
and coordinate activities”.50 This, together with the “Smart Defence”, ideally would 
have helped strengthen transatlantic relations and, especially NATO. Yet in terms of 
declining defence budgets, many European countries regarded Asia as a “region too 
far” and preferred to concentrate on their own backyard.51 Europe’s unwillingness to 
follow US steps pivoting to Asia did not affect US determination to increase its 
security focus on Asia. President Obama expressed his will of changing budget 
allocations, labelling himself as the “Pacific President” who would take a decisive 
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turn away from Europe. 52  It was clear that Washington was attempting to 
reconceptualise the role of the US as to whether it should be a Pacific rather than 
European power. 
The US “Pivot to Asia” strategy came at a time when the US was over-
committed internationally. Domestic arguments against US international military 
engagement continued after Afghanistan and Iraq. Libertarian Republicans who 
worried about the growing budget deficit, criticised costly military engagement. 
Traditional Democrats were concerned that too many international missions would 
drain resources for domestic social purposes. 53  In response to these “misguided 
impulses” that sought to scale down US international commitments in favour of 
domestic priorities, Hillary Clinton proposed a compelling answer: “We cannot afford 
not to.” 54  But her argument was based on the necessity of increasing American 
preoccupation with Pacific rather than European security. Therefore, even though it 
was certain that the US would not downsize its foreign engagement, it remained 
unclear whether the US would retain its commitment to the European security 
architecture. In terms of the fact that the US is overstretched around the world and 
frustrated with the economic crisis, and that European countries are still busy 
decreasing their defence budgets and nurturing skeptical public opinion on military 
participation in conflicts management, if the US has to retreat, it will of course retreat 
from Europe.         
Thus, according to Trine Flockhart, “a transatlantic relationship built on the 
assumption of identical interests is no longer relevant”.55 However, this does not mean 
that Europe is no longer important to the US. Washington and European capitals do 
share a perception of economic and security threats and “they share the perception of 
a need to safeguard their leading position as trading states in the international system, 
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and they continue to share liberal values and to work closely together in a densely 
institutionalised manner”.56 Furthermore, in terms of Obama’s recent foreign policy 
vision outlined on May 28, 2014, it seems that the US has refocused its attention on 
Europe: in addition to the remarkable claim that “America must always lead on the 
world stage”, Obama also emphasised the importance of mobilising allies and partners 
to take collective action, which sent a message to European countries in particular that 
the US would strengthen its cooperation with them in dealing with the Syrian and 
Ukrainian crises.57 Moreover, Obama pledged a billion-dollar military programme of 
reinforcements in Europe in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis, reaffirming US 
commitment to Eastern Europe and showing US determination to “review its force 
presence in Europe in the light of the new security challenges on the continent”.58 So 
far, the Air Force Aviation  Detachment (Av-Det) in Poland has got a continuous 
US presence, with ten US Air Force members stationed at Lask Air Base.59 This is 
certainly in conformity with the US promise to boost the military contingent in 
Europe, but the question remains as to how seriously can US commitment to Europe 
be taken, given that after all, Obama’s “European reassurance initiative” was not 
about stationing US or NATO troops permanently in Poland or the Baltic states.60 
Whether Washington is truly “refocusing” its attention on Europe is ambiguous, 
nonetheless US commitment to NATO is strengthened under current circumstances, 
regarding the need to show a strong response to Russia’s aggression.           
But it is not easy to assure a positive outcome for a reinvigorated transatlantic 
relationship that is based on the future rather than the past. As Mark Webber et al. 
point out, the challenge to NATO’s persistence nowadays is whether it can service its 
two motors: its principle of purpose and its principle of function.61 The Ukraine crisis 
has at least given NATO a purpose. But the good functioning of NATO has not been 
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guaranteed, given that as a consequence of the Alliance’s operations “NATO is 
becoming solely dependent on the US nuclear guarantee”. 62  Such a situation 
reinforces the burden-sharing argument that is again emerging. 63  Therefore, most 
importantly, the inherent NATO problems should be tackled as soon as possible. For 
the US commitment to the Alliance, what NATO operations discovered was 
constantly similar: the most likely factor that might terminate US commitment to the 
Alliance comes from the inherent problem of burden-sharing which has remained 
unresolved since the establishment of NATO. And the problem will possibly be 
repeated in Ukraine again if NATO ultimately get involved, given that NATO 
members have already been in disagreement: “Germany is more circumspect about 
sanctions against Russia, and wants NATO to keep to its 1997 agreement. France is at 
loggerheads with Poland (and America) over its plans to sell Russia two amphibious 
assault ships.”64 The Ukraine crisis has cast a light on many long-standing issues that 
need to be addressed if the Alliance is to be reinvigorated.65 Some people might argue 
that the NATO problems had existed even before the 1990s and no serious 
consequence had been caused thus far. Yet the situation today is unprecedentedly 
complicated, which will probably bring an earthshaking change to the transatlantic 
relationship if it is not taken seriously. According to a recent Chatham House report 
by the NATO Group Policy Experts, European governments bear particular 
responsibility for ensuring their own territorial security, as “no amount of “smarter” 
defence will compensate for a failure to reverse falling defence spending”.66 In short, 
with respect to the growing US preference for the “Pivot to Asia” strategy and the 
declining function of the “Smart Defence” resolution, it becomes certain that ‘unless 
something changes, NATO will end up just doing less with less’.67  
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Note: graphs constructed from information obtained from ‘Financial and Economic 
Data Relating to NATO Defence’, NATO, 24 February 2014.  
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2 Armed forces—annual strength 
 
 
Note: graph constructed from information obtained from ‘Financial and Economic 
Data Relating to NATO Defence’, NATO, 24 February 2014.  
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3 Defence expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product 
 
 
Note: graph constructed from information obtained from ‘Financial and Economic 
Data Relating to NATO Defence’, NATO, 24 February 2014.   
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